The Goodman-Nguyen Relation within Imprecise Probability Theory

The Goodman-Nguyen relation is a partial order generalising the implication (inclusion) relation to conditional events. As such, with precise probabilities it both induces an agreeing probability ordering and is a key tool in a certain common extension problem. Most previous work involving this relation is concerned with either conditional event algebras or precise probabilities. We investigate here its role within imprecise probability theory, first in the framework of conditional events and then proposing a generalisation of the Goodman-Nguyen relation to conditional gambles. It turns out that this relation induces an agreeing ordering on coherent or C-convex conditional imprecise previsions. In a standard inferential problem with conditional events, it lets us determine the natural extension, as well as an upper extension. With conditional gambles, it is useful in deriving a number of inferential inequalities.Comment: Published version: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0888613X1400101

Default Logic in a Coherent Setting

In this talk - based on the results of a forthcoming paper (Coletti, Scozzafava and Vantaggi 2002), presented also by one of us at the Conference on "Non Classical Logic, Approximate Reasoning and Soft-Computing" (Anacapri, Italy, 2001) - we discuss the problem of representing default rules by means of a suitable coherent conditional probability, defined on a family of conditional events. An event is singled-out (in our approach) by a proposition, that is a statement that can be either true or false; a conditional event is consequently defined by means of two propositions and is a 3-valued entity, the third value being (in this context) a conditional probability

2-coherent and 2-convex Conditional Lower Previsions

In this paper we explore relaxations of (Williams) coherent and convex conditional previsions that form the families of $n$-coherent and $n$-convex conditional previsions, at the varying of $n$. We investigate which such previsions are the most general one may reasonably consider, suggesting (centered) $2$-convex or, if positive homogeneity and conjugacy is needed, $2$-coherent lower previsions. Basic properties of these previsions are studied. In particular, we prove that they satisfy the Generalized Bayes Rule and always have a $2$-convex or, respectively, $2$-coherent natural extension. The role of these extensions is analogous to that of the natural extension for coherent lower previsions. On the contrary, $n$-convex and $n$-coherent previsions with $n\geq 3$ either are convex or coherent themselves or have no extension of the same type on large enough sets. Among the uncertainty concepts that can be modelled by $2$-convexity, we discuss generalizations of capacities and niveloids to a conditional framework and show that the well-known risk measure Value-at-Risk only guarantees to be centered $2$-convex. In the final part, we determine the rationality requirements of $2$-convexity and $2$-coherence from a desirability perspective, emphasising how they weaken those of (Williams) coherence.Comment: This is the authors' version of a work that was accepted for publication in the International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, vol. 77, October 2016, pages 66-86, doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2016.06.003, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0888613X1630079

Bayesian Conditioning, the Reflection Principle, and Quantum Decoherence

The probabilities a Bayesian agent assigns to a set of events typically change with time, for instance when the agent updates them in the light of new data. In this paper we address the question of how an agent's probabilities at different times are constrained by Dutch-book coherence. We review and attempt to clarify the argument that, although an agent is not forced by coherence to use the usual Bayesian conditioning rule to update his probabilities, coherence does require the agent's probabilities to satisfy van Fraassen's [1984] reflection principle (which entails a related constraint pointed out by Goldstein [1983]). We then exhibit the specialized assumption needed to recover Bayesian conditioning from an analogous reflection-style consideration. Bringing the argument to the context of quantum measurement theory, we show that "quantum decoherence" can be understood in purely personalist terms---quantum decoherence (as supposed in a von Neumann chain) is not a physical process at all, but an application of the reflection principle. From this point of view, the decoherence theory of Zeh, Zurek, and others as a story of quantum measurement has the plot turned exactly backward.Comment: 14 pages, written in memory of Itamar Pitowsk

Precise Propagation of Upper and Lower Probability Bounds in System P

In this paper we consider the inference rules of System P in the framework of coherent imprecise probabilistic assessments. Exploiting our algorithms, we propagate the lower and upper probability bounds associated with the conditional assertions of a given knowledge base, automatically obtaining the precise probability bounds for the derived conclusions of the inference rules. This allows a more flexible and realistic use of System P in default reasoning and provides an exact illustration of the degradation of the inference rules when interpreted in probabilistic terms. We also examine the disjunctive Weak Rational Monotony of System P+ proposed by Adams in his extended probability logic.Comment: 8 pages -8th Intl. Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning NMR'2000, April 9-11, Breckenridge, Colorad

Coherent frequentism

By representing the range of fair betting odds according to a pair of confidence set estimators, dual probability measures on parameter space called frequentist posteriors secure the coherence of subjective inference without any prior distribution. The closure of the set of expected losses corresponding to the dual frequentist posteriors constrains decisions without arbitrarily forcing optimization under all circumstances. This decision theory reduces to those that maximize expected utility when the pair of frequentist posteriors is induced by an exact or approximate confidence set estimator or when an automatic reduction rule is applied to the pair. In such cases, the resulting frequentist posterior is coherent in the sense that, as a probability distribution of the parameter of interest, it satisfies the axioms of the decision-theoretic and logic-theoretic systems typically cited in support of the Bayesian posterior. Unlike the p-value, the confidence level of an interval hypothesis derived from such a measure is suitable as an estimator of the indicator of hypothesis truth since it converges in sample-space probability to 1 if the hypothesis is true or to 0 otherwise under general conditions.Comment: The confidence-measure theory of inference and decision is explicitly extended to vector parameters of interest. The derivation of upper and lower confidence levels from valid and nonconservative set estimators is formalize

The shape of incomplete preferences

Incomplete preferences provide the epistemic foundation for models of imprecise subjective probabilities and utilities that are used in robust Bayesian analysis and in theories of bounded rationality. This paper presents a simple axiomatization of incomplete preferences and characterizes the shape of their representing sets of probabilities and utilities. Deletion of the completeness assumption from the axiom system of Anscombe and Aumann yields preferences represented by a convex set of state-dependent expected utilities, of which at least one must be a probability/utility pair. A strengthening of the state-independence axiom is needed to obtain a representation purely in terms of a set of probability/utility pairs.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/009053606000000740 in the Annals of Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aos/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org