3,680 research outputs found
The Coat Problem. Counterfactuals, Truth-makers, and Temporal specification
Standard semantic treatments of counterfactuals appeal to a relation of similarity between possible worlds. Similarity, however, is a vague notion. Lewis suggests reducing the vagueness of similarity by adopting a principle known as 'late departure' (LD): the more the past two worlds share, the more they are similar. LD has several virtues. However, as Bennett points out, a standard semantics based on LD suffers from the so-called coat problem. In a nutshell, we are led to assign counterintuitive truth-values to counterfactuals whose antecedent time is left underspecified. In the present paper, we argue that the coat problem may be solved by defining a time-sensitive notion of similarity. To illustrate, we assume a Priorean, tensed language, interpreted on branching-time frames in the usual, 'Ockhamist' way, and we enrich it with a counterfactual connective. Within this framework, we define a time-sensitive relation of similarity, based on Yablo's work on truth-makers and partial truth. In the resulting semantics, which has independent interest, the coat problem does not arise
How Strong Is a Counterfactual?
The literature on counterfactuals is dominated by strict accounts and variably strict accounts. Counterexamples to the principle of Antecedent Strengthening were thought to be fatal to SA; but it has been shown that by adding dynamic resources to the view, such examples can be accounted for. We broaden the debate between VSA and SA by focusing on a new strengthening principle, Strengthening with a Possibility. We show dynamic SA classically validates this principle. We give a counterexample to it and show that extra dynamic resources cannot help SA. We then show VSA accounts for the counterexample if it allows for orderings on worlds that are not almost-connected, and that such an ordering naturally falls out of a Kratzerian ordering source semantics. We conclude that the failure of Strengthening with a Possibility tells strongly against Dynamic SA and in favor of an ordering source-based version of VSA
Counterfactual Causality from First Principles?
In this position paper we discuss three main shortcomings of existing
approaches to counterfactual causality from the computer science perspective,
and sketch lines of work to try and overcome these issues: (1) causality
definitions should be driven by a set of precisely specified requirements
rather than specific examples; (2) causality frameworks should support system
dynamics; (3) causality analysis should have a well-understood behavior in
presence of abstraction.Comment: In Proceedings CREST 2017, arXiv:1710.0277
Chances, counterfactuals and similarity
John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong.
I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorneâs challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewisâs first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewisâs own suggested modification
Casting Light Upon The Great Endarkenment
While the Enlightenment promoted thinking for oneself independent of religious authority, the âEndarkenmentâ (Millgram 2015) concerns deference to a new authority: the specialist, a hyperspecializer. Non-specialists need to defer to such authorities as they are unable to understand their reasoning. Millgram describes how humans are capable of being serial hyperspecializers, able to move from one specialism to another. We support the basic thrust of Millgramâs position, and seek to articulate how the core idea is deployed in very different ways in relation to extremely different philosophical areas. We attend to the issue of the degree of isolation of different specialists and we urge greater emphasis on parallel hyperspecialization, which describes how different specialisms can be embodied in one person at one time
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