Khaled Hosseini, Keigo Higashino, and Zoe Ferraris: Social Concealment, Personal Revelation, and Community Guilt

Detective novels, while generally considered to be pulp fiction and therefore worthy of less academic attention, nonetheless lay bare the reader’s interest in getting to the so-called truth. Even the inclusion of “red herrings” and false leads serves to entice a deeper commitment to proving the existence of what “really” happened. They are, therefore, escapist in the sense that they tease readers to reject the underpinnings of deconstruction and poststructuralism and allow, at least for the limited duration of the reading, a comforting illusion that there are larger truths that an actual “self” can discern and pin down. This need for structural stability and personal agency carries over into more literary works, though the desire there is generally expressed in the dramatic arc of Freytag’s Pyramid: exposition, rising action, climax, falling action, and dénouement

A Theory of Transactions Privacy

In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation with result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made before the transaction occurs. In such cases, initial assignments of rights (for example, privacy laws) can have consequences for efficiency.

Nigerian scam e-mails and the charms of capital

So-called '419' or 'advance-fee' e-mail frauds have proved remarkably successful. Global losses to these scams are believed to run to billions of dollars. Although it can be assumed that the promise of personal gain which these e-mails hold out is part of what motivates victims, there is more than greed at issue here. How is it that the seemingly incredible offers given in these unsolicited messages can find an audience willing to treat them as credible? The essay offers a speculative thesis in answer to this question. Firstly, it is argued, these scams are adept at exploiting common presuppositions in British and American culture regarding Africa and the relationships that are assumed to exist between their nations and those in the global south. Secondly, part of the appeal of these e-mails lies in the fact that they appear to reveal the processes by which wealth is created and distributed in the global economy. They thus speak to their readers’ attempts to map or conceptualise the otherwise inscrutable processes of that economy. In the conclusion the essay looks at the contradictions in the official state response to this phenomena

Search of Prior Art and Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants

We examine the strategic non-revelation of information by patent applicants. In a model of a bilateral search of information, we show that patent applicants may conceal information, and that examiners make their screening intensity contingent upon the received information. We then analyze the effects of a double review policy and a policy in which examiners ex ante commit to screening efforts. The implementation of the former policy reduces strategic non-revelation, but its overall implication remains unclear. The latter policy involves equal screening intensity across all applications, requires a limited commitment power and induces truthful revelation.patents; information; incentives

A Contest with the Taxman - The Impact of Tax Rates on Tax Evasion and Wastefully Invested Resources

We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.tax evasion, auditing rules, contest, moral hazard

A contest with the taxman - The impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources

We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we …nd conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.Tax Evasion, Auditing Rules, Contest, Moral Hazard