Propositional semantics for default logic

We present new semantics for propositional default logic based on the notion of meta-interpretations - truth functions that assign truth values to clauses rather than letters. This leads to a propositional characterization of default theories: for each such finite theory, we show a classical propositional theory such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between models for the latter and extensions of the former. This means that computing an extension and answering questions about coherence, set-membership, and set-entailment are reducible to propositional satisfiability. The general transformation is exponential but tractable for a subset which we call 2-DT which is a superset of network default theories and disjunction-free default theories. This leads to the observation that coherence and membership for the class 2-DT is NP-complete and entailment is co-NP-complete.Since propositional satisfiability can be regarded as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP), this work also paves the way for applying CSP techniques to default reasoning. In particular, we use the taxonomy of tractable CSP to identify new tractable subsets for Reiter's default logic. Our procedures allow also for computing stable models of extended logic programs

Towards efficient default reasoning

A decision method for Reiter's default logic is developed. It can determine whether a default theory has an extension, whether a formula is in some extension of a default theory and whether a formula is in every extension of a default theory. The method handles full propositional default logic. It can be implemented to work in polynomial space and by using only a theorem prover for the underlying propositional logic as a subroutine. The method divides default reasoning into two major subtasks: the search task of examining every alternative for extensions, which is solved by backtracking search, and the classical reasoning task, which can be implemented by a theorem prover for the underlying classical logic. Special emphasis is given to the search problem. The decision method employs a new compact representation of extensions which reduces the search space. Efficient techniques for pruning the search space further are developed

Default reasoning and the law: a dialogue

Reasoning by default is a relevant aspect of everyday life that has traditionally attracted the attention of many fields of research, from psychology to the philosophy of logic, from economics to artificial intelligence. Also in the field of law, default reasoning is widely used by lawyers, judges and other legal decision-makers. In this paper, a philosopher of language (Carlo Penco) and a philosopher of law (Damiano Canale) attempt to explore some uses of default reasoning that are scarcely considered by legal theory. In particular, the dialogue dwells on the notion of literal meaning, witness testimony, and the problem of disagreement among experts in legal proceedings. The paper is intended as a sort of brain storming useful to identify new lines of research straddling philosophy of law, cognitive psychology and philosophy of language

The Zoo Keeper's Paradox

Default reasoning is a mode of commonsense reas(Miing which lets us jump to plausible conclusions when there is no contrary information. A crucial operation of default reasoning systems is the checking and maintaining of consistency. However, it has been argued that default reasoning is inconsistent: Any rational agent will believe that it has some false beliefs. By doing so. the agent guarantees itself an inconsistent belief set (Israel, 1980). Perlis (1986) develops Israel's argument into an argument for the inconsist^cy of recoUective Socratic default reasoning systems. The Zoo Keeper's Paradox has been offered as a concrete example to demonstrate the inconsistency of commonsense beliefs. In this paper, w e show that Israel and Perils' arguments are not well founded. A rational agent only needs to believe that some of its beliefs are possibly or probably false. This requirement does not imply that the beliefs of rational agents are necessarily inconsistent Decision theory is used to show that concrete examples of seemingly inconsistent beliefs, such as the Zoo Keeper's Paradox, can be rational as well as consistent. These examples show that analyses of commonsense beliefs can be very misleading when utility is ignored. W e also examine the justifications of the exploratory and incredulous approaches in default reasoning, decision theoretic considerations favor the exploratory approach

Disjunctive Logic Programs with Inheritance

The paper proposes a new knowledge representation language, called DLP<, which extends disjunctive logic programming (with strong negation) by inheritance. The addition of inheritance enhances the knowledge modeling features of the language providing a natural representation of default reasoning with exceptions. A declarative model-theoretic semantics of DLP< is provided, which is shown to generalize the Answer Set Semantics of disjunctive logic programs. The knowledge modeling features of the language are illustrated by encoding classical nonmonotonic problems in DLP<. The complexity of DLP< is analyzed, proving that inheritance does not cause any computational overhead, as reasoning in DLP< has exactly the same complexity as reasoning in disjunctive logic programming. This is confirmed by the existence of an efficient translation from DLP< to plain disjunctive logic programming. Using this translation, an advanced KR system supporting the DLP< language has been implemented on top of the DLV system and has subsequently been integrated into DLV.Comment: 28 pages; will be published in Theory and Practice of Logic Programmin