61,119 research outputs found
A value for bi-cooperative games
Bi-cooperative games were introduced by Bilbao et al. as a generalization of TU cooperative games, in which each player can participate positively, negatively, or not at all. In this paper, we propose a definition of a share of the worth obtained by some players after they decided on their participation in the game. It turns out that the cost allocation rule does not look for a given player to her contribution at the opposite participation option to the one she chooses. The relevance of the value is discussed on several examples.Bi-cooperative games ;Value ;Efficiency
A value for bi-cooperative games
International audienceBi-cooperative games were introduced by Bilbao et al. as a generalization of TU cooperative games, in which each player can participate positively, negatively, or not at all. In this paper, we propose a definition of a share of the worth obtained by some players after they decided on their participation in the game. It turns out that the cost allocation rule does not look for a given player to her contribution at the opposite participation option to the one she chooses. The relevance of the value is discussed on several examples
Axiomatisation of the Shapley value and power index for bi-cooperative games
URL des Cahiers : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/CAHIERS-MSECahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques 2006.23 - ISSN 1624-0340Bi-cooperative games have been introduced by Bilbao as a generalization of classical cooperative games, where each player can participate positively to the game (defender), negatively (defeater), or do not participate (abstentionist). In a voting situation (simple games), they coincide with ternary voting game of Felsenthal and Mochover, where each voter can vote in favor, against or abstain. In this paper, we propose a definition of value or solution concept for bi-cooperative games, close to the Shapley value, and we give an interpretation of this value in the framework of (ternary) simple games, in the spirit of Shapley-Shubik, using the notion of swing. Lastly, we compare our definition with the one of Felsenthal and Machover, based on the notion of ternary roll-call, and the Shapley value of multi-choice games proposed by Hsiao and Ragahavan.Les jeux bi-coopératifs ont été introduits par Bilbao comme une généralisation des jeux coopératifs classiques. Dans ces jeux, chaque joueur peut participer positivement au jeu (pour l'objectif), ou négativement (contre l'objectif), ou ne pas participer du tout. Dans une situation de vote, ces jeux coïncident avec les jeux de vote ternaires proposés par Felsenthal et Machover, dans lequels chaque votant peut voter en faveur, contre, ou s'abstenir. Dans ce papier, on propose une définition d'une valeur ou solution pour les jeux bi-coopératifs, dans l'esprit de la valeur de Shapley, et nous donnons une interprétation de cette valeur dans le cadre des jeux de vote ternaires, à la manière de Shapley-Shubik. Dans une dernière partie, nous comparons notre approche avec celle de Felsenthal et Machover, et celle de Hsiao et Raghavan qui ont proposé une valeur de Shapley pour les jeux multi-choix
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among
self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of
agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or
can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a
solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in
the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new
coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game
theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have
received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software
agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly
explicit.
In this paper we define a concise general representation for games in
characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, and show that it allows for
efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then show that
determining whether the core is nonempty is -complete both with
and without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes the problem
hard in both cases is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of
outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that if these are given,
the problem becomes tractable in both cases. However, we then demonstrate that
for a hybrid version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible only
within the grand coalition, the problem remains -complete even
when the collaborative possibilities are given
Equivalence and axiomatization of solutions for cooperative games with circular communication structure
We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focus is on communication structures where the set of players forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph. Single-valued solutions are considered which are the average of specific marginal vectors. A marginal vector is deduced from a permutation on the player set and assigns as payoff to a player his marginal contribution when he joins his predecessors in the permutation. We compare the collection of all marginal vectors that are deduced from the permutations in which every player is connected to his immediate predecessor with the one deduced from the permutations in which every player is connected to at least one of his predecessors. The average of the first collection yields the average tree solution and the average of the second one is the Shapley value for augmenting systems. Although the two collections of marginal vectors are different and the second collection contains the first one, it turns out that both solutions coincide on the class of circular graph games. Further, an axiomatization of the solution is given using efficiency, linearity, some restricted dummy property, and some kind of symmetry
Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game
Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in
successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know
each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component
that enables cooperation in such social dilemma situations is the reputation
system. Under the reputation system, a buyer can avoid transacting with a
seller with a bad reputation. A transaction in online marketplaces is better
modeled by the trust game than other social dilemma games, including the
donation game and the prisoner's dilemma. In addition, most individuals
participate mostly as buyers or sellers; each individual does not play the two
roles with equal probability. Although the reputation mechanism is known to be
able to remove the moral hazard in games with asymmetric roles, competition
between different strategies and population dynamics of such a game are not
sufficiently understood. On the other hand, existing models of reputation-based
cooperation, also known as indirect reciprocity, are based on the symmetric
donation game. We analyze the trust game with two fixed roles, where trustees
(i.e., sellers) but not investors (i.e., buyers) possess reputation scores. We
study the equilibria and the replicator dynamics of the game. We show that the
reputation mechanism enables cooperation between unacquainted buyers and
sellers under fairly generous conditions, even when such a cooperative
equilibrium coexists with an asocial equilibrium in which buyers do not buy and
sellers cheat. In addition, we show that not many buyers may care about the
seller's reputation under cooperative equilibrium. Buyers' trusting behavior
and sellers' reputation-driven cooperative behavior coevolve to alleviate the
social dilemma.Comment: 5 figure
Cooperative Control and Potential Games
We present a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We review the game-theoretic concepts of potential and weakly acyclic games, and demonstrate how several cooperative control problems, such as consensus and dynamic sensor coverage, can be formulated in these settings. Motivated by this connection, we build upon game-theoretic concepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control problems. In particular, we extend existing learning algorithms to accommodate restricted action sets caused by the limitations of agent capabilities and group based decision making. Furthermore, we also introduce a new class of games called sometimes weakly acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to an equilibrium
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