Complexity, BioComplexity, the Connectionist Conjecture and Ontology of Complexity\ud

This paper develops and integrates major ideas and concepts on complexity and biocomplexity - the connectionist conjecture, universal ontology of complexity, irreducible complexity of totality & inherent randomness, perpetual evolution of information, emergence of criticality and equivalence of symmetry & complexity. This paper introduces the Connectionist Conjecture which states that the one and only representation of Totality is the connectionist one i.e. in terms of nodes and edges. This paper also introduces an idea of Universal Ontology of Complexity and develops concepts in that direction. The paper also develops ideas and concepts on the perpetual evolution of information, irreducibility and computability of totality, all in the context of the Connectionist Conjecture. The paper indicates that the control and communication are the prime functionals that are responsible for the symmetry and complexity of complex phenomenon. The paper takes the stand that the phenomenon of life (including its evolution) is probably the nearest to what we can describe with the term “complexity”. The paper also assumes that signaling and communication within the living world and of the living world with the environment creates the connectionist structure of the biocomplexity. With life and its evolution as the substrate, the paper develops ideas towards the ontology of complexity. The paper introduces new complexity theoretic interpretations of fundamental biomolecular parameters. The paper also develops ideas on the methodology to determine the complexity of “true” complex phenomena.\u

The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative

Platonic model of mind as an approximation to neurodynamics

Hierarchy of approximations involved in simplification of microscopic theories, from sub-cellural to the whole brain level, is presented. A new approximation to neural dynamics is described, leading to a Platonic-like model of mind based on psychological spaces. Objects and events in these spaces correspond to quasi-stable states of brain dynamics and may be interpreted from psychological point of view. Platonic model bridges the gap between neurosciences and psychological sciences. Static and dynamic versions of this model are outlined and Feature Space Mapping, a neurofuzzy realization of the static version of Platonic model, described. Categorization experiments with human subjects are analyzed from the neurodynamical and Platonic model points of view

Dimensions of Neural-symbolic Integration - A Structured Survey

Research on integrated neural-symbolic systems has made significant progress in the recent past. In particular the understanding of ways to deal with symbolic knowledge within connectionist systems (also called artificial neural networks) has reached a critical mass which enables the community to strive for applicable implementations and use cases. Recent work has covered a great variety of logics used in artificial intelligence and provides a multitude of techniques for dealing with them within the context of artificial neural networks. We present a comprehensive survey of the field of neural-symbolic integration, including a new classification of system according to their architectures and abilities.Comment: 28 page

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

Training neural networks to encode symbols enables combinatorial generalization

Combinatorial generalization - the ability to understand and produce novel combinations of already familiar elements - is considered to be a core capacity of the human mind and a major challenge to neural network models. A significant body of research suggests that conventional neural networks can't solve this problem unless they are endowed with mechanisms specifically engineered for the purpose of representing symbols. In this paper we introduce a novel way of representing symbolic structures in connectionist terms - the vectors approach to representing symbols (VARS), which allows training standard neural architectures to encode symbolic knowledge explicitly at their output layers. In two simulations, we show that neural networks not only can learn to produce VARS representations, but in doing so they achieve combinatorial generalization in their symbolic and non-symbolic output. This adds to other recent work that has shown improved combinatorial generalization under specific training conditions, and raises the question of whether specific mechanisms or training routines are needed to support symbolic processing