Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services

This Policy Series by James Salzman brings attention to a rapidly developing phenomenon—payments for ecosystem services (PES). Salzman, the Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law and the Nicholas Institute Professor of Environmental Policy at Duke University, explains when and where ecosystem services can be provided by voluntary markets rather than government actions. The key to understanding how PES work is rooted in the basis of any voluntary market transaction—gains from trade. One party agrees to take action because another party offers an incentive. Both parties benefit. A beekeeper, for example, brings her hives to an orchard to provide pollination services for a fee. But Salzman explores the less obvious services such as forests at the top of a municipal watershed that act as a filter providing clean water to people below. Salzman states that we receive many environmental benefits for “free,” which provides little or no incentive for people to pay for them or for entrepreneurs to provide them. Because price signals that alert individuals about scarce resources in traditional markets are absent, ecosystem services are taken for granted—until they stop providing benefits. Then the cost of remediation or building infrastructure, such as a water treatment plant, makes their value obvious. For decades the solution to environmental protection has been government action. Today, knowledge about environmental processes combined with increased environmental sensitivity provides opportunities for entrepreneurs to find innovative ways of developing markets for ecosystem services

A Policy Maker’s Guide to Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services

Over the past five years, there has been increasing interest around the globe in payment schemes for the provision of ecosystem services, such as water purification, carbon sequestration, flood control, etc. Written for an Asian Development Bank project in China, this report provides a user-friendly guide to designing payments for the provision of ecosystem services. Part I explains the different types of ecosystem services, different ways of assessing their value, and why they are traditionally under-protected by law and policy. This is followed by an analysis of when payments for services are a preferable approach to other policy instruments. Part II explains the design issues underlying payments for services. These include identification of the service as well as potential buyers and sellers, the level of service needed, payment timing, payment type, and risk allocation. Part II contains a detailed analysis of the different types of payment mechanisms, ranging from general subsidy and certification to mitigation and offset payments. Part III explores the challenges to designing a payment scheme. These include the ability to monitor service provision, secure property rights, perverse incentives, supporting institutions, and poverty alleviation

A Policy Maker’s Guide to Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services

Over the past five years, there has been increasing interest around the globe in payment schemes for the provision of ecosystem services, such as water purification, carbon sequestration, flood control, etc. Written for an Asian Development Bank project in China, this report provides a user-friendly guide to designing payments for the provision of ecosystem services. Part I explains the different types of ecosystem services, different ways of assessing their value, and why they are traditionally under-protected by law and policy. This is followed by an analysis of when payments for services are a preferable approach to other policy instruments. Part II explains the design issues underlying payments for services. These include identification of the service as well as potential buyers and sellers, the level of service needed, payment timing, payment type, and risk allocation. Part II contains a detailed analysis of the different types of payment mechanisms, ranging from general subsidy and certification to mitigation and offset payments. Part III explores the challenges to designing a payment scheme. These include the ability to monitor service provision, secure property rights, perverse incentives, supporting institutions, and poverty alleviation

Impact of firm-level factors and market entry mode on performance: A study of service MNCs in an emerging economy

The study examined the market entry strategies of multinational services companies into Ghana’s service sector and the linkages to firm level performance after entry. Literature was reviewed on market entry strategies, internationalisation, globalisation of service firms and resource-based theory. The study adopted a combination of both quantitative and qualitative research approaches in this study. The qualitative approach was for deeper enquiry and quantitative for empirical testing. The study found that firm specific factors affect the market entry strategy while the entry strategy also affects performance after it enters the market. Home country factors and the features of services are also seen to moderate on the effects mentioned. Respondents also indicated that the features of services were an industry wide issue not so much consideration is given to it

Conserving Water in Irrigated Agriculture: The Economics and Valuation of Water Rights

