On the notion of negation in certain non-classical propositional logics

The purpose of this study is to investigate some aspects of how negation functions in certain non-classical propositional logics. These include the intuitionistic system developed by Heyting, the minimal calculus proposed by Johansson, and various intermediate logics between the minimal and the classical systems. Part I contains the new results which can be grouped into two classes: extension-criteria results and infinite chain results. In the first group criteria are given for answering the question: when do formulae added to the axioms of the minimal calculus as extra axioms extend the minimal calculus to various known intermediate logics? One of the results in this group (THEOREM 1 in Chapter II, Section 1) is a generalization of a result of Jankov. In the second group certain intermediate logics are defined which form infinite chains between well-known logical systems. One of the results here (THEOREM 1 in Chapter II, Section 2) is a generalization of a result of McKay. In Part II the new results are discussed from the viewpoint of negation. It is rather difficult, however, to draw definite conclusions which are acceptable to all. For these depend on, and are closely bound up with, certain basic philosophical presuppositions which are neither provable, nor disprovable in a strict sense. Taking an essentially classical position, it is argued that the logics appearing in the defined infinite chains are such that they diverge only in the vicinity of negation, and the notions of negation in them are simply ordered in a sense which is specified during the discussion. In Appendix I a number of conjectures are formulated in connection with the new results.<p

Non-normal modal logics, quantification, and deontic dilemmas. A study in multi-relational semantics

This dissertation is devoted to the study of non-normal (modal) systems for deontic logics, both on the propositional level, and on the first order one. In particular we developed our study the Multi-relational setting that generalises standard Kripke Semantics. We present new completeness results concerning the semantic setting of several systems which are able to handle normative dilemmas and conflicts. Although primarily driven by issues related to the legal and moral field, these results are also relevant for the more theoretical field of Modal Logic itself, as we propose a syntactical, and semantic study of intermediate systems between the classical propositional calculus CPC and the minimal normal modal logic K

Expansion Trees with Cut

Herbrand's theorem is one of the most fundamental insights in logic. From the syntactic point of view it suggests a compact representation of proofs in classical first- and higher-order logic by recording the information which instances have been chosen for which quantifiers, known in the literature as expansion trees. Such a representation is inherently analytic and hence corresponds to a cut-free sequent calculus proof. Recently several extensions of such proof representations to proofs with cut have been proposed. These extensions are based on graphical formalisms similar to proof nets and are limited to prenex formulas. In this paper we present a new approach that directly extends expansion trees by cuts and covers also non-prenex formulas. We describe a cut-elimination procedure for our expansion trees with cut that is based on the natural reduction steps. We prove that it is weakly normalizing using methods from the epsilon-calculus

Sequent Calculus in the Topos of Trees

Nakano's "later" modality, inspired by G\"{o}del-L\"{o}b provability logic, has been applied in type systems and program logics to capture guarded recursion. Birkedal et al modelled this modality via the internal logic of the topos of trees. We show that the semantics of the propositional fragment of this logic can be given by linear converse-well-founded intuitionistic Kripke frames, so this logic is a marriage of the intuitionistic modal logic KM and the intermediate logic LC. We therefore call this logic $\mathrm{KM}_{\mathrm{lin}}$. We give a sound and cut-free complete sequent calculus for $\mathrm{KM}_{\mathrm{lin}}$ via a strategy that decomposes implication into its static and irreflexive components. Our calculus provides deterministic and terminating backward proof-search, yields decidability of the logic and the coNP-completeness of its validity problem. Our calculus and decision procedure can be restricted to drop linearity and hence capture KM.Comment: Extended version, with full proof details, of a paper accepted to FoSSaCS 2015 (this version edited to fix some minor typos

Neutrality and Many-Valued Logics

In this book, we consider various many-valued logics: standard, linear, hyperbolic, parabolic, non-Archimedean, p-adic, interval, neutrosophic, etc. We survey also results which show the tree different proof-theoretic frameworks for many-valued logics, e.g. frameworks of the following deductive calculi: Hilbert's style, sequent, and hypersequent. We present a general way that allows to construct systematically analytic calculi for a large family of non-Archimedean many-valued logics: hyperrational-valued, hyperreal-valued, and p-adic valued logics characterized by a special format of semantics with an appropriate rejection of Archimedes' axiom. These logics are built as different extensions of standard many-valued logics (namely, Lukasiewicz's, Goedel's, Product, and Post's logics). The informal sense of Archimedes' axiom is that anything can be measured by a ruler. Also logical multiple-validity without Archimedes' axiom consists in that the set of truth values is infinite and it is not well-founded and well-ordered. On the base of non-Archimedean valued logics, we construct non-Archimedean valued interval neutrosophic logic INL by which we can describe neutrality phenomena.Comment: 119 page

Proof-graphs for Minimal Implicational Logic

It is well-known that the size of propositional classical proofs can be huge. Proof theoretical studies discovered exponential gaps between normal or cut free proofs and their respective non-normal proofs. The aim of this work is to study how to reduce the weight of propositional deductions. We present the formalism of proof-graphs for purely implicational logic, which are graphs of a specific shape that are intended to capture the logical structure of a deduction. The advantage of this formalism is that formulas can be shared in the reduced proof. In the present paper we give a precise definition of proof-graphs for the minimal implicational logic, together with a normalization procedure for these proof-graphs. In contrast to standard tree-like formalisms, our normalization does not increase the number of nodes, when applied to the corresponding minimal proof-graph representations.Comment: In Proceedings DCM 2013, arXiv:1403.768

Towards a Proof Theory of G\"odel Modal Logics

Analytic proof calculi are introduced for box and diamond fragments of basic modal fuzzy logics that combine the Kripke semantics of modal logic K with the many-valued semantics of G\"odel logic. The calculi are used to establish completeness and complexity results for these fragments