264 research outputs found
Stealthy Deception Attacks Against SCADA Systems
SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to
network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research focuses on network
anomaly detection based on meta--data (message sizes, timing, command
sequence), or on the state values of the physical process. In this work we
present a class of semantic network-based attacks against SCADA systems that
are undetectable by the above mentioned anomaly detection. After hijacking the
communication channels between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), our attacks cause the HMI to present a
fake view of the industrial process, deceiving the human operator into taking
manual actions. Our most advanced attack also manipulates the messages
generated by the operator's actions, reversing their semantic meaning while
causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with the attempted human
actions. The attacks are totaly stealthy because the message sizes and timing,
the command sequences, and the data values of the ICS's state all remain
legitimate.
We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the test lab of our
local electric company, against a real HMI and real PLCs, separated by a
commercial-grade firewall. We developed a real-time security assessment tool,
that can simultaneously manipulate the communication to multiple PLCs and cause
the HMI to display a coherent system--wide fake view. Our tool is configured
with message-manipulating rules written in an ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML)
we designed, which may be of independent interest. Our semantic attacks all
successfully fooled the operator and brought the system to states of blackout
and possible equipment damage
Machine Learning based Anomaly Detection for Cybersecurity Monitoring of Critical Infrastructures
openManaging critical infrastructures requires to increasingly rely on Information and Communi-
cation Technologies. The last past years showed an incredible increase in the sophistication
of attacks. For this reason, it is necessary to develop new algorithms for monitoring these
infrastructures. In this scenario, Machine Learning can represent a very useful ally. After a
brief introduction on the issue of cybersecurity in Industrial Control Systems and an overview
of the state of the art regarding Machine Learning based cybersecurity monitoring, the
present work proposes three approaches that target different layers of the control network
architecture. The first one focuses on covert channels based on the DNS protocol, which can
be used to establish a command and control channel, allowing attackers to send malicious
commands. The second one focuses on the field layer of electrical power systems, proposing
a physics-based anomaly detection algorithm for Distributed Energy Resources. The third
one proposed a first attempt to integrate physical and cyber security systems, in order to face
complex threats. All these three approaches are supported by promising results, which gives
hope to practical applications in the next future.openXXXIV CICLO - SCIENZE E TECNOLOGIE PER L'INGEGNERIA ELETTRONICA E DELLE TELECOMUNICAZIONI - Elettromagnetismo, elettronica, telecomunicazioniGaggero, GIOVANNI BATTIST
SoK: Security of Programmable Logic Controllers
Billions of people rely on essential utility and manufacturing
infrastructures such as water treatment plants, energy management, and food
production. Our dependence on reliable infrastructures makes them valuable
targets for cyberattacks. One of the prime targets for adversaries attacking
physical infrastructures are Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) because they
connect the cyber and physical worlds. In this study, we conduct the first
comprehensive systematization of knowledge that explores the security of PLCs:
We present an in-depth analysis of PLC attacks and defenses and discover trends
in the security of PLCs from the last 17 years of research. We introduce a
novel threat taxonomy for PLCs and Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Finally,
we identify and point out research gaps that, if left ignored, could lead to
new catastrophic attacks against critical infrastructures.Comment: 25 pages, 13 figures, Extended version February 2024, A shortened
version is to be published in the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium, for more
information, see https://efrenlopez.org
Time is of the Essence: Machine Learning-based Intrusion Detection in Industrial Time Series Data
The Industrial Internet of Things drastically increases connectivity of
devices in industrial applications. In addition to the benefits in efficiency,
scalability and ease of use, this creates novel attack surfaces. Historically,
industrial networks and protocols do not contain means of security, such as
authentication and encryption, that are made necessary by this development.
Thus, industrial IT-security is needed. In this work, emulated industrial
network data is transformed into a time series and analysed with three
different algorithms. The data contains labeled attacks, so the performance can
be evaluated. Matrix Profiles perform well with almost no parameterisation
needed. Seasonal Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average performs well in the
presence of noise, requiring parameterisation effort. Long Short Term
Memory-based neural networks perform mediocre while requiring a high training-
and parameterisation effort.Comment: Extended version of a publication in the 2018 IEEE International
Conference on Data Mining Workshops (ICDMW
Bibliographical review on cyber attacks from a control oriented perspective
This paper presents a bibliographical review of definitions, classifications and applications concerning cyber attacks in networked control systems (NCSs) and cyber-physical systems (CPSs). This review tackles the topic from a control-oriented perspective, which is complementary to information or communication ones. After motivating the importance of developing new methods for attack detection and secure control, this review presents security objectives, attack modeling, and a characterization of considered attacks and threats presenting the detection mechanisms and remedial actions. In order to show the properties of each attack, as well as to provide some deeper insight into possible defense mechanisms, examples available in the literature are discussed. Finally, open research issues and paths are presented.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
SATAn: Air-Gap Exfiltration Attack via Radio Signals From SATA Cables
This paper introduces a new type of attack on isolated, air-gapped
workstations. Although air-gap computers have no wireless connectivity, we show
that attackers can use the SATA cable as a wireless antenna to transfer radio
signals at the 6 GHz frequency band. The Serial ATA (SATA) is a bus interface
widely used in modern computers and connects the host bus to mass storage
devices such as hard disk drives, optical drives, and solid-state drives. The
prevalence of the SATA interface makes this attack highly available to
attackers in a wide range of computer systems and IT environments. We discuss
related work on this topic and provide technical background. We show the design
of the transmitter and receiver and present the implementation of these
components. We also demonstrate the attack on different computers and provide
the evaluation. The results show that attackers can use the SATA cable to
transfer a brief amount of sensitive information from highly secured, air-gap
computers wirelessly to a nearby receiver. Furthermore, we show that the attack
can operate from user mode, is effective even from inside a Virtual Machine
(VM), and can successfully work with other running workloads in the background.
