1,299 research outputs found
MixEth: Efficient, Trustless Coin Mixing Service for Ethereum
Coin mixing is a prevalent privacy-enhancing technology for cryptocurrency users. In this paper, we present MixEth, which is a trustless coin mixing service for Turing-complete blockchains. MixEth does not rely on a trusted setup and is more efficient than any proposed trustless coin tumbler. It requires only 3 on-chain transactions at most per user and 1 off-chain message. It achieves strong notions of anonymity and is able to resist denial-of-service attacks. Furthermore the underlying protocol can also be used to efficiently shuffle ballots, ciphertexts in a trustless and decentralized manner
Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity: Sybil-Resistant, Anonymous Authentication on Permissionless Blockchains and Incentive Compatible, Strictly Dominant Cryptocurrencies
Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity from trusted public certificates (e.g.,
national identity cards and/or ePassports; eSIM) is introduced here to
permissionless blockchains in order to remove the inefficiencies of
Sybil-resistant mechanisms such as Proof-of-Work (i.e., high energy and
environmental costs) and Proof-of-Stake (i.e., capital hoarding and lower
transaction volume). The proposed solution effectively limits the number of
mining nodes a single individual would be able to run while keeping membership
open to everyone, circumventing the impossibility of full decentralization and
the blockchain scalability trilemma when instantiated on a blockchain with a
consensus protocol based on the cryptographic random selection of nodes.
Resistance to collusion is also considered.
Solving one of the most pressing problems in blockchains, a zk-PoI
cryptocurrency is proved to have the following advantageous properties:
- an incentive-compatible protocol for the issuing of cryptocurrency rewards
based on a unique Nash equilibrium
- strict domination of mining over all other PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies, thus
the zk-PoI cryptocurrency becoming the preferred choice by miners is proved to
be a Nash equilibrium and the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies are condemned to pay the Price of Crypto-Anarchy,
redeemed by the optimal efficiency of zk-PoI as it implements the social
optimum
- the circulation of a zk-PoI cryptocurrency Pareto dominates other PoW/PoS
cryptocurrencies
- the network effects arising from the social networks inherent to national
identity cards and ePassports dominate PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies
- the lower costs of its infrastructure imply the existence of a unique
equilibrium where it dominates other forms of paymentComment: 2.1: Proof-of-Personhood Considered Harmful (and Illegal); 4.1.5:
Absence of Active Authentication; 4.2.6: Absence of Active Authentication;
4.2.7: Removing Single-Points of Failure; 4.3.2: Combining with
Non-Zero-Knowledge Authentication; 4.4: Circumventing the Impossibility of
Full Decentralizatio
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