The effective management of water resources in Alberta is crucial to sustainable agriculture, industrial development, and environmental management. The historical water allocation mechanism, administrative apportionment, has been viewed in recent years as ineffective and cumbersome. Accordingly, the revision of the Water Act in 1996, included an attempt to improve the efficiency of water allocation. By making the transfer of water rights possible, the revised Act provides many new options for water use and flexibility. The implications of transferable water rights in Alberta water policy must be carefully considered in order to determine the viability and suitability of such a system in the provincial context. This project examines some of the economic aspects of transferable water rights and the potential for effective water allocation by way of transfers in an Alberta setting. As a major part of this project, a hedonic price model, focusing on land values in southern Alberta, was constructed based on similar models, which have been used elsewhere to value water rights or agricultural products. The hedonic approach to market analysis uses the relationship between the price of land and the attributes of the land, such as water availability, soil quality and location, to explain differences in land prices. In this process, the hedonic model is used to estimate the implicit marginal price or value of each land attribute -- in our case, the marginal value of irrigation water. This value will provide us with an indirect estimate of the value of water rights in the region studied. An advantage of the technique is that it estimates the value that farmers express for irrigation water in the market place for land. Such values, then, give us an indication of the anticipated prices, which might prevail for water rights in southern Alberta. The focus of the study was an area of southern Alberta encompassing the counties of Wheatland, Newell, Cypress, Forty Mile, Taber, Warner, Lethbridge and Vulcan and the irrigation districts of Western, Eastern, St.Mary's, Taber, Lethbridge Northern, and portions of Raymond. Information was collected on the physical and economic characteristics of 230 land parcels, which were sold in this region in 1993 and early 1994. A crude comparison of the value of irrigated agricultural land and non-irrigated agricultural land in the sample reveals that irrigated land was worth, on average, $325 more per acre than non-irrigated land. In the ensuing analysis, it was estimated that the value of a parcel of land was determined largely by the buildings on it, the number of acres in the parcel, the proximity of the parcel to a major city (in this case Calgary or Lethbridge), and by the availability of irrigation water. In the hedonic model, the coefficient values of the variables included represent the marginal impact of each of these characteristics on land prices holding all other things constant. For example, the value of water rights represents the average difference between land values of farms that have access to irrigation and farms that do not. This study estimated that every dollar of improvements to farm buildings translates to a one cent increase in the per acre price of the land parcel, where the addition of one extra acre of land to a land parcel lowers the price per acre by$5.17 per acre. Land prices were seen to increase with the proximity of the parcel to large cities. Similarly, the results of the preferred model indicate that the implicit value of having access to irrigation water in southern Alberta is approximately $190 per acre, or, using the conventional estimate that irrigating one acre of land requires 1.5 acre feet of water, this translates to$126 per acre foot of irrigation water. Accordingly, it is revealed that the existence of water rights adds approximately 35% to the value of non-irrigated land. Since this value represents the implicit amount farmers are willing to pay for access to water, it could also be construed as an indirect measure of the value of water rights. From these results, it is reasonable to conclude that water rights do have a measurable impact on land values. Accordingly, proper incentives may be needed to ensure that water is used efficiently and not incorrectly treated as a relatively free or cheap good. One possible method of policy reform to achieve such a system would be the institution of a system of transferable water rights, permitting water to be traded, or effectively sold, at its market price or scarcity value. Further work was done to determine the potential effects of transferable water rights on the Eastern Irrigation District in southern Alberta. Farm budget information was used to gather information and create twelve representative farm types whose financial performance was analysed using linear programming with increasing water quantity constraints. The resulting productive water values were then used to imply potential reallocations of water among farm types and cropping systems. Analysis of the data gathered revealed that all representative farms faced downward sloping demand functions for water. The overall value of water for a 1% reduction ranged from $8 to$250 per acre foot, with the lowest value belonging to largely pasture operations and the highest value attributed to specialty crop producers. This large range in water values for the region indicates that there is sufficient heterogeneity within the EID to accommodate a transferable rights system. Further analysis of the data reveals that the implementation of a transfer system would result in water being transferred to specialty crop producers and the acreage devoted to specialty crops would increase. Small irrigated pasture operations and cereal crop producers would be the first to give up their water allocations under a transfer system. The analysis indicates that there is considerable potential for economic gains from water trade within this district, the main constraint being the market limitations to expanded specialty crop production. Using these two major studies and other sources, this report concludes with a brief evaluation of the economic advantages, disadvantages and other issues involved in instituting a system of transferable water rights in Alberta. Experience elsewhere, primarily in Australia and the western United States, strongly suggests that transferable water rights, despite some drawbacks and problems of implementation, can be a very worthwhile water policy tool. Now that such tradable water rights are permissible under the revised Water Resources Act of 1996, it is recommended that a pilot project involving transferable water rights be instituted in a water short basin or sub-basin in southern Alberta once a water management plan for that basin is completed.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This paper examines two major forces that may soon increase competition in the U.S. secondary conforming mortgage market: (1) the expansion of Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchase programs and (2) the adoption of revised risk-based capital requirements for large U.S. banks (Basel II). The authors argue that this competition is likely to reduce the growth and relative importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and hence their franchise values and effective capital. Such developments could, in turn, lead to more risky behaviors by these two GSEs. It is this last consequence that warrants greater regulatory awareness.

