Choice of Consistent Family, and Quantum Incompatibility

In consistent history quantum theory, a description of the time development of a quantum system requires choosing a framework or consistent family, and then calculating probabilities for the different histories which it contains. It is argued that the framework is chosen by the physicist constructing a description of a quantum system on the basis of questions he wishes to address, in a manner analogous to choosing a coarse graining of the phase space in classical statistical mechanics. The choice of framework is not determined by some law of nature, though it is limited by quantum incompatibility, a concept which is discussed using a two-dimensional Hilbert space (spin half particle). Thus certain questions of physical interest can only be addressed using frameworks in which they make (quantum mechanical) sense. The physicist's choice does not influence reality, nor does the presence of choices render the theory subjective. On the contrary, predictions of the theory can, in principle, be verified by experimental measurements. These considerations are used to address various criticisms and possible misunderstandings of the consistent history approach, including its predictive power, whether it requires a new logic, whether it can be interpreted realistically, the nature of ``quasiclassicality'', and the possibility of ``contrary'' inferences.Comment: Minor revisions to bring into conformity with published version. Revtex 29 pages including 1 page with figure

Correspondence Truth and Quantum Mechanics

The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either 'true' or 'false', describing what is actually the case at a certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of 'no go' theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton 'uniqueness theorem' is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences.Comment: 19 page

Quantum value indefiniteness

The indeterministic outcome of a measurement of an individual quantum is certified by the impossibility of the simultaneous, definite, deterministic pre-existence of all conceivable observables from physical conditions of that quantum alone. We discuss possible interpretations and consequences for quantum oracles.Comment: 19 pages, 2 tables, 2 figures; contribution to PC0