8,977 research outputs found
Cycles in adversarial regularized learning
Regularized learning is a fundamental technique in online optimization,
machine learning and many other fields of computer science. A natural question
that arises in these settings is how regularized learning algorithms behave
when faced against each other. We study a natural formulation of this problem
by coupling regularized learning dynamics in zero-sum games. We show that the
system's behavior is Poincar\'e recurrent, implying that almost every
trajectory revisits any (arbitrarily small) neighborhood of its starting point
infinitely often. This cycling behavior is robust to the agents' choice of
regularization mechanism (each agent could be using a different regularizer),
to positive-affine transformations of the agents' utilities, and it also
persists in the case of networked competition, i.e., for zero-sum polymatrix
games.Comment: 22 pages, 4 figure
Adversarial scheduling analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion.
In (Istrate et al. SODA 2001) we advocated the investigation of robustness of results in the theory of learning in games under adversarial scheduling models. We provide evidence that such an analysis is feasible and can lead to nontrivial results by investigating, in an adversarial scheduling setting, Peyton Young's model of diffusion of norms . In particular, our main result incorporates contagion into Peyton Young's model.evolutionary games, stochastic stability, adversarial scheduling
A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games
As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy
inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical
data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do
not respond linearly to mitigation attempts. A more apt model entails ordinary
people who neither commit nor sanction crime as the third strategy besides the
criminals and punishers. Since ordinary people free-ride on the sanctioning
efforts of punishers, they may introduce cyclic dominance that enables the
coexistence of all three competing strategies. In this setup ordinary
individuals become the biggest impediment to crime abatement. We therefore also
consider heterogeneous punisher strategies, which seek to reduce their
investment into fighting crime in order to attain a more competitive payoff. We
show that this diversity of punishment leads to an explosion of complexity in
the system, where the benefits and pitfalls of criminal behavior are revealed
in the most unexpected ways. Due to the raise and fall of different alliances
no less than six consecutive phase transitions occur in dependence on solely
the temptation to succumb to criminal behavior, leading the population from
ordinary people-dominated across punisher-dominated to crime-dominated phases,
yet always failing to abolish crime completely.Comment: 9 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific
Report
Machine Learning for Fluid Mechanics
The field of fluid mechanics is rapidly advancing, driven by unprecedented
volumes of data from field measurements, experiments and large-scale
simulations at multiple spatiotemporal scales. Machine learning offers a wealth
of techniques to extract information from data that could be translated into
knowledge about the underlying fluid mechanics. Moreover, machine learning
algorithms can augment domain knowledge and automate tasks related to flow
control and optimization. This article presents an overview of past history,
current developments, and emerging opportunities of machine learning for fluid
mechanics. It outlines fundamental machine learning methodologies and discusses
their uses for understanding, modeling, optimizing, and controlling fluid
flows. The strengths and limitations of these methods are addressed from the
perspective of scientific inquiry that considers data as an inherent part of
modeling, experimentation, and simulation. Machine learning provides a powerful
information processing framework that can enrich, and possibly even transform,
current lines of fluid mechanics research and industrial applications.Comment: To appear in the Annual Reviews of Fluid Mechanics, 202
Allocating Limited Resources to Protect a Massive Number of Targets using a Game Theoretic Model
Resource allocation is the process of optimizing the rare resources. In the
area of security, how to allocate limited resources to protect a massive number
of targets is especially challenging. This paper addresses this resource
allocation issue by constructing a game theoretic model. A defender and an
attacker are players and the interaction is formulated as a trade-off between
protecting targets and consuming resources. The action cost which is a
necessary role of consuming resource, is considered in the proposed model.
Additionally, a bounded rational behavior model (Quantal Response, QR), which
simulates a human attacker of the adversarial nature, is introduced to improve
the proposed model. To validate the proposed model, we compare the different
utility functions and resource allocation strategies. The comparison results
suggest that the proposed resource allocation strategy performs better than
others in the perspective of utility and resource effectiveness.Comment: 14 pages, 12 figures, 41 reference
Multiparty Dynamics and Failure Modes for Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence
An important challenge for safety in machine learning and artificial
intelligence systems is a~set of related failures involving specification
gaming, reward hacking, fragility to distributional shifts, and Goodhart's or
Campbell's law. This paper presents additional failure modes for interactions
within multi-agent systems that are closely related. These multi-agent failure
modes are more complex, more problematic, and less well understood than the
single-agent case, and are also already occurring, largely unnoticed. After
motivating the discussion with examples from poker-playing artificial
intelligence (AI), the paper explains why these failure modes are in some
senses unavoidable. Following this, the paper categorizes failure modes,
provides definitions, and cites examples for each of the modes: accidental
steering, coordination failures, adversarial misalignment, input spoofing and
filtering, and goal co-option or direct hacking. The paper then discusses how
extant literature on multi-agent AI fails to address these failure modes, and
identifies work which may be useful for the mitigation of these failure modes.Comment: 12 Pages, This version re-submitted to Big Data and Cognitive
Computing, Special Issue "Artificial Superintelligence: Coordination &
Strategy
- …