192 research outputs found
You have been warned: Abusing 5G's Warning and Emergency Systems
The Public Warning System (PWS) is an essential part of cellular networks and
a country's civil protection. Warnings can notify users of hazardous events
(e.g., floods, earthquakes) and crucial national matters that require immediate
attention. PWS attacks disseminating fake warnings or concealing precarious
events can have a serious impact, causing fraud, panic, physical harm, or
unrest to users within an affected area. In this work, we conduct the first
comprehensive investigation of PWS security in 5G networks. We demonstrate five
practical attacks that may impact the security of 5G-based Commercial Mobile
Alert System (CMAS) as well as Earthquake and Tsunami Warning System (ETWS)
alerts. Additional to identifying the vulnerabilities, we investigate two PWS
spoofing and three PWS suppression attacks, with or without a man-in-the-middle
(MitM) attacker. We discover that MitM-based attacks have more severe impact
than their non-MitM counterparts. Our PWS barring attack is an effective
technique to eliminate legitimate warning messages. We perform a rigorous
analysis of the roaming aspect of the PWS, incl. its potentially secure
version, and report the implications of our attacks on other emergency features
(e.g., 911 SIP calls). We discuss possible countermeasures and note that
eradicating the attacks necessitates a scrupulous reevaluation of the PWS
design and a secure implementation
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A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research
We present a comprehensive survey of Voice over IP security academic research, using a set of 245 publications forming a closed cross-citation set. We classify these papers according to an extended version of the VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) Threat Taxonomy. Our goal is to provide a roadmap for researchers seeking to understand existing capabilities and to identify gaps in addressing the numerous threats and vulnerabilities present in VoIP systems. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to vulnerabilities reported in a variety of VoIP products. We identify two specific problem areas (denial of service, and service abuse) as requiring significant more attention from the research community. We also find that the overwhelming majority of the surveyed work takes a black box view of VoIP systems that avoids examining their internal structure and implementation. Such an approach may miss the mark in terms of addressing the main sources of vulnerabilities, i.e., implementation bugs and misconfigurations. Finally, we argue for further work on understanding cross-protocol and cross-mechanism vulnerabilities (emergent properties), which are the byproduct of a highly complex system-of-systems and an indication of the issues in future large-scale systems
VeTo: reference manual
The SIP protocol is established as the defacto standard for media session signaling, in particular for voice-over IP services. Many research works and alert bulletins have reported various vulnerabilities in this protocol. These vulnerabilities are either inherent to the protocol specification or arise as flaws within SIP stack implementations or erroneous configurations. To protect SIP-based networks from the exploitation of such vulnerabilities, patches may be released for the implementation bugs, the SIP specification may be revisited to cover the specification errors and configuration guidelines can be issued to offer good configuration receipts to administrators. The time to patching and revisiting specification may be considerable. To overcome this problem, a first-line of defense against SIP vulnerabilities has to be developed. In a previous work, we have presented a stateful firewall architecture dedicated to SIP-based networks protection. The firewall runtime uses a domain specific language, called VeTo. Its design, syntax and semantics are described in this work.Le protocole SIP est aujourd'hui le standard de fait pour la signalisation des sessions multimédia á l'échelle de l'Internet. Plusieurs travaux ainsi que des bulletins d'alertes ont reporté l'existence des différentes vulnérabilités au niveau de ses implantations, de ses spécifications, de ses implémentations et de ses paramétrages. La protection du protocole SIP de l'exploitation de ces vulnérabilités nécessite l'application des patches au niveau de ses implantations á bien que la révision des ses spécifications et la publication de recettes de bonnes pratiques pour sa configuration. Ces actions prennent un temps considérable avant d'être menées. Afin de résoudre ces problémes, une première ligne de défense nécessite d'être mise en place. Dans un précédent travail, nous avons proposé une architecture de défense reposant sur un pare-feu dédié au protocole SIP. Ce pare-feu s'appuie sur un langage, nommé VeTo dédié á la spécification de régles de prévention contre les vulnérabilités présentes dans le protocole SIP. Ce rapport détaille la syntaxe, la sémantique et son infrastructure support
A hybrid and cross-protocol architecture with semantics and syntax awareness to improve intrusion detection efficiency in Voice over IP environments
Includes abstract.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-140).Voice and data have been traditionally carried on different types of networks based on different technologies, namely, circuit switching and packet switching respectively. Convergence in networks enables carrying voice, video, and other data on the same packet-switched infrastructure, and provides various services related to these kinds of data in a unified way. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) stands out as the standard that benefits from convergence by carrying voice calls over the packet-switched infrastructure of the Internet. Although sharing the same physical infrastructure with data networks makes convergence attractive in terms of cost and management, it also makes VoIP environments inherit all the security weaknesses of Internet Protocol (IP). In addition, VoIP networks come with their own set of security concerns. Voice traffic on converged networks is packet-switched and vulnerable to interception with the same techniques used to sniff other traffic on a Local Area Network (LAN) or Wide Area Network (WAN). Denial of Service attacks (DoS) are among the most critical threats to VoIP due to the disruption of service and loss of revenue they cause. VoIP systems are supposed to provide the same level of security provided by traditional Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs), although more functionality and intelligence are distributed to the endpoints, and more protocols are involved to provide better service. A new design taking into consideration all the above factors with better techniques in Intrusion Detection are therefore needed. This thesis describes the design and implementation of a host-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that targets VoIP environments. Our intrusion detection system combines two types of modules for better detection capabilities, namely, a specification-based and a signaturebased module. Our specification-based module takes the specifications of VoIP applications and protocols as the detection baseline. Any deviation from the protocol’s proper behavior described by its specifications is considered anomaly. The Communicating Extended Finite State Machines model (CEFSMs) is used to trace the behavior of the protocols involved in VoIP, and to help exchange detection results among protocols in a stateful and cross-protocol manner. The signature-based module is built in part upon State Transition Analysis Techniques which are used to model and detect computer penetrations. Both detection modules allow for protocol-syntax and protocol-semantics awareness. Our intrusion detection uses the aforementioned techniques to cover the threats propagated via low-level protocols such as IP, ICMP, UDP, and TCP
A Look Back at "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite"
About fifteen years ago, I wrote a paper on security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite. In particular, I focused on protocol-level issues, rather than implementation flaws. It is instructive to look back at that paper, to see where my focus and my predictions were accurate, where I was wrong, and where dangers have yet to happen. This is a reprint of the original paper, with added commentary
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