A mathematical framework for analyzing incentives in peer-to-peer networks

Abstract

The existence and performance of peer-to-peer systems depend on thecontribution of resources from interacting peers. One of the challenges ofresource sharing in peer-to-peer systems is free riding. A situation usersattempt to exploit the system by utilizing the resources of others withoutcontributing. We view this from rationality perspective that every peer inthe network will attempt to maximize their utility of the system. In thispaper, we approach the problem of free riders mitigation from utilityoptimization point of view, by modeling each peer's interest as UtilityMaximization Problem (UTP). We propose analytical model for the wholenetwork as a mixed integer linear programming model. The super peers inthe network are given the responsibility of maximizing the utility of all peers connected to them. This is to ensure fairness among the interacting peers and the stability of the entire system. This technique allows peers to either upload or download resources based on their best strategy and interest.Keywords: Free rider, Utility, Peer-to-Peer, Incentives, Maximization,Resource

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