Interdependencies between Evaluation of Collision Risks and Performance of Shipborne PNT Data Provision

The highest priority for safe ship navigation is the avoidance of collisions and groundings. For this purpose the concept of ship domain has been introduced to describe the surrounding effective waters which should be kept clear of other ships and obstacles. In the last decades a large variety of ship domains have been developed differing in the applied method of their determination as well as in the modelled shape, size, and safety areas. However, a ship domain should be adjusted in real time to enable a reliable evaluation of collision risks by the officers of the watch. Until today in the discussions about modelling and utilization of ship domains it has been mostly unnoticed that the performance of vessel’s position (P), navigation (N), and timing data (T) ultimately determines the accuracy and integrity of indicated ship domain. This paper addresses this question and starts with a comprehensive analysis of AIS data to prove the violation of ship domains in the maritime practice. A simulation system has been developed to enable for the first time to investigate how far inaccuracies in PNT data result into a fault evaluation of collision risks. The simulation results have shown that there is a non-negligible risk of not detecting a collision, if inaccuracies of sensor data remain unnoticed

Interdependencies between Evaluation of Collision Risks and Performance of Shipborne PNT Data Provision

The highest priority for safe ship navigation is the avoidance of collisions and groundings. For this purpose the concept of ship domain has been introduced to describe the surrounding effective waters which should be kept clear of other ships and obstacles. In the last decades a large variety of ship domains have been developed differing in the applied method of their determination as well as in the modelled shape, size, and safety areas. However, a ship domain should be adjusted in real time to enable a reliable evaluation of collision risks by the officers of the watch. Until today in the discussions about modelling and utilization of ship domains it has been mostly unnoticed that the performance of vessel’s position (P), navigation (N), and timing data (T) ultimately determines the accuracy and integrity of indicated ship domain. This paper addresses this question and starts with a comprehensive analysis of AIS data to prove the violation of ship domains in the maritime practice. A simulation system has been developed to enable for the first time to investigate how far inaccuracies in PNT data result into a fault evaluation of collision risks. The simulation results have shown that there is a non-negligible risk of not detecting a collision, if inaccuracies of sensor data remain unnoticed

A study on the effects of e-navigation on reducing vessel accidents

The dissertation aims to evaluate how and to what extent e-navigation contributes to reducing accidents for SOLAS ships as well as non-SOLAS ships, hoping that the results are referred to IMO Member States when they are implementing enavigation along with the maritime sectors such as shipping companies, crews on board ships and manufactures developing e-navigation related systems. The study focuses on the potential effects of e-navigation based on tool kits of the IMO e-navigation for SOLAS ships and services of SMART-navigation, which is the Korean approach to implementing the e-navigation concept for both SOLAS ships and non-SOLAS ships. The processes and the methodologies that are used by the IMO to assess the effects of e-navigation are investigated. The vessel accidents for all ships in Korean waters and all Korean-flagged ships worldwide during the 5 years from 2009 to 2013 are analyzed. The formula is proposed to calculate the effects of e-navigation on reducing accidents, which can also be used by other Member States of the IMO when they implement e-navigation in their waters. The direct causes of accidents, which are reducible by the risk control options (RCOs), and the RCOs, which are applicable to non-SOLAS ships, are identified. Additionally, an expert questionnaire survey is carried out with a view to supporting the validity of identifying the RCOs and the direct causes. The results are collated and evaluated for the potential effects of e-navigation on reducing accidents, in relation to type of accidents as well as type of ships, for comparison with the results obtained by the IMO and for reference of other Member States. The concluding chapter examines the results of analysis of e-navigation\u27s tool kits and methodologies to assess their effects on reducing accidents, and discusses the potential rate of accident reduction through e-navigation. A number of recommendations are made concerning the need for further investigation in quantifying the coefficient applied to the proposed formula for evaluating the effects of e-navigation

Worldwide Availability of Maritime Medium-Frequency Radio Infrastructure for R-Mode-Supported Navigation

The Ranging Mode (R-Mode), a maritime terrestrial navigation system under development, is a promising approach to increase the resilient provision of position, navigation and timing (PNT) information for bridge instruments, which rely on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). The R-Mode utilizes existing maritime radio infrastructure such as marine radio beacons, which support maritime traffic with more reliable and accurate PNT data in areas with challenging conditions. This paper analyzes the potential service, which the R-Mode could provide to the mariner if worldwide radio beacons were upgraded to broadcast R-Mode signals. The authors assumed for this study that the R-Mode is available in the service area of the 357 operational radio beacons. The comparison with the maritime traffic, which was generated from a one-day worldwide Automatic Identification System (AIS) Class A dataset, showed that on average, 67% of ships would operate in a global R-Mode service area, 40% of ships would see at least three and 25% of ships would see at least four radio beacons at a time. This means that R-Mode would support 25% to 40% of all ships with position and 67% of all ships with PNT integrity information. The relatively high number of supported ships compared to the total radio beacon coverage of about 9% of the earth’s surface is caused by the good coverage of busy ports and areas such as the coast of China, North Sea and Baltic Sea. These numbers emphasize the importance of marine radio beacons for the R-Mode system

Availability of Maritime Radio Beacon Signals for R-Mode in the Southern Baltic Sea

This paper presents an overview of the development of a terrestrial positioning system called Ranging Mode (R-Mode) in the Southern Baltic Sea region which utilizes already existing maritime radio infrastructure. Here, an R-Mode testbed is planned to be set up until 2020 that meets maritime user needs for resilient PNT. First measurements of radio beacon signals on-board a vessel sailing in the Southern Baltic Sea show the good availability of beacon signals in this region. A comparison of received signals with a coverage prediction based on the nominal range of radio beacons shows the shortcoming of this approach and emphasizes the need for more elaborated coverage predictions which consider all effects of medium frequency wave propagation at day and night. In the measurements results the skywave has a major impact on the beacon signal stability in the night. The time stability of the signal amplitude seems to be a good indicator for disturbed reception conditions

Global Administrative Law: Global Governance Of The Global Positioning System And Galileo

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) system originally developed by the Depart- ment of Defense of the United States government in early 1970s.

PNT cyber resilience : a Lab2Live observer based approach, Report 2: specifications for cyber testing facilities. Technical report 2

The use of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such as GPS and Galileo are vital sources of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) information for vehicles. This information is of critical importance for connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) due to their dependence on this information for localisation, route planning and situational awareness. A downside to solely relying on GNSS for PNT is that the signal strength arriving from navigation satellites in space is weak and currently there is no authentication included in the civilian GNSS adopted in the automotive industry. This means that cyber-attacks against the GNSS signal via jamming or spoofing are attractive to adversaries due to the potentially high impact they can achieve. This report introduces specifications and recommendations for GNSS cyber-security test facilities for CAVs. These specifications are based on a survey of academic literature, interviews with a select group of experts, and experiences obtained performing laboratory and real-world testing (shown in Figure 1)