A duopoly model with heterogeneous congestion-sensitive customers

This paper analyzes a model with multiple firms (providers), and two classes of customers. These customers classes are characterized by their attitude towards `congestion' (caused by other customers using the same resources); a firm is selected on the basis of both the prices charged by the firms, and the `congestion levels'. The model can be represented by a two-stage game: in the first providers set their prices, whereas in the second the customers choose the provider (or to not use any service at all) for given prices. We explicitly allow the providers to split their resources, in order to serve more than just one market segment. This enables us to further analyze the Paris metro pricing ({\sc Pmp}) proposal for service differentiation in the Internet. \u

Self-Evaluation Applied Mathematics 2003-2008 University of Twente

This report contains the self-study for the research assessment of the Department of Applied Mathematics (AM) of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS) at the University of Twente (UT). The report provides the information for the Research Assessment Committee for Applied Mathematics, dealing with mathematical sciences at the three universities of technology in the Netherlands. It describes the state of affairs pertaining to the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008

A duopoly model with heterogeneous congestion-sensitive customers.

This paper analyzes a model with two firms (providers), and two classes of customers. These customers classes are characterized by their attitude towards `congestion' (caused by other customers using the same resources); a firm is selected on the basis of both the prices charged by the firms, and the `congestion levels'. The model can be represented by a two-stage game: in the first providers set their prices, whereas in the second the customers choose the provider (or to not use any service at all) for given prices. We explicitly allow the providers to split their resources, in order to serve more than just one market segment. This enables us to further analyze the Paris metro pricing (PMP) proposal for service differentiation in the Internet. We prove that the stage-2 game (the customers' behavior for given prices, and a given division of the providers' resources) has a unique equilibrium. Insight is gained into the structural properties of the equilibrium. We also show that the objective functions in the stage-1 game are continuous (in the providers' decision variables), thus enabling an efficient search for its equilibrium. We comment on the viability of the PMP proposa

A duopoly model with heterogeneous congestion-sensitive customers

This paper analyzes a model with two firms (providers), and two classes of customers. These customers classes are characterized by their attitude towards ‘congestion’ (caused by other customers using the same resources); a firm is selected on the basis of both the prices charged by the firms, and the ‘congestion levels’. The model can be represented by a two-stage game: in the first providers set their prices, whereas in the second the customers choose the provider (or to not use any service at all) for given prices. We explicitly allow the providers to split their resources, in order to serve more than just one market segment. This enables us to further analyze the Paris metro pricing (Pmp) proposal for service differentiation in the Internet.\ud \ud We prove that the stage-2 game (the customers’ behavior for given prices, and a given division of the providers’ resources) has a unique equilibrium. Insight is gained into the structural properties of the equilibrium. We also show that the objective functions in the stage-1 game are continuous (in the providers’ decision variables), thus enabling an efficient search for its equilibrium. We comment on the viability of the Pmp proposal