Money and the Public Debt: Treasury Market Liquidity as a Legal Phenomenon

The market for U.S. government debt (Treasuries) forms the bedrock of the global financial system. The ability of investors to sell Treasuries quickly, cheaply, and at scale has led to an assumption, in many places enshrined in law, that Treasuries are nearly equivalent to cash. Yet in recent years Treasury market liquidity has evaporated on several occasions and, in 2020, the market’s near collapse led to the most aggressive central bank intervention in history. This Article pieces together what went wrong and offers a new account of the relationship between money issue and debt issue as mechanisms of public finance. It argues that a high degree of convertibility between Treasuries and cash generally requires intermediaries that can augment the money supply, absorbing sales by expanding their balance sheets on both sides. The historical depth of the Treasury market was in large part the result of a concerted effort by policymakers to nurture and support such balance sheet capacity at a collection of nonbank broker-dealers. In 2008, the ability of these intermediaries to augment the money supply became impaired as investors lost confidence in their money-like liabilities (known as repos). Subsequent changes to market structure pushed substantial Treasury dealing further beyond the bank regulatory perimeter, leaving public finance increasingly dependent on high-frequency traders and hedge funds — “shadow dealers.” The near money issued by these intermediaries proved highly unstable in 2020. Policy makers are now focused on reforming Treasury market structure so that Treasuries remain the world’s most liquid asset class. Successful reform likely requires a legal framework that, among other things, supports elastic intermediation capacity through balance sheets that can expand and contract as needed to meet market needs

Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance

This article analyzes the law and economics of market internalization: the capability of markets to both penalize and reward firms for their environmental, health and safety performance. As for market sticks, the article maintains that market transactions - both private and public sales of corporate assets as well as transactions in publicly traded securities - are an important avenue through which firms realize comparative advantages in regulatory compliance, and that such transactions have the potential to significantly enhance corporate environmental and social performance. Asset transactions tend to drive environmental cleanup and transfer assets to firms that are better able to know about and comply with relevant regulatory directives. On public securities markets, the very fact that traders are imperfectly informed about firm-specific regulatory risk causes disproportionately large market reaction to the revelation of such risks. The incentive to avoid such large, negative market reactions to the revelation of negative information leads may induce a higher level of compliance than were no such market reaction anticipated. Incentives for voluntary disclosure of negative information are complex, but as is true of financial disclosure, mandatory disclosure requirements may be crucial in allowing firms to make such credible commitments. As for the potential positive rewards (in the form of price premia) that SR consumers and investor offer to firms that they perceive to be pursuing CSR, the fundamental problem is that CSR cannot be directly observed by consumers and investors. Unless firms can find a credible signal of CSR, the positive potential of the market may go unrealized. Inevitably, much corporate communication regarding CSR is (from a game-theoretic point of view) cheap talk. There is likely to an uninformative, pooling equilibrium in which only firms in industries with well-recognized, large SR impacts are likely to engage in CSR cheap talk, so that such reports do not generate information on the relative economic and social performance of firms within the category of firms that report. The article\u27s policy conclusions include the following: - The SEC\u27s standard requiring the disclosure only of those environmental regulatory costs and liabilities that are probable and reasonably estimable is sensible as tracking the market\u27s limitations in coping with risk versus uncertainty, but the SEC\u27s almost complete failure to enforce its rules regarding the disclosure of environmental risks has made it impossible for corporate managers to credibly commit to being one of the good guys by voluntarily disclosing such bad news. - As for the potential for legal liability for false assertions of CSR to deter bad companies from pretending to be good ones via their CSR communications (thus destroying the uninformative (or babbling) market equilibrium, the optimal liability system involves potential liability (because it gives plaintiffs access to civil discovery that allows for the discovery of information regarding corporate labor and environmental practices that otherwise would be asymmetrically available only to the corporate speaker), but liability that is strictly limited in amount. The market alternative of private, third party certification of CSR disclosures and assertions - a market response to SR consumers\u27 and investors\u27 demand for credible, reliable firm-specific information - is effective only if itself credible. While market reputation clearly helps ensure the truthfulness and credibility of private auditors\u27 CSR reports, the risk of collusion between audited companies and their auditors is just as great when it comes to CSR as it is in the traditional area of financial report auditing. Just as with financial reports, the threat of holding auditors legally liable for intentionally or negligently false CSR audit reports may be necessary for private CSR auditing to generate credible information