16 research outputs found
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple
agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting
their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is
computational complexity. In particular, it has been shown that it is NP-hard
to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However,
NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results
suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. In this paper, we
study empirically the manipulability of single transferable voting (STV) to
determine if computational complexity is really a barrier to manipulation. STV
was one of the first voting rules shown to be NP-hard. It also appears one of
the harder voting rules to manipulate. We sample a number of distributions of
votes including uniform and real world elections. In almost every election in
our experiments, it was easy to compute how a single agent could manipulate the
election or to prove that manipulation by a single agent was impossible.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2010
How Hard Is It to Control an Election by Breaking Ties?
We study the computational complexity of controlling the result of an
election by breaking ties strategically. This problem is equivalent to the
problem of deciding the winner of an election under parallel universes
tie-breaking. When the chair of the election is only asked to break ties to
choose between one of the co-winners, the problem is trivially easy. However,
in multi-round elections, we prove that it can be NP-hard for the chair to
compute how to break ties to ensure a given result. Additionally, we show that
the form of the tie-breaking function can increase the opportunities for
control. Indeed, we prove that it can be NP-hard to control an election by
breaking ties even with a two-stage voting rule.Comment: Revised and expanded version including longer proofs and additional
result
Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections
Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting
in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting
honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that there is no strategy-proof voting rule
that simultaneously satisfies certain combinations of desirable properties.
Researchers have attempted to get around the impossibility results in several
ways such as domain restriction and computational hardness of manipulation.
However these approaches have been shown to have limitations. Since prevention
of manipulation seems to be elusive, an interesting research direction
therefore is detection of manipulation. Motivated by this, we initiate the
study of detection of possible manipulators in an election.
We formulate two pertinent computational problems - Coalitional Possible
Manipulators (CPM) and Coalitional Possible Manipulators given Winner (CPMW),
where a suspect group of voters is provided as input to compute whether they
can be a potential coalition of possible manipulators. In the absence of any
suspect group, we formulate two more computational problems namely Coalitional
Possible Manipulators Search (CPMS), and Coalitional Possible Manipulators
Search given Winner (CPMSW). We provide polynomial time algorithms for these
problems, for several popular voting rules. For a few other voting rules, we
show that these problems are in NP-complete. We observe that detecting
manipulation maybe easy even when manipulation is hard, as seen for example, in
the case of the Borda voting rule.Comment: Accepted in AAMAS 201
Swap Bribery
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an
external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in
order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery
where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is
asked to implement. Specifically, in our model the briber can change a voter's
preference list by paying for a sequence of swaps of consecutive candidates.
Each swap may have a different price; the price of a bribery is the sum of the
prices of all swaps that it involves. We prove complexity results for this
model, which we call swap bribery, for a broad class of election systems,
including variants of approval and k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and maximin.Comment: 17 page
A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power
We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for
generalized scoring rules. Previously it has been shown that, under some
conditions on the distribution of votes, if the number of manipulators is
, where is the number of voters, then the probability that a
random profile is manipulable by the coalition goes to zero as the number of
voters goes to infinity, whereas if the number of manipulators is
, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable
goes to one. Here we consider the critical window, where a coalition has size
, and we show that as goes from zero to infinity, the limiting
probability that a random profile is manipulable goes from zero to one in a
smooth fashion, i.e., there is a smooth phase transition between the two
regimes. This result analytically validates recent empirical results, and
suggests that deciding the coalitional manipulation problem may be of limited
computational hardness in practice.Comment: 22 pages; v2 contains minor changes and corrections; v3 contains
minor changes after comments of reviewer
The Shield that Never Was: Societies with Single-Peaked Preferences are More Open to Manipulation and Control
Much work has been devoted, during the past twenty years, to using complexity
to protect elections from manipulation and control. Many results have been
obtained showing NP-hardness shields, and recently there has been much focus on
whether such worst-case hardness protections can be bypassed by frequently
correct heuristics or by approximations. This paper takes a very different
approach: We argue that when electorates follow the canonical political science
model of societal preferences the complexity shield never existed in the first
place. In particular, we show that for electorates having single-peaked
preferences, many existing NP-hardness results on manipulation and control
evaporate.Comment: 38 pages, 2 figure
Voting with Coarse Beliefs
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof
voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial.
Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of
strategy-proofness where voters believe that the other voters' preferences are
i.i.d.~(independent and identically distributed). In this paper, we take a
bounded-rationality approach to this problem and consider a setting where
voters have "coarse" beliefs (a notion that has gained popularity in the
behavioral economics literature). In particular, we construct good voting rules
that satisfy a notion of strategy-proofness with respect to coarse
i.i.d.~beliefs, thus circumventing the above impossibility results