Finally, we discuss defense and mitigation techniques for this new air-gap
attack
A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems
Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enables the
smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among
system components as well as with outside entities, such as optimized
automation via outsourced cloud analytics and increased building-grid
integrations. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with
increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed
environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in
many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse
consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and
unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the
state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical
solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and
systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact
assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber-secure resilient control
strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the
gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security
for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation
level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific
vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols are reviewed, followed by a
discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. The
impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal
delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense
approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber-secure resilient control
strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active
resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally
discussed.Comment: 38 pages, 7 figures, 6 tables, submitted to Annual Reviews in Contro
Wide-Area Situation Awareness based on a Secure Interconnection between Cyber-Physical Control Systems
Posteriormente, examinamos e identificamos los requisitos especiales que limitan el diseño y la operación de una arquitectura de interoperabilidad segura para los SSC (particularmente los SCCF) del smart grid. Nos enfocamos en modelar requisitos no funcionales que dan forma a esta infraestructura, siguiendo la metodología NFR para extraer requisitos esenciales, técnicas para la satisfacción de los requisitos y métricas para nuestro modelo arquitectural.
Estudiamos los servicios necesarios para la interoperabilidad segura de los SSC del SG revisando en profundidad los mecanismos de seguridad, desde los servicios básicos hasta los procedimientos avanzados capaces de hacer frente a las amenazas sofisticadas contra los sistemas de control, como son los sistemas de detección, protección y respuesta ante intrusiones. Nuestro análisis se divide en diferentes áreas: prevención, consciencia y reacción, y restauración; las cuales general un modelo de seguridad robusto para la protección de los sistemas críticos.
Proporcionamos el diseño para un modelo arquitectural para la interoperabilidad segura y la interconexión de los SCCF del smart grid. Este escenario contempla la interconectividad de una federación de proveedores de energía del SG, que interactúan a través de la plataforma de interoperabilidad segura para gestionar y controlar sus infraestructuras de forma cooperativa. La plataforma tiene en cuenta las características inherentes y los nuevos servicios y tecnologías que acompañan al movimiento de la Industria 4.0. Por último, presentamos una prueba de concepto de nuestro modelo arquitectural, el cual ayuda a validar el diseño propuesto a través de experimentaciones. Creamos un conjunto de casos de validación que prueban algunas de las funcionalidades principales ofrecidas por la arquitectura diseñada para la interoperabilidad segura, proporcionando información sobre su rendimiento y capacidades.Las infraestructuras críticas (IICC) modernas son vastos sistemas altamente complejos, que precisan del uso de las tecnologías de la información para gestionar, controlar y monitorizar el funcionamiento de estas infraestructuras. Debido a sus funciones esenciales, la protección y seguridad de las infraestructuras críticas y, por tanto, de sus sistemas de control, se ha convertido en una tarea prioritaria para las diversas instituciones gubernamentales y académicas a nivel mundial. La interoperabilidad de las IICC, en especial de sus sistemas de control (SSC), se convierte en una característica clave para que estos sistemas sean capaces de coordinarse y realizar tareas de control y seguridad de forma cooperativa.
El objetivo de esta tesis se centra, por tanto, en proporcionar herramientas para la interoperabilidad segura de los diferentes SSC, especialmente los sistemas de control ciber-físicos (SCCF), de forma que se potencie la intercomunicación y coordinación entre ellos para crear un entorno en el que las diversas infraestructuras puedan realizar tareas de control y seguridad cooperativas, creando una plataforma de interoperabilidad segura capaz de dar servicio a diversas IICC, en un entorno de consciencia situacional (del inglés situational awareness) de alto espectro o área (wide-area).
Para ello, en primer lugar, revisamos las amenazas de carácter más sofisticado que amenazan la operación de los sistemas críticos, particularmente enfocándonos en los ciberataques camuflados (del inglés stealth) que amenazan los sistemas de control de infraestructuras críticas como el smart grid. Enfocamos nuestra investigación al análisis y comprensión de este nuevo tipo de ataques que aparece contra los sistemas críticos, y a las posibles contramedidas y herramientas para mitigar los efectos de estos ataques
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