3 research outputs found
A private contributions game for joint replenishment
We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria. © Springer-Verlag 2011
Essays on non-cooperative inventory games
Ankara : The Department of Industrial Engineering and the Institute of Engineering and Science of Bilkent University, 2012.Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Bilkent University, 2012.Includes bibliographical references leaves 165-170.In this thesis we study different non–cooperative inventory games. In particular,
we focus on joint replenishment games and newsvendor duopoly under
asymmetric information. Chapter 1 contains introduction and motivation behind
the research. Chapter 2 is a preliminary chapter which introduce basic
concepts used in the thesis such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium
and mechanism design.
In Chapter 3, we study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment of
multiple firms that operate under an EOQ–like setting. Each firm decides whether
to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much
to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment
cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed
with the private contributions of participating firms. We consider two variants
of the participation-contribution game: in the single–stage variant, participation
and contribution decisions are made simultaneously, and, in the two-stage variant,
participating firms become common knowledge at the contribution stage. We
characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria for
the one-stage game and subgame-perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game.
In Chapter 4, we extend the private contributions game to an asymmetric
information counterpart. We assume each firm only knows the probability distribution
of the other firms’ adjusted demand rates (demand rate multiplied by
inventory holding cost rate). We show the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric information game and provide its characterization.
Finally, we conduct some numerical study to examine the impact of
information asymmetry on expected and interim values of total contributions,
cycle times and total costs.
quantities for all firm types except the type that has the highest possible unit
cost, who orders the same quantity as he would as a monopolist newsboy. Consequently,
competition leads to higher total inventory in the industry. A firm’s
equilibrium order quantity increases with a stochastic increase in the total industry
demand or with an increase in his initial allocation of the total industry
demand. Finally, we provide full characterization of the equilibrium, corresponding
payoffs and comparative statics for a parametric special case with uniform
demand and linear market shares.Körpeoğlu, EvrenPh.D