Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Mechanism Design Approach

In this paper we use mechanism design approach to find the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.peer-to-peer networks, mechanism design.

On the Applicability of Resources Optimization Model for Mitigating Free Riding in P2P System

The survival of peer-to-peer systems depends on the contribution of resources by all the participating peers. Selfish behavior of some peers that do not contribute resources inhibits the expected level of service delivery. Free riding has been found to seriously affect the performance and negates the sharing principle of peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, first, we investigate through simulations the effectiveness of a proposed linear model for mitigating free riding in a P2P system. Second, we extended the initial linear model by incorporating additional constraints on download and upload of each peer. This helps in reducing the effects of free riding behavior on the system. Lastly, we evaluate the impacts of some parameters on the models.Keywords: Peer-to-Peer, Resources, Free rider, Optimization, Constraints, Algorith

A mathematical framework for analyzing incentives in peer-to-peer networks

The existence and performance of peer-to-peer systems depend on thecontribution of resources from interacting peers. One of the challenges ofresource sharing in peer-to-peer systems is free riding. A situation usersattempt to exploit the system by utilizing the resources of others withoutcontributing. We view this from rationality perspective that every peer inthe network will attempt to maximize their utility of the system. In thispaper, we approach the problem of free riders mitigation from utilityoptimization point of view, by modeling each peer's interest as UtilityMaximization Problem (UTP). We propose analytical model for the wholenetwork as a mixed integer linear programming model. The super peers inthe network are given the responsibility of maximizing the utility of all peers connected to them. This is to ensure fairness among the interacting peers and the stability of the entire system. This technique allows peers to either upload or download resources based on their best strategy and interest.Keywords: Free rider, Utility, Peer-to-Peer, Incentives, Maximization,Resource

Mitigating Free Riding in Peer-To-Peer Networks: Game Theory Approach

The performance of peer-to-peer systems is based on the quality and quantity of resource contributions from participating peers. In most systems, users are assumed to be cooperative, but in reality, sharing in peer-to-peer systems is faced with the problem of free riding. In this paper, we model the interactions between peers as a modified gift giving game and proposed an utility exchange incentive mechanism to inhibit free riding. This technique allows peers to either upload or download resources based on their best strategy and interest. Through extensive simulations, we show that this mechanism can increase fairness and encourage resource contribution by peers to the network. This will ensure a resourceful and stable peer- to-peer systems.http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/njt.v34i2.2

Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms

Game theory has developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent software systems. This tailoring gives rise to the field of computational mechanism design, which applies economic principles to computer systems design