Content and action: The guidance theory of representation

The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. We offer a brief account of the biological origins of representation, a formal characterization of the guidance theory, some examples of its use, and show how the guidance theory handles some traditional problem cases for representation: the problems of error and of representation of fictional and abstract entities

Enabling collaboration in virtual reality navigators

In this paper we characterize a feature superset for Collaborative Virtual Reality Environments (CVRE), and derive a component framework to transform stand-alone VR navigators into full-fledged multithreaded collaborative environments. The contributions of our approach rely on a cost-effective and extensible technique for loading software components into separate POSIX threads for rendering, user interaction and network communications, and adding a top layer for managing session collaboration. The framework recasts a VR navigator under a distributed peer-to-peer topology for scene and object sharing, using callback hooks for broadcasting remote events and multicamera perspective sharing with avatar interaction. We validate the framework by applying it to our own ALICE VR Navigator. Experimental results show that our approach has good performance in the collaborative inspection of complex models.Postprint (published version

Modal Considerations on Information Processing and Computation in the Nervous System

We can characterize computationalism very generally as a complex thesis with two main parts: the thesis that the brain (or the nervous system) is a computational system and the thesis that neural computation explains cognition. As Piccinini and Bahar (2012) point out, over the last six decades, computationalism has been the mainstream theory of cognition. Nevertheless, there is still substantial debate about which type of computation explains cognition, and computationalism itself still remains controversial. My aim in this paper is to make two main contributions to the debate about the first subthesis of computationalism, i.e. that the brain is a computational system. First, I want to offer an accurate elucidation of the notion relevant for understanding computationalism (the notion of computation) and clarify the relation between computation and information as well as the relations between both computation and information processing and the nervous system. Second, I want to argue against a peculiar form of computationalism: the thesis that neural processes are constitutively computational in some sense; that neural processes cannot be realized by a system that is not in some sense computational. I will call this thesis "modal computationalism". In particular, I want to argue that neural processing can be realized by a system that is not a sui generis computer (i. e., a computing system that is neither digital nor analog) and by a system that is not a generic computer (a computer in the most general sense: one that includes digital, analog, and any other kind of computation). Actual neural processing is presumed to be computational in these two senses (Piccinini and Bahar 2012). I will argue that, even if this is true, neural processing can be realized by a computing system that is not of the same kind as those that perform actual neural processing and even by a system that is not computational at all.Fil: Wajnerman Paz, Abel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentin

Aerospace Medicine and Biology: A continuing bibliography with indexes (supplement 314)

This bibliography lists 139 reports, articles, and other documents introduced into the NASA scientific and technical information system in August, 1988