5 research outputs found
A compositional treatment of iterated open games
Compositional Game Theory is a new, recently introduced model of economic games based upon the computer science idea of compositionality. In it, complex and irregular games can be built up from smaller and simpler games, and the equilibria of these complex games can be defined recursively from the equilibria of their simpler subgames. This paper extends the model by providing a final coalgebra semantics for infinite games. In the course of this, we introduce a new operator on games to model the economic concept of subgame perfection
Compositional game theory
We introduce open games as a compositional foundation of economic game
theory. A compositional approach potentially allows methods of game theory and
theoretical computer science to be applied to large-scale economic models for
which standard economic tools are not practical. An open game represents a game
played relative to an arbitrary environment and to this end we introduce the
concept of coutility, which is the utility generated by an open game and
returned to its environment. Open games are the morphisms of a symmetric
monoidal category and can therefore be composed by categorical composition into
sequential move games and by monoidal products into simultaneous move games.
Open games can be represented by string diagrams which provide an intuitive but
formal visualisation of the information flows. We show that a variety of games
can be faithfully represented as open games in the sense of having the same
Nash equilibria and off-equilibrium best responses.Comment: This version submitted to LiCS 201
Morphisms of open games
We define a notion of morphisms between open games, exploiting a surprising
connection between lenses in computer science and compositional game theory.
This extends the more intuitively obvious definition of globular morphisms as
mappings between strategy profiles that preserve best responses, and hence in
particular preserve Nash equilibria. We construct a symmetric monoidal double
category in which the horizontal 1-cells are open games, vertical 1-morphisms
are lenses, and 2-cells are morphisms of open games. States (morphisms out of
the monoidal unit) in the vertical category give a flexible solution concept
that includes both Nash and subgame perfect equilibria. Products in the
vertical category give an external choice operator that is reminiscent of
products in game semantics, and is useful in practical examples. We illustrate
the above two features with a simple worked example from microeconomics, the
market entry game