44,866 research outputs found
READING HAN FEI AS SOCIAL SCIENTIST : A CASE-STUDY IN HISTORICAL CORRESPONDENCE
Han Fei was one of the main proponents of Legalism in Qin-era China. Although his works are mostly read from a historic perspective, the aim of this paper is to advance an interpretation of Han Fei as a social scientist. The social sciences are the fields of academic scholarship that study society and its institutions as a consequence of human behavior. Methodologically, social sciences combine abstract approaches in model-building with empiric investigations, seeking to prove the functioning of the models. In a third step, social sciences also aim at providing policy advice. Han Fei can be read as operating similarly. First, he builds a model of the nature of men, the state, and its interconnections, and then he uses history as empiric ground to prove his models. Again, after studying society as a raw fact, Han Fei develops models on how to deal with society. This article examines the social scientific inclinations of Han Fei by re-reading Chapter 49 of his book and applying an analysis in historical correspondence. This article serves as a case-study in this new type of analysis that can prove fruitful for the advancement of comparative philosophy
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The use of "no evidence" statements in public health
Public health communication makes extensive use of a linguistic formulation that will be called the "no evidence" statement. This is a written or spoken statement of the form "There is no evidence that P" where P stands for a proposition that typically describes a human health risk. Danger lurks in these expressions for the hearer or reader who is not logically perspicacious, as arguments that use them are only warranted under certain conditions. The extent to which members of the public are able to determine what those conditions are will be considered by examining data obtained from 879 subjects. The role of "no evidence" statements as cognitive heuristics in public health reasoning is considered
Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition
One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understood as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by according the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we have for them. Certain kinds of rational failings are so because they are manifestly illogical â for example, maintaining overtly contradictory commitments, violating deductive closure by refusing to accept the logical consequences of oneâs present commitments, or failing to track basing relations by not updating oneâs commitments in view of new, defeating information. Yet, according to the internal and empirical critiques, logic and probability theory fail to supply a fit set of norms for human reasoning and argument. Particularly, theories of bounded rationality have put pressure on argumentation theory to lower the normative standards of rationality for reasoners and arguers on the grounds that we are bounded, finite, and fallible agents incapable of meeting idealized standards. This paper explores the idea that argumentation, as a set of practices, together with the procedures and technologies of argumentation theory, is able to extend cognition such that we are better able to meet these idealized logical standards, thereby extending our responsibilities to adhere to idealized rational norms
Civil Procedure as a Critical Discussion
This Article develops a model for analyzing legal dispute resolution systems as systems for argumentation. Our model meshes two theories of argument conceived centuries apart: contemporary argumentation theory and classical stasis theory. In this Article, we apply the model to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a proof of concept. Specifically, the model analyzes how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure function as a staged argumentative critical discussion designed to permit judge and jury to rationally resolve litigantsâ differences in a reasonable manner. At a high level, this critical discussion has three phases: a confrontation, an (extended) opening, and a concluding phase. Those phases are the umbrella under which discrete argumentation phases occur at points we call stases. Whenever litigants seek a ruling or judgment, they reach a stasisâa stopping or standing point for arguing procedural points of disagreement. During these stases, the parties make arguments that fall into predictable âcommonplaceâ argument types. Taken together, these stock argument types form a taxonomy of arguments for all civil cases. Our claim that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure function as a system for argumentation is novel, as is our claim that civil cases breed a taxonomy of argument types. These claims also mark the beginning of a broader project. Starting here with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we embark on a journey that we expect to follow for several years (and which we hope other scholars will join), exploring our modelâs application across dispute resolution systems and using it to make normative claims about those systems. From a birds-eye view, this Article also represents a short modern trek in a much longer journey begun by advocates in city states in and near Greece nearly 2500 years ago
Getting our country back : the UK press on the eve of the EU referendum
This paper investigates a critical discourse analysis the author has conducted of UK mainstream newspaper coverage on the eve of the EU referendum. Immigration became a key issue in the closing days. The paper will explore the possibility that the discourse moved from persuasion to prejudice and xenophobia. The paper will also argue that in the age of populist post-truth politics, some of the newspapers also employed such emotive rhetoric, designed to influence and compel the audience to draw certain conclusions â to get their country back. In so doing, it is argued some of the UK media also pose a serious threat to democracy and journalism â rather than holding those in power to account and maintaining high journalistic standards. The notion that that some of the UK media played on public perceptions and a collective memory that has created, propagated and embedded many myths about the EU for decades, is explored. The possibility this swayed many â despite limited or a lack of substantiation, is explored, a discourse of ellipsis, if you will
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Scaring the public: fear appeal arguments in public health reasoning
The study of threat and fear appeal arguments has given rise to a sizeable literature. Even within a public health context, much is now known about how these arguments work to gain the public's compliance with health recommendations. Notwithstanding this level of interest in, and examination of, these arguments, there is one aspect of these arguments that still remains unexplored. That aspect concerns the heuristic function of these arguments within our thinking about public health problems. Specifically, it is argued that threat and fear appeal arguments serve as valuable shortcuts in our reasoning, particularly when that reasoning is subject to biases that are likely to diminish the effectiveness of public health messages. To this extent, they are rationally warranted argument forms rather than fallacies, as has been their dominant characterization in logic
Fanaticism and Sacred Values
What, if anything, is fanaticism? Philosophers including Locke, Hume, Shaftesbury, and Kant offered an account of fanaticism, analyzing it as (1) unwavering commitment to an ideal, together with (2) unwillingness to subject the ideal (or its premises) to rational critique and (3) the presumption of a non-rational sanction for the ideal. In the first part of the paper, I explain this account and argue that it does not succeed: among other things, it entails that a paradigmatically peaceful and tolerant individual can be a fanatic. The following sections argue that the fanatic is distinguished by four features: (4) the adoption of sacred values; (5) the need to treat these values as unconditional in order to preserve a particular form of psychic unity; (6) the sense that the status of these values is threatened by lack of widespread acceptance; and (7) the identification with a group, where the group is defined by shared commitment to the sacred values. If the account succeeds, it not only reveals the nature of fanaticism, but also uncovers a distinctive form of ethical critique: we can critique a way of understanding values not on the grounds that it is false, but on the grounds that it promotes a particular form of social pathology
Towards a Benchmark of Natural Language Arguments
The connections among natural language processing and argumentation theory
are becoming stronger in the latest years, with a growing amount of works going
in this direction, in different scenarios and applying heterogeneous
techniques. In this paper, we present two datasets we built to cope with the
combination of the Textual Entailment framework and bipolar abstract
argumentation. In our approach, such datasets are used to automatically
identify through a Textual Entailment system the relations among the arguments
(i.e., attack, support), and then the resulting bipolar argumentation graphs
are analyzed to compute the accepted arguments
Between Contingency and Necessity of Human Action. Are We Free in our Choices?
The point of departure of this paper is the characterization of human action as contingent or necessary (obligatory). The key question concerns the place for choice in the human action, i.e. are we free in our choices? Thus, the aim of this paper is to search for the answer to the question concerning human freedom and free will. In searching for the answer to this controversial question, consideration is focused on the cognitive structure of human beings. The research refers to Roman Ingardenâs conception of the human being as a relatively isolated system of a higher order, contained in a compound hierarchical structure. In this way, the argumentation for the place of free will is supported by the structure of the human being, and joins both the ontological and the epistemic aspects. In consequence, methodologically they are treated as a primary to inquiries into the theory of action on one side, and into the biological approach of cognitive science on the other
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