Information (In)Efficiency in Prediction Markets

We analyze the extent to which simple markets can be used to aggregate dispersed information into efficient forecasts of unknown future events. From the examination of case studies in a variety of financial settings we enumerate and suggest solutions to various pitfalls of these simple markets. Despite the potential problems, we show that market-generated forecasts are typically fairly accurate in a variety of prediction contexts, and that they outperform most moderately sophisticated benchmarks. We also show how conditional contracts can be used to discover the markets belief about correlations between events, and how with further assumptions these correlations can be used to make decisions

Opposites attract: The case of Greek and Turkish financial markets

We investigate the presence of financial linkages between Turkey and Greece. In particular, we estimate bivariate vector error correction systems between the Greek and Turkish stock markets and then between the Greek Drachma and the Turkish Lira to test for long and short run causality and interdependence. The findings indicate that interdependence and a long-run causal relationship are indeed present. Given the apparent evidence for nominal linkages, we test a number of possible propagation mechanisms that could produce these linkages, such as real linkages, trade linkages, common balance of payments shocks, and contagion. Our findings suggest that the observed comovement of the two markets can be primarily attributed to the increased real integration of both countries, as well as the fact that they share a common set of trade and FDI partners. We also find evidence of contagion effects between the Drachma and Lira markets, but not between the stock markets. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings. --Cointegration,Contagion,Interdependence,Market Linkages

An Asian Option to the Valuation of Insurance Futures Contracts

While insurers have a variety of instruments readily available to hedge the risk of assets and interest rate sensitive liabilities, until recently reinsurance was the only mechanism for hedging underwriting risk. The insurance futures contracts introduced in December 1992 by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) offer insurers an alternative to reinsurance as a hedging device for under-writing risk. These instruments have the usual features of liquidity, anonymity, and low transaction costs that characterize futures contracts. Unlike reinsurance, hedging through futures has the advantage of reversibility since any position may be closed before the maturity of the futures contract if the overall exposure of the insurer has diminished. Reversing a reinsurance transaction exposes the insurer to relatively high transactions costs as well as additional charges to protect the reinsurer against adverse selection. Because futures contracts are based on losses incurred by a pool of a least 10 insurance companies selected by the Insurance Services Officer, the potential for adverse selection and the accompanying administrative costs are greatly diminished relative to a reinsurance contract. Unlike most futures contracts traded on the CBOT, insurance futures are based on an accumulation of insurance loss payments over a period of time rather than the price of a commodity or asset at the end of a period of time. The classical relationships between the spot price and the futures price do not hold. The fact that the futures price at maturity will reflect a sum of claim payments entails a structural similarity between this contract and an Asian option, for which the underlying asset is an average, i.e., a sum of spot prices (up to a multiplicative constant). Thus, it would be incorrect to price these instruments using standard futures pricing techniques. Geman and Yor (1992, 1993) investigate the exact solution of this problem. The authors apply the Geman-Yor approach to the valuation of the insurance catastrophe futures contracts offered by the CBOT. In their model, the state variable is assumed to be a geometric Brownian motion - the claims process. The payoff on the insurance futures contract is determined by the accumulation or integral of the state variable. The authors believe there is a significant systematic component to insurance losses, especially those involving catastrophes. Insurers should be able to reduce risk by trading futures contracts. In their view the primary reason for limited trading of insurance futures is the lack of information on the loss index. There is very little information to support parameter estimation or to assist traders in forming expectations. In the authors' view, the CBOT's current offerings are unlikely to be successful unless the information problem is solved.

A Double-Sided Multiunit Combinatorial Auction for Substitutes: Theory and Algorithms

Combinatorial exchanges have existed for a long time in securities markets. In these auctions buyers and sellers can place orders on combinations, or bundles of different securities. These orders are conjunctive: they are matched only if the full bundle is available. On business-to-business (B2B) exchanges, buyers have the choice to receive the same product with different attributes; for instance the same product can be produced by different sellers. A buyer indicates his preference by submitting a disjunctive order, where he specifies how much of the product he wants, and how much he values each attribute. Only the goods with the best attributes and prices will be matched. This article considers a doubled-sided multi-unit combinatorial auction for substitutes, that is, a uniform price auction where buyers and sellers place both types of orders, conjunctive and disjunctive. We prove the existence of a linear price which is both competitive and surplus-maximizing when goods are perfectly divisible, and nearly so otherwise. We describe an algorithm to clear the market, which is particularly efficient when the number of traders is large.Combinatorial auction, economic equilibrium

Financial Integration Without the Volatility

Integration to international capital markets is one of the key pillars of development. However, capital flows also bring volatility to emerging markets. Are there mechanisms to reap the benefits of capital flows without being hurt by their volatility? Are current practices, such as large reserves accumulation, public deleveraging, and export promotion strategies, efficient external insurance mechanisms? In this pa- per we start by documenting the external volatility faced by emerging markets as well as current self-insurance practices, especially among prudent economies. We then provide a simple model that illustrates the inefficient nature of these practices. We argue that with the help of the IFIs in developing the right contingent markets, similar protection could be obtained at lower cost by using financial hedging strategies. We also argue that, at least for now, local governments have an important role to play in the implementation of these external insurance mechanisms.

The Cost of Rational Agency

The rational agency assumption limits systems to domains of application that have never been observed. Moreover, representing agents as being rational in the sense of maximising utility subject to some well specified constraints renders software systems virtually unscalable. These properties of the rational agency assumption are shown to be unnecessary in representations or analogies of markets. The demonstration starts with an analysis of how the rational agency assumption limits the applicability and scalability of the IBM information filetering economy. An unrestricted specification of the information filtering economy is developed from an analysis of the properties of markets as systems and the implementation of a model based on intelligent agents. This extended information filtering economy modelis used to test the analytical results on the scope for agents to act as intermediaries between human users and information sources

Illiquidity and All Its Friends.

The recent crisis was characterized by massive illiquidity. This paper reviews what we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market freezes, fire sales, contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. It first explains why liquidity cannot easily be apprehended through a single statistics, and asks whether liquidity should be regulated given that a capital adequacy requirement is already in place. The paper then analyzes market breakdowns due to either adverse selection or shortages of financial muscle, and explains why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information acquisition. It then looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on systemic risk and its containment. Finally, the paper takes a macroeconomic perspective, discusses shortages of aggregate liquidity and analyses how market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to asset prices. It concludes with a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and recapitalizations, and analyses optimal combinations thereof; it stresses the need for macroprudential policies.