104 research outputs found
Pierre Duhemâs philosophy and history of science
LEITE (FĂĄbio Rodrigo) â STOFFEL (Jean-François), Introduction (pp. 3-6). BARRA (Eduardo Salles de O.) â SANTOS (Ricardo Batista dos), Duhemâs analysis of Newtonian method and the logical priority of physics over metaphysics (pp. 7-19). BORDONI (Stefano), The French roots of Duhemâs early historiography and epistemology (pp. 20-35). CHIAPPIN (JosĂ© R. N.) â LARANJEIRAS (CĂĄssio Costa), Duhemâs critical analysis of mechaÂniÂcism and his defense of a formal conception of theoretical phyÂsics (pp. 36-53). GUEGUEN (Marie) â PSILLOS (Stathis), Anti-Âscepticism and epistemic humility in Pierre Duhemâs philosophy of science (pp. 54-72). LISTON (Michael), Duhem : images of science, historical continuity, and the first crisis in physics (pp. 73-84). MAIOCCHI (Roberto), Duhem in pre-war Italian philosÂophy : the reasons of an absence (pp. 85-92). HERNĂNDEZ MĂRQUEZ (VĂctor Manuel), Was Pierre Duhem an «esprit de finesse» ? (pp. 93-107). NEEDHAM (Paul), Was Duhem justified in not distinguishing between physical and chemical atomism ? (pp. 108-111). OLGUIN (Roberto Estrada), «Bon sens» and «noĂ»s» (pp. 112-126). OLIVEIRA (Amelia J.), Duhemâs legacy for the change in the historiography of science : An analysis based on Kuhnâs writings (pp. 127-139). PRĂNCIPE (JoĂŁo), PoincarĂ© and Duhem : Resonances in their first epistemological reflecÂtions (pp. 140-156). MONDRAGON (DamiĂĄn Islas), Book review of «Pierre Duhem : entre fĂsica y metafĂsica» (pp. 157-159). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Book review of P. Duhem : «La thĂ©orie physique : son objet, sa structure» / edit. by S. Roux (pp. 160-162). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Book review of St. Bordoni : «When historiography met epistemology» (pp. 163-165)
Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory
This monographic chapter explains how expected utility (EU) theory arose in von Neumann and Morgenstern, how it was called into question by Allais and others, and how it gave way to non-EU theories, at least among the specialized quarters of decion theory. I organize the narrative around the idea that the successive theoretical moves amounted to resolving Duhem-Quine underdetermination problems, so they can be assessed in terms of the philosophical recommendations made to overcome these problems. I actually follow Duhem's recommendation, which was essentially to rely on the passing of time to make many experiments and arguments available, and evebntually strike a balance between competing theories on the basis of this improved knowledge. Although Duhem's solution seems disappointingly vague, relying as it does on "bon sens" to bring an end to the temporal process, I do not think there is any better one in the philosophical literature, and I apply it here for what it is worth.
In this perspective, EU theorists were justified in resisting the first attempts at refuting their theory, including Allais's in the 50s, but they would have lacked "bon sens" in not acknowledging their defeat in the 80s, after the long process of pros and cons had sufficiently matured.
This primary Duhemian theme is actually combined with a secondary theme - normativity. I suggest that EU theory was normative at its very beginning and has remained so all along, and I express dissatisfaction with the orthodox view that it could be treated as a straightforward descriptive theory for purposes of prediction and scientific test. This view is usually accompanied with a faulty historical reconstruction, according to which EU theorists initially formulated the VNM axioms descriptively and retreated to a normative construal once they fell threatened by empirical refutation. From my historical study, things did not evolve in this way, and the theory was both proposed and rebutted on the basis of normative arguments already in the 1950s. The ensuing, major problem was to make choice experiments compatible with this inherently normative feature of theory. Compability was obtained in some experiments, but implicitly and somewhat confusingly, for instance by excluding overtly incoherent subjects or by creating strong incentives for the subjects to reflect on the questions and provide answers they would be able to defend.
I also claim that Allais had an intuition of how to combine testability and normativity, unlike most later experimenters, and that it would have been more fruitful to work from his intuition than to make choice experiments of the naively empirical style that flourished after him.
In sum, it can be said that the underdetermination process accompanying EUT was resolved in a Duhemian way, but this was not without major inefficiencies. To embody explicit rationality considerations into experimental schemes right from the beginning would have limited the scope of empirical research, avoided wasting resources to get only minor findings, and speeded up the Duhemian process of groping towards a choice among competing theories
Why Quantum Theory is Possibly Wrong
Quantum theory is a tremendously successful physical theory, but nevertheless
suffers from two serious problems: the measurement problem and the problem of
interpretational underdetermination. The latter, however, is largely overlooked
as a genuine problem of its own. Both problems concern the doctrine of realism,
but pull, quite curiously, into opposite directions. The measurement problem
can be captured such that due to scientific realism about quantum theory common
sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts as
an argument against scientific realism. I will also consider the more refined
distinctions of ontic and epistemic realism and demonstrate that quantum theory
in its most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various
realism claims. A way out of the conundrum is to come to the bold conclusion
that quantum theory is, possibly, wrong (in the realist sense)
How to do Things With Theory: The Instrumental Role of Auxiliary Hypotheses in Testing
Pierre Duhem's influential argument for holism relies on a view of the role that background theory plays in testing: according to this still common account of "auxiliary hