2,320 research outputs found
Pricing average price advertising options when underlying spot market prices are discontinuous
Advertising options have been recently studied as a special type of
guaranteed contracts in online advertising, which are an alternative sales
mechanism to real-time auctions. An advertising option is a contract which
gives its buyer a right but not obligation to enter into transactions to
purchase page views or link clicks at one or multiple pre-specified prices in a
specific future period. Different from typical guaranteed contracts, the option
buyer pays a lower upfront fee but can have greater flexibility and more
control of advertising. Many studies on advertising options so far have been
restricted to the situations where the option payoff is determined by the
underlying spot market price at a specific time point and the price evolution
over time is assumed to be continuous. The former leads to a biased calculation
of option payoff and the latter is invalid empirically for many online
advertising slots. This paper addresses these two limitations by proposing a
new advertising option pricing framework. First, the option payoff is
calculated based on an average price over a specific future period. Therefore,
the option becomes path-dependent. The average price is measured by the power
mean, which contains several existing option payoff functions as its special
cases. Second, jump-diffusion stochastic models are used to describe the
movement of the underlying spot market price, which incorporate several
important statistical properties including jumps and spikes, non-normality, and
absence of autocorrelations. A general option pricing algorithm is obtained
based on Monte Carlo simulation. In addition, an explicit pricing formula is
derived for the case when the option payoff is based on the geometric mean.
This pricing formula is also a generalized version of several other option
pricing models discussed in related studies.Comment: IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 201
A Novel Method to Calculate Click Through Rate for Sponsored Search
Sponsored search adopts generalized second price (GSP) auction mechanism
which works on the concept of pay per click which is most commonly used for the
allocation of slots in the searched page. Two main aspects associated with GSP
are the bidding amount and the click through rate (CTR). The CTR learning
algorithms currently being used works on the basic principle of (#clicks_i/
#impressions_i) under a fixed window of clicks or impressions or time. CTR are
prone to fraudulent clicks, resulting in sudden increase of CTR. The current
algorithms are unable to find the solutions to stop this, although with the use
of machine learning algorithms it can be detected that fraudulent clicks are
being generated. In our paper, we have used the concept of relative ranking
which works on the basic principle of (#clicks_i /#clicks_t). In this
algorithm, both the numerator and the denominator are linked. As #clicks_t is
higher than previous algorithms and is linked to the #clicks_i, the small
change in the clicks which occurs in the normal scenario have a very small
change in the result but in case of fraudulent clicks the number of clicks
increases or decreases rapidly which will add up with the normal clicks to
increase the denominator, thereby decreasing the CTR.Comment: 10 pages, 1 figur
Real-Time Bidding by Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertising
The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB)
--- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just
being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally,
it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid
an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as
a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression
independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the
bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span
before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by
the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the
rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has
completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy
sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across
all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future
rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a
reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the
auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is
the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition,
we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding
policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding
environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world
auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation
using neural networks.Comment: WSDM 201
Born to trade: a genetically evolved keyword bidder for sponsored search
In sponsored search auctions, advertisers choose a set of keywords based on products they wish to market. They bid for advertising slots that will be displayed on the search results page when a user submits a query containing the keywords that the advertiser selected. Deciding how much to bid is a real challenge: if the bid is too low with respect to the bids of other advertisers, the ad might not get displayed in a favorable position; a bid that is too high on the other hand might not be profitable either, since the attracted number of conversions might not be enough to compensate for the high cost per click.
In this paper we propose a genetically evolved keyword bidding strategy that decides how much to bid for each query based on historical data such as the position obtained on the previous day. In light of the fact that our approach does not implement any particular expert knowledge on keyword auctions, it did remarkably well in the Trading Agent Competition at IJCAI2009
The Economics of Internet Markets
The internet has facilitated the creation of new markets characterized by large scale, increased customization, rapid innovation and the collection and use of detailed consumer and market data. I describe these changes and some of the economic theory that has been useful for thinking about online advertising markets, retail and business-to-business e-commerce, internet job matching and financial exchanges, and other internet platforms. I also discuss the empirical evidence on competition and consumer behavior in internet markets and some directions for future research.internet, market, innovation, advertising, retail, e-commerce, financial exchanges
Real-time Bidding for Online Advertising: Measurement and Analysis
The real-time bidding (RTB), aka programmatic buying, has recently become the
fastest growing area in online advertising. Instead of bulking buying and
inventory-centric buying, RTB mimics stock exchanges and utilises computer
algorithms to automatically buy and sell ads in real-time; It uses per
impression context and targets the ads to specific people based on data about
them, and hence dramatically increases the effectiveness of display
advertising. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis and measurement of
a production ad exchange. Using the data sampled from both demand and supply
side, we aim to provide first-hand insights into the emerging new impression
selling infrastructure and its bidding behaviours, and help identifying
research and design issues in such systems. From our study, we observed that
periodic patterns occur in various statistics including impressions, clicks,
bids, and conversion rates (both post-view and post-click), which suggest
time-dependent models would be appropriate for capturing the repeated patterns
in RTB. We also found that despite the claimed second price auction, the first
price payment in fact is accounted for 55.4% of total cost due to the
arrangement of the soft floor price. As such, we argue that the setting of soft
floor price in the current RTB systems puts advertisers in a less favourable
position. Furthermore, our analysis on the conversation rates shows that the
current bidding strategy is far less optimal, indicating the significant needs
for optimisation algorithms incorporating the facts such as the temporal
behaviours, the frequency and recency of the ad displays, which have not been
well considered in the past.Comment: Accepted by ADKDD '13 worksho
Statistical Arbitrage Mining for Display Advertising
We study and formulate arbitrage in display advertising. Real-Time Bidding
(RTB) mimics stock spot exchanges and utilises computers to algorithmically buy
display ads per impression via a real-time auction. Despite the new automation,
the ad markets are still informationally inefficient due to the heavily
fragmented marketplaces. Two display impressions with similar or identical
effectiveness (e.g., measured by conversion or click-through rates for a
targeted audience) may sell for quite different prices at different market
segments or pricing schemes. In this paper, we propose a novel data mining
paradigm called Statistical Arbitrage Mining (SAM) focusing on mining and
exploiting price discrepancies between two pricing schemes. In essence, our
SAMer is a meta-bidder that hedges advertisers' risk between CPA (cost per
action)-based campaigns and CPM (cost per mille impressions)-based ad
inventories; it statistically assesses the potential profit and cost for an
incoming CPM bid request against a portfolio of CPA campaigns based on the
estimated conversion rate, bid landscape and other statistics learned from
historical data. In SAM, (i) functional optimisation is utilised to seek for
optimal bidding to maximise the expected arbitrage net profit, and (ii) a
portfolio-based risk management solution is leveraged to reallocate bid volume
and budget across the set of campaigns to make a risk and return trade-off. We
propose to jointly optimise both components in an EM fashion with high
efficiency to help the meta-bidder successfully catch the transient statistical
arbitrage opportunities in RTB. Both the offline experiments on a real-world
large-scale dataset and online A/B tests on a commercial platform demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed solution in exploiting arbitrage in various
model settings and market environments.Comment: In the proceedings of the 21st ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD 2015
- …