Principles of Physical Layer Security in Multiuser Wireless Networks: A Survey

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the domain of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks. The essential premise of physical-layer security is to enable the exchange of confidential messages over a wireless medium in the presence of unauthorized eavesdroppers without relying on higher-layer encryption. This can be achieved primarily in two ways: without the need for a secret key by intelligently designing transmit coding strategies, or by exploiting the wireless communication medium to develop secret keys over public channels. The survey begins with an overview of the foundations dating back to the pioneering work of Shannon and Wyner on information-theoretic security. We then describe the evolution of secure transmission strategies from point-to-point channels to multiple-antenna systems, followed by generalizations to multiuser broadcast, multiple-access, interference, and relay networks. Secret-key generation and establishment protocols based on physical layer mechanisms are subsequently covered. Approaches for secrecy based on channel coding design are then examined, along with a description of inter-disciplinary approaches based on game theory and stochastic geometry. The associated problem of physical-layer message authentication is also introduced briefly. The survey concludes with observations on potential research directions in this area.Comment: 23 pages, 10 figures, 303 refs. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1303.1609 by other authors. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 201

Blockchain-based distributive auction for relay-assisted secure communications

Physical layer security (PLS) is considered as a promising technique to prevent information eavesdropping in wireless systems. In this context, cooperative relaying has emerged as a robust solution for achieving PLS due to multipath diversity and relatively lower transmission power. However, relays or the relay operators in the practical environment are unwilling for service provisioning unless they are incentivized for their cost of services. Thus, it is required to jointly consider network economics and relay cooperation to improve system efficiency. In this paper, we consider the problem of joint network economics and PLS using cooperative relaying and jamming. Based on the double auction theory, we model the interaction between transmitters seeking for a particular level of secure transmission of information and relay operators for suitable relay and jammer assignment, in a multiple source-destination networks. In addition, theoretical analyses are presented to justify that the proposed auction mechanism satisfies the desirable economic properties of individual rationality, budget balance, and truthfulness. As the participants in the traditional centralized auction framework may take selfish actions or collude with each other, we propose a decentralized and trustless auction framework based on blockchain technology. In particular, we exploit the smart contract feature of blockchain to construct a completely autonomous framework, where all the participants are financially enforced by smart contract terms. The security properties of the proposed framework are also discussed

Jamming Cognitive Radios

The goal of this thesis is to identify and evaluate weaknesses in the rendezvous process for Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) in the presence of a Cognitive Jammer (CJ). Jamming strategies are suggested and tested for effectiveness. Methods for safe- guarding the Cognitive Radios (CRs) against a CJ are also explored. A simulation is constructed to set up a scenario of two CRs interacting with a CJ. Analysis of the simulation is conducted primarily at the waveform level. A hardware setup is constructed to analyze the system in the physical layer, verify the interactions from the simulation, and test in a low signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) environment. The hardware used in this thesis is the Wireless Open-Access Research Platform. Performance metrics from open literature and independent testing are compared against those captured from the jamming tests. The goal of testing is to evaluate and quantify the ability to delay the rendezvous process of a CRN. There was some success in delaying rendezvous, even in a high SINR environment. Jamming strategies include a jammer that repeats an observed channel-hopping pattern, a jammer with random inputs using the same algorithm of the CRs, a jammer that estimates channel-hopping parameters based on observations, and a random channel-hopping jammer. Results were compared against control scenarios, consisting of no jamming and a jammer that is always jamming on the same channel as one of the CRs. The repeater, random inputs to the CR algorithm, observation-based estimation jammer, and the random channel hopping jammer were mildly successful in delaying rendezvous at about 0%, 9%, 0%, and 1%, respectively. The jammer that is always on the same channel as a CR had an overall rendezvous delay about 13% of the time

Binary Signaling under Subjective Priors and Costs as a Game

Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of the transmitter to his policies, we formulate the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and establish equilibrium solutions and their properties. In addition, the effects of subjective priors and costs on Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are analyzed. It is shown that there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the Stackelberg assumption, but there always exists an equilibrium. However, apart from the informative and non-informative equilibria cases, under certain conditions, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium when the receiver is restricted to use deterministic policies. For the corresponding team setup, however, an equilibrium typically always exists and is always informative. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs on equilibrium values around the team setup (with identical costs and priors), and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium behavior is not robust to small perturbations whereas the Nash equilibrium is.Comment: to appear in CDC 2018 : Proceedings of the 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Miami Beach, FL, USA, December 17-19, 201

Handshaking Protocols and Jamming Mechanisms for Blind Rendezvous in a Dynamic Spectrum Access Environment

Blind frequency rendezvous is an important process for bootstrapping communications between radios without the use of pre-existing infrastructure or common control channel in a Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) environment. In this process, radios attempt to arrive in the same frequency channel and recognize each other’s presence in changing, under-utilized spectrum. This paper refines existing blind rendezvous techniques by introducing a handshaking algorithm for setting up communications once two radios have arrived in the same frequency channel. It then investigates the effect of different jamming techniques on blind rendezvous algorithms that utilize this handshake. The handshake performance is measured by determining the probability of a handshake, the time to handshake, and the increase in time to rendezvous (TTR) with a handshake compared to that without. The handshake caused varying increases in TTR depending on the time spent in each channel. Four different jamming techniques are applied to the blind rendezvous process: noise, deceptive, sense, and Primary User Emulation (PUE). Each jammer type is analyzed to determine how they increase the TTR, how often they successfully jam over a period of time, and how long it takes to jam. The sense jammer was most effective, followed by PUE, deceptive, and noise, respectively

Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks

The advanced features of 5G mobile wireless network systems yield new security requirements and challenges. This paper presents a comprehensive survey on security of 5G wireless network systems compared to the traditional cellular networks. The paper starts with a review on 5G wireless networks particularities as well as on the new requirements and motivations of 5G wireless security. The potential attacks and security services with the consideration of new service requirements and new use cases in 5G wireless networks are then summarized. The recent development and the existing schemes for the 5G wireless security are presented based on the corresponding security services including authentication, availability, data confidentiality, key management and privacy. The paper further discusses the new security features involving different technologies applied to 5G such as heterogeneous networks, device-to-device communications, massive multiple-input multiple-output, software defined networks and Internet of Things. Motivated by these security research and development activities, we propose a new 5G wireless security architecture, based on which the analysis of identity management and flexible authentication is provided. As a case study, we explore a handover procedure as well as a signaling load scheme to show the advantage of the proposed security architecture. The challenges and future directions of 5G wireless security are finally summarized

Game Theory Meets Network Security and Privacy

This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the research contributions that analyze and solve security and privacy problems in computer networks by game-theoretic approaches. A selected set of works are presented to highlight the application of game theory in order to address different forms of security and privacy problems in computer networks and mobile applications. The presented works are classified into six main categories based on their topics: security of the physical and MAC layers, application layer security in mobile networks, intrusion detection systems, anonymity and privacy, economics of network security, and cryptography. In each category, security problems, players, and game models are identified and the main results of selected works, such as equilibrium analysis and security mechanism designs are summarized. In addition, a discussion on advantages, drawbacks, and the future direction of using game theory in this field is provided. In this survey, we aim to provide a better understanding of the different research approaches for applying game theory to network security. This survey can also help researchers from various fields develop game-theoretic solutions to current and emerging security problems in computer networking