Between Sense and Sensibility: Declarative narrativisation of mental models as a basis and benchmark for visuo-spatial cognition and computation focussed collaborative cognitive systems

What lies between `\emph{sensing}' and `\emph{sensibility}'? In other words, what kind of cognitive processes mediate sensing capability, and the formation of sensible impressions ---e.g., abstractions, analogies, hypotheses and theory formation, beliefs and their revision, argument formation--- in domain-specific problem solving, or in regular activities of everyday living, working and simply going around in the environment? How can knowledge and reasoning about such capabilities, as exhibited by humans in particular problem contexts, be used as a model and benchmark for the development of collaborative cognitive (interaction) systems concerned with human assistance, assurance, and empowerment? We pose these questions in the context of a range of assistive technologies concerned with \emph{visuo-spatial perception and cognition} tasks encompassing aspects such as commonsense, creativity, and the application of specialist domain knowledge and problem-solving thought processes. Assistive technologies being considered include: (a) human activity interpretation; (b) high-level cognitive rovotics; (c) people-centred creative design in domains such as architecture & digital media creation, and (d) qualitative analyses geographic information systems. Computational narratives not only provide a rich cognitive basis, but they also serve as a benchmark of functional performance in our development of computational cognitive assistance systems. We posit that computational narrativisation pertaining to space, actions, and change provides a useful model of \emph{visual} and \emph{spatio-temporal thinking} within a wide-range of problem-solving tasks and application areas where collaborative cognitive systems could serve an assistive and empowering function.Comment: 5 pages, research statement summarising recent publication

Challenging the Computational Metaphor: Implications for How We Think

This paper explores the role of the traditional computational metaphor in our thinking as computer scientists, its influence on epistemological styles, and its implications for our understanding of cognition. It proposes to replace the conventional metaphor--a sequence of steps--with the notion of a community of interacting entities, and examines the ramifications of such a shift on these various ways in which we think

Spatial Aggregation: Theory and Applications

Visual thinking plays an important role in scientific reasoning. Based on the research in automating diverse reasoning tasks about dynamical systems, nonlinear controllers, kinematic mechanisms, and fluid motion, we have identified a style of visual thinking, imagistic reasoning. Imagistic reasoning organizes computations around image-like, analogue representations so that perceptual and symbolic operations can be brought to bear to infer structure and behavior. Programs incorporating imagistic reasoning have been shown to perform at an expert level in domains that defy current analytic or numerical methods. We have developed a computational paradigm, spatial aggregation, to unify the description of a class of imagistic problem solvers. A program written in this paradigm has the following properties. It takes a continuous field and optional objective functions as input, and produces high-level descriptions of structure, behavior, or control actions. It computes a multi-layer of intermediate representations, called spatial aggregates, by forming equivalence classes and adjacency relations. It employs a small set of generic operators such as aggregation, classification, and localization to perform bidirectional mapping between the information-rich field and successively more abstract spatial aggregates. It uses a data structure, the neighborhood graph, as a common interface to modularize computations. To illustrate our theory, we describe the computational structure of three implemented problem solvers -- KAM, MAPS, and HIPAIR --- in terms of the spatial aggregation generic operators by mixing and matching a library of commonly used routines.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

Irrespective Priority-Based Regular Properties of High-Intensity Virtual Environments

We have a lot of relation to the encoding and the Theory of Information, when considering thinking. This is a natural process and, at once, the complex thing we investigate. This always was a challenge - to understand how our mind works, and we are trying to find some universal models for this. A lot of ways have been considered so far, but we are looking for Something, we seek for approaches. And the goal is to find a consistent, noncontradictory view, which should at once be enough flexible in any dimensions to allow to represent various kinds of processes and environments, matters of different nature and diverse objects. Developing of such a model is the destination of this article.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures; ISBN: 978-1-4673-2984-

Intelligence and chess

The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate the evidence supporting the hypothesis that innate talent (for example a higher level of intelligence) may account for aspects of chess skill. We start by giving some standard definitions of intelligence, and then present empirical data on chessplayers’ intelligence, both with children and adults. In the second part of this paper, we discuss Geschwind and Galaburda’s (1985) influential theory of the neurobiology of talent in music, mathematics, and visual arts, and review evidence of its applicability for explaining chess expertise. For that purpose, we will present empirical data based on brain lesions, brain-imaging studies, and handedness. In the conclusion, we will attempt to reconcile the strand of research emphasising practice and the role of the environment with that emphasising the role of innate talent

Modelling the Developing Mind: From Structure to Change

This paper presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of mind. Thus, the architecture of mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The paper then specifies the types of change that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the paper and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience is discussed throughout the paper