Social welfare and profit maximization from revealed preferences

Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her $n$ (divisible) goods when faced with a set of $m$ consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study both social welfare and profit maximization with revealed preferences. Although social welfare maximization is a seemingly non-convex optimization problem in prices, we show that (i) it can be reduced to a dual convex optimization problem in prices, and (ii) the revealed preferences can be interpreted as supergradients of the concave conjugate of valuation, with which subgradients of the dual function can be computed. We thereby obtain a simple subgradient-based algorithm for strongly concave valuations and convex cost, with query complexity $O(m^2/\epsilon^2)$, where $\epsilon$ is the additive difference between the social welfare induced by our algorithm and the optimum social welfare. We also study social welfare maximization under the online setting, specifically the random permutation model, where consumers arrive one-by-one in a random order. For the case where consumer valuations can be arbitrary continuous functions, we propose a price posting mechanism that achieves an expected social welfare up to an additive factor of $O(\sqrt{mn})$ from the maximum social welfare. Finally, for profit maximization (which may be non-convex in simple cases), we give nearly matching upper and lower bounds on the query complexity for separable valuations and cost (i.e., each good can be treated independently)

The Variable Markov Oracle: Algorithms for Human Gesture Applications

This article introduces the Variable Markov Oracle (VMO) data structure for multivariate time series indexing. VMO can identify repetitive fragments and find sequential similarities between observations. VMO can also be viewed as a combination of online clustering algorithms with variable-order Markov constraints. The authors use VMO for gesture query-by-content and gesture following. A probabilistic interpretation of the VMO query-matching algorithm is proposed to find an analogy to the inference problem in a hidden Markov model (HMM). This probabilistic interpretation extends VMO to be not only a data structure but also a model for time series. Query-by-content experiments were conducted on a gesture database that was recorded using a Kinect 3D camera, showing state-of-the-art performance. The query-by-content experiments' results are compared to previous works using HMM and dynamic time warping. Gesture following is described in the context of an interactive dance environment that aims to integrate human movements with computer-generated graphics to create an augmented reality performance

Allocation Problems in Ride-Sharing Platforms: Online Matching with Offline Reusable Resources

Bipartite matching markets pair agents on one side of a market with agents, items, or contracts on the opposing side. Prior work addresses online bipartite matching markets, where agents arrive over time and are dynamically matched to a known set of disposable resources. In this paper, we propose a new model, Online Matching with (offline) Reusable Resources under Known Adversarial Distributions (OM-RR-KAD), in which resources on the offline side are reusable instead of disposable; that is, once matched, resources become available again at some point in the future. We show that our model is tractable by presenting an LP-based adaptive algorithm that achieves an online competitive ratio of 1/2 - eps for any given eps greater than 0. We also show that no non-adaptive algorithm can achieve a ratio of 1/2 + o(1) based on the same benchmark LP. Through a data-driven analysis on a massive openly-available dataset, we show our model is robust enough to capture the application of taxi dispatching services and ride-sharing systems. We also present heuristics that perform well in practice.Comment: To appear in AAAI 201

How the Experts Algorithm Can Help Solve LPs Online

We consider the problem of solving packing/covering LPs online, when the columns of the constraint matrix are presented in random order. This problem has received much attention and the main focus is to figure out how large the right-hand sides of the LPs have to be (compared to the entries on the left-hand side of the constraints) to allow $(1+\epsilon)$-approximations online. It is known that the right-hand sides have to be $\Omega(\epsilon^{-2} \log m)$ times the left-hand sides, where $m$ is the number of constraints. In this paper we give a primal-dual algorithm that achieve this bound for mixed packing/covering LPs. Our algorithms construct dual solutions using a regret-minimizing online learning algorithm in a black-box fashion, and use them to construct primal solutions. The adversarial guarantee that holds for the constructed duals helps us to take care of most of the correlations that arise in the algorithm; the remaining correlations are handled via martingale concentration and maximal inequalities. These ideas lead to conceptually simple and modular algorithms, which we hope will be useful in other contexts.Comment: An extended abstract appears in the 22nd European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2014

The Social Medium Selection Game

We consider in this paper competition of content creators in routing their content through various media. The routing decisions may correspond to the selection of a social network (e.g. twitter versus facebook or linkedin) or of a group within a given social network. The utility for a player to send its content to some medium is given as the difference between the dissemination utility at this medium and some transmission cost. We model this game as a congestion game and compute the pure potential of the game. In contrast to the continuous case, we show that there may be various equilibria. We show that the potential is M-concave which allows us to characterize the equilibria and to propose an algorithm for computing it. We then give a learning mechanism which allow us to give an efficient algorithm to determine an equilibrium. We finally determine the asymptotic form of the equilibrium and discuss the implications on the social medium selection problem