Ideas of the Good in Moral and Political Philosophy

Article to accompany the Routledge Lecture in Philosophy entitled "Value in Morality and Politics", given at the University of Cambridge, March 15, 2011

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology

Gladstone, Religious Freedom and Practical Reasoning

W.E. Gladstone’s changing and inconsistent views on religious oaths and established churches present an intriguing puzzle. This article compares and contrasts his early and later stances on these topics with the purpose of evaluating the place of practical judgments in his arguments. This exploration reveals that the prevailing description of Gladstone’s views, which privileges the role practicality played in his later support for a more liberal set of policies governing church–state relations, does not explain the changes and inconsistencies in his position as well as does a description that emphasizes the changes and continuities in his fundamental philosophy. In conclusion, connections are suggested between this explanation of Gladstone’s views and theoretical considerations regarding the development of liberal freedoms

Restorative Justice-Informed Moral Acquaintance: Resolving the Dual Role Problem in Correctional and Forensic Practice

The issue of dual roles within forensic and correctional fields has typically been conceptualized as dissonance—experienced by practitioners— when attempting to adhere to the conflicting ethical requirements associated with client well-being and community protection. In this paper, we argue that the dual role problem should be conceptualized more broadly; to incorporate the relationship between the offender and their victim. We also propose that Restorative Justice (RJ) is able to provide a preliminary ethical framework to deal with this common ethical oversight. Furthermore, we unite the RJ framework with that of Ward’s (2013) moral acquaintance model to provide a more powerful approach—RJ informed moral acquaintance—aimed at addressing the ethical challenges faced by practitioners within forensic and correctional roles

Limited Epistocracy and Political Inclusion

In this paper I defend a form of epistocracy I call limited epistocracy— rule by institutions housing expertise in non-political areas that become politically relevant. This kind of limited epistocracy, I argue, isn’t a far-off fiction. With increasing frequency, governments are outsourcing political power to expert institutions to solve urgent, multidimensional problems because they outperform ordinary democratic decision-making. I consider the objection that limited epistocracy, while more effective than its competitors, lacks a fundamental intrinsic value that its competitors have; namely, political inclusion. After explaining this challenge, I suggest that limited epistocracies can be made compatible with robust political inclusion if specialized institutions are confined to issuing directives that give citizens multiple actionable options. I explain how this safeguards citizens’ inclusion through rational deliberation, choice, and contestation

Contractualism and the Second-Person Moral Standpoint

This article explores Darwall’s second-­‐personal account of morality, which draws on Fichte’s practical philosophy, particularly Fichte’s notions of a summons and principle of right. Darwall maintains that Fichte offers a philosophically more appealing account of relations of right than Kant. Likewise, he thinks that his second-­‐personal interpretation of morality gives rise to contractualism. I reject Darwall’s criticism of Kant’s conception of right. Moreover, I try to show that Darwall’s second-­‐personal conception of morality relies on a Kantian form of contractualism. Instead of accepting Darwall’s claim that contractualism depends upon a second-­‐personal account of morality, I will argue that contractualism provides the foundations not only for second-­‐personal moral relations, but also for first-­‐personal moral authority