Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas

The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform. Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Reports [related work available at arXiv:1412.4113

Maximizing Welfare in Social Networks under a Utility Driven Influence Diffusion Model

Motivated by applications such as viral marketing, the problem of influence maximization (IM) has been extensively studied in the literature. The goal is to select a small number of users to adopt an item such that it results in a large cascade of adoptions by others. Existing works have three key limitations. (1) They do not account for economic considerations of a user in buying/adopting items. (2) Most studies on multiple items focus on competition, with complementary items receiving limited attention. (3) For the network owner, maximizing social welfare is important to ensure customer loyalty, which is not addressed in prior work in the IM literature. In this paper, we address all three limitations and propose a novel model called UIC that combines utility-driven item adoption with influence propagation over networks. Focusing on the mutually complementary setting, we formulate the problem of social welfare maximization in this novel setting. We show that while the objective function is neither submodular nor supermodular, surprisingly a simple greedy allocation algorithm achieves a factor of $(1-1/e-\epsilon)$ of the optimum expected social welfare. We develop \textsf{bundleGRD}, a scalable version of this approximation algorithm, and demonstrate, with comprehensive experiments on real and synthetic datasets, that it significantly outperforms all baselines.Comment: 33 page

Theories for influencer identification in complex networks

In social and biological systems, the structural heterogeneity of interaction networks gives rise to the emergence of a small set of influential nodes, or influencers, in a series of dynamical processes. Although much smaller than the entire network, these influencers were observed to be able to shape the collective dynamics of large populations in different contexts. As such, the successful identification of influencers should have profound implications in various real-world spreading dynamics such as viral marketing, epidemic outbreaks and cascading failure. In this chapter, we first summarize the centrality-based approach in finding single influencers in complex networks, and then discuss the more complicated problem of locating multiple influencers from a collective point of view. Progress rooted in collective influence theory, belief-propagation and computer science will be presented. Finally, we present some applications of influencer identification in diverse real-world systems, including online social platforms, scientific publication, brain networks and socioeconomic systems.Comment: 24 pages, 6 figure

Network-based ranking in social systems: three challenges

Ranking algorithms are pervasive in our increasingly digitized societies, with important real-world applications including recommender systems, search engines, and influencer marketing practices. From a network science perspective, network-based ranking algorithms solve fundamental problems related to the identification of vital nodes for the stability and dynamics of a complex system. Despite the ubiquitous and successful applications of these algorithms, we argue that our understanding of their performance and their applications to real-world problems face three fundamental challenges: (i) Rankings might be biased by various factors; (2) their effectiveness might be limited to specific problems; and (3) agents' decisions driven by rankings might result in potentially vicious feedback mechanisms and unhealthy systemic consequences. Methods rooted in network science and agent-based modeling can help us to understand and overcome these challenges.Comment: Perspective article. 9 pages, 3 figure