Batch Testing, Adaptive Algorithms, and Heuristic Applications for Stable Marriage Problems

In this dissertation we focus on different variations of the stable matching (marriage) problem, initially posed by Gale and Shapley in 1962. In this problem, preference lists are used to match n men with n women in such a way that no (man, woman) pair exists that would both prefer each other over their current partners. These two would be considered a blocking pair, preventing a matching from being considered stable. In our research, we study three different versions of this problem. First, we consider batch testing of stable marriage solutions. Gusfield and Irving presented an open problem in their 1989 book The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms\u3c\italic\u3e on whether, given a reasonable amount of preprocessing time, stable matching solutions could be verified in less than O(n^2) time. We answer this question affirmatively, showing an algorithm that will verify k different matchings in O((m + kn) log^2 n) time. Second, we show how the concept of an adaptive algorithm can be used to speed up running time in certain cases of the stable marriage problem where the disorder present in preference lists is limited. While a problem with identical lists can be solved in a trivial O(n) running time, we present an O(n+k) time algorithm where the women have identical preference lists, and the men have preference lists that differ in k positions from a set of identical lists. We also show a visualization program for better understanding the effects of changes in preference lists. Finally, we look at preference list based matching as a heuristic for cost based matching problems. In theory, this method can lead to arbitrarily bad solutions, but through empirical testing on different types of random sources of data, we show how to obtain reasonable results in practice using methods for generating preference lists “asymmetrically” that account for long-term ramifications of short-term decisions. We also discuss several ways to measure the stability of a solution and how this might be used for bicriteria optimization approaches based on both cost and stability

Editorial: special issue on matching under preferences

This special issue of Algorithms is devoted to the study of matching problems involving ordinal preferences from the standpoint of algorithms and complexit

Approximately Stable, School Optimal, and Student-Truthful Many-to-One Matchings (via Differential Privacy)

We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this endeavor is differential privacy: we give an algorithm that coordinates a stable matching using differentially private signals, which lead to our truthfulness guarantee. This is the first setting in which it is known how to achieve nontrivial truthfulness guarantees for students when computing school optimal matchings, assuming worst- case preferences (for schools and students) in large markets

Backward Unraveling over Time: The Evolution of Strategic Behavior in the Entry-Level British Medical Labor Markets

This paper studies an adaptive artificial agent model using a genetic algorithm to analyze how a population of decision-makers learns to coordinate on the selection of an equilibrium or a social convention in a two-sided matching game. In the contexts of centralized and decentralized entry-level labor markets, evolution and adjustment paths of unraveling are explored using this model in an environment inspired by the Kagel and Roth (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000) experimental study. As an interesting result, it is demonstrated that stability need not be required for the success of a matching mechanism under incomplete information in the long run.Genetic algorithms, linear programming matching, stability, two-sided matching, unraveling