Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

Centralized networks inevitably exhibit single points of failure that malicious actors regularly target. Decentralized networks are more resilient if numerous participants contribute to the network’s functionality. Most decentralized networks employ incentive mechanisms to coordinate the participation and cooperation of peers and thereby ensure the functionality and security of the network. This article systematically reviews incentive mechanisms for decentralized networks and networked systems by covering 165 prior literature reviews and 178 primary research papers published between 1993 and October 2022. Of the considered sources, we analyze 11 literature reviews and 105 primary research papers in detail by categorizing and comparing the distinctive properties of the presented incentive mechanisms. The reviewed incentive mechanisms establish fairness and reward participation and cooperative behavior. We review work that substitutes central authority through independent and subjective mechanisms run in isolation at each participating peer and work that applies multiparty computation. We use monetary, reputation, and service rewards as categories to differentiate the implementations and evaluate each incentive mechanism’s data management, attack resistance, and contribution model. Further, we highlight research gaps and deficiencies in reproducibility and comparability. Finally, we summarize our assessments and provide recommendations to apply incentive mechanisms to decentralized networks that share computational resources

The state of peer-to-peer network simulators

Networking research often relies on simulation in order to test and evaluate new ideas. An important requirement of this process is that results must be reproducible so that other researchers can replicate, validate and extend existing work. We look at the landscape of simulators for research in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks by conducting a survey of a combined total of over 280 papers from before and after 2007 (the year of the last survey in this area), and comment on the large quantity of research using bespoke, closed-source simulators. We propose a set of criteria that P2P simulators should meet, and poll the P2P research community for their agreement. We aim to drive the community towards performing their experiments on simulators that allow for others to validate their results

Maintaining unlinkability in group based P2P environments

In the wake of the success of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networking, security has arisen as one of its main concerns, becoming a key issue when evaluating a P2P system. Unfortunately, some systems' design focus targeted issues such as scalabil-ity or overall performance, but not security. As a result, security mechanisms must be provided at a later stage, after the system has already been designed and partially (or even fully) implemented, which may prove a cumbersome proposition. This work exposes how a security layer was provided under such circumstances for a specic Java based P2P framework: JXTA-Overlay.Arran de l'èxit de (P2P) peer-to-peer, la seguretat ha sorgit com una de les seves principals preocupacions, esdevenint una qüestió clau en l'avaluació d'un sistema P2P. Malauradament, alguns sistemes de disseny apunten focus de problemes com l'escalabilitat o l'acompliment general, però no de seguretat. Com a resultat d'això, els mecanismes de seguretat s¿han de proporcionar en una etapa posterior, després que el sistema ja ha estat dissenyat i parcialment (o fins i tot totalment) implementat, la qual cosa pot ser una proposició incòmode. Aquest article exposa com es va proveir una capa de seguretat sota aquestes circumstàncies per un Java específic basat en un marc P2P: JXTA-superposició.A raíz del éxito de (P2P) peer-to-peer, la seguridad ha surgido como una de sus principales preocupaciones, convirtiéndose en una cuestión clave en la evaluación de un sistema P2P. Desgraciadamente, algunos sistemas de diseño apuntan un foco de problemas como la escalabilidad o el desempeño general, pero no de seguridad. Como resultado de ello, los mecanismos de seguridad se proporcionarán en una etapa posterior, después de que el sistema ya ha sido diseñado y parcialmente (o incluso totalmente) implementado, lo que puede ser una proposición incómodo. Este artículo expone cómo se proveyó una capa de seguridad bajo estas circunstancias por un Java específico basado en un marco P2P: JXTA-superposición

Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms

Game theory has developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent software systems. This tailoring gives rise to the field of computational mechanism design, which applies economic principles to computer systems design

Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Mechanism Design Approach

In this paper we use mechanism design approach to find the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.peer-to-peer networks, mechanism design.