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Current capabilities, requirements and a proposed strategy for interdependency analysis in the UK
The UK government recently commissioned a research study to identify the state-of-the-art in Critical Infrastructure modelling and analysis, and the government/industry requirements for such tools and services. This study (Cetifs) concluded with a strategy aiming to bridge the gaps between the capabilities and requirements, which would establish interdependency analysis as a commercially viable service in the near future. This paper presents the findings of this study that was carried out by CSR, City University London, Adelard LLP, a safety/security consultancy and Cranfield University, defense academy of the UK
Towards a Common Language of Infrastructure Interdependency
Infrastructure systems can exist interdependently with one another either by design, necessity or evolution. There is
evidence that interdependencies can be the source of emergent benefits and hazards, and therefore there is value in
their identification and management. Achieving this requires collaboration and communication between infrastructure
stakeholders across all relevant sectors.
Recognising, developing and sharing multiple understandings of infrastructure interdependency and dependency will
facilitate a wide range of multi-disciplinary and cross-sectorial work and support productive stakeholder dialogues.
This paper therefore aims to initiate discussion around the nature of infrastructure interdependency and dependency
in order to establish the basis of a useful, coherent and complete conceptual taxonomy. It sets out an approach for
locating this taxonomy and language within a framework of commonplace stakeholder viewpoints.
The paper looks at the potential structural arrangements of infrastructure interdependencies before exploring the
qualitative ways in which the relationships can be characterised. This builds on the existing body of knowledge as
well as experience through case studies in developing an Interdependency Planning and Management Framework for
Infrastructure
Modelling interdependencies between the electricity and information infrastructures
The aim of this paper is to provide qualitative models characterizing
interdependencies related failures of two critical infrastructures: the
electricity infrastructure and the associated information infrastructure. The
interdependencies of these two infrastructures are increasing due to a growing
connection of the power grid networks to the global information infrastructure,
as a consequence of market deregulation and opening. These interdependencies
increase the risk of failures. We focus on cascading, escalating and
common-cause failures, which correspond to the main causes of failures due to
interdependencies. We address failures in the electricity infrastructure, in
combination with accidental failures in the information infrastructure, then we
show briefly how malicious attacks in the information infrastructure can be
addressed
Resilience of Hierarchical Critical Infrastructure Networks
Concern over the resilience of critical infrastructure networks has increased dramatically over the last decade due to a
number of well documented failures and the significant disruption associated with these. This has led to a large body of
research that has adopted graph-theoretic based analysis in order to try and improve our understanding of infrastructure
network resilience. Many studies have asserted that infrastructure networks possess a scale-free topology which is
robust to random failures but sensitive to targeted attacks at highly connected hubs. However, many studies have
ignored that many networks in addition to their topological connectivity may be organised either logically or spatially
in a hierarchical system which may significantly change their response to perturbations. In this paper we explore if
hierarchical network models exhibit significantly different higher-order topological characteristics compared to other
network structures and how this impacts on their resilience to a number of different failure types. This is achieved by
investigating a suite of synthetic networks as well as a suite of âreal worldâ spatial infrastructure networks
Mitigating Cascading Failures in Interdependent Power Grids and Communication Networks
In this paper, we study the interdependency between the power grid and the
communication network used to control the grid. A communication node depends on
the power grid in order to receive power for operation, and a power node
depends on the communication network in order to receive control signals for
safe operation. We demonstrate that these dependencies can lead to cascading
failures, and it is essential to consider the power flow equations for studying
the behavior of such interdependent networks. We propose a two-phase control
policy to mitigate the cascade of failures. In the first phase, our control
policy finds the non-avoidable failures that occur due to physical
disconnection. In the second phase, our algorithm redistributes the power so
that all the connected communication nodes have enough power for operation and
no power lines overload. We perform a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the
performance of our control policy, and show that our control policy achieves
close to optimal yield for many scenarios. This analysis can help design robust
interdependent grids and associated control policies.Comment: 6 pages, 9 figures, submitte
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