5 research outputs found

    Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games

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    We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is "common understanding" among the players that they are all rational.Belief revision, common belief, counterfactual, dynamic game, model of a game, rationality

    AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to . . .

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    In [6] a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for extensive-form games was introduced and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Besides sequential rationality, the ingredients of the proposed notion are (1) the existence of a plausibility order on the set of histories that rationalizes the given assessment and (2) the notion of Bayesian consistency relative to the plausibility order. We show that a cardinal property of the plausibility order and a strengthening of the notion of Bayesian consistency provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a PBE to be a sequential equilibrium

    Game Theory

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    This is a two-volume set that provides an introduction to non-cooperative Game Theory. Volume 1 covers the basic concepts, while Volume 2 is devoted to advanced topics. The book is richly illustrated with approximately 400 figures. It is suitable for both self-study and as the basis for an undergraduate course in game theory as well as a first-year graduate-level class. It is written to be accessible to anybody with high-school level knowledge of mathematics. At the end of each chapter there is a collection of exercises accompanied by detailed answers. The book contains approximately 180 exercises

    Game Theory (Open Access textbook with 165 solved exercises)

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    This is an Open Access textbook on non-cooperative Game Theory with 165 solved exercises.Comment: 578 pages, 163 figure

    AGM belief revision in dynamic games

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    Within the context of extensive-form (or dynamic) games, we use choice frames to represent the initial beliefs of a player as well as her disposition to change those beliefs when she learns that an information set of hers has been reached. As shown in [5], in order for the revision operation to be consistent with the AGM postulates [1], the playerā€™s choice frame must be rationalizable in terms of a total pre-order on the set of histories. We consider four properties of choice frames and show that, together with the hypothesis of a common prior, are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a plausibility order that rationalizes the epistemic state (that is, initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs) of all the players. The plausibility order satisfies the properties introduced in [6] as part of a new definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for dynamic games. Thus the present paper provides epistemic foundations for that solution concept
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