5 research outputs found

    A compositional treatment of iterated open games

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    Compositional Game Theory is a new, recently introduced model of economic games based upon the computer science idea of compositionality. In it, complex and irregular games can be built up from smaller and simpler games, and the equilibria of these complex games can be defined recursively from the equilibria of their simpler subgames. This paper extends the model by providing a final coalgebra semantics for infinite games. In the course of this, we introduce a new operator on games to model the economic concept of subgame perfection

    Compositional game theory

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    We introduce open games as a compositional foundation of economic game theory. A compositional approach potentially allows methods of game theory and theoretical computer science to be applied to large-scale economic models for which standard economic tools are not practical. An open game represents a game played relative to an arbitrary environment and to this end we introduce the concept of coutility, which is the utility generated by an open game and returned to its environment. Open games are the morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category and can therefore be composed by categorical composition into sequential move games and by monoidal products into simultaneous move games. Open games can be represented by string diagrams which provide an intuitive but formal visualisation of the information flows. We show that a variety of games can be faithfully represented as open games in the sense of having the same Nash equilibria and off-equilibrium best responses.Comment: This version submitted to LiCS 201

    Morphisms of open games

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    We define a notion of morphisms between open games, exploiting a surprising connection between lenses in computer science and compositional game theory. This extends the more intuitively obvious definition of globular morphisms as mappings between strategy profiles that preserve best responses, and hence in particular preserve Nash equilibria. We construct a symmetric monoidal double category in which the horizontal 1-cells are open games, vertical 1-morphisms are lenses, and 2-cells are morphisms of open games. States (morphisms out of the monoidal unit) in the vertical category give a flexible solution concept that includes both Nash and subgame perfect equilibria. Products in the vertical category give an external choice operator that is reminiscent of products in game semantics, and is useful in practical examples. We illustrate the above two features with a simple worked example from microeconomics, the market entry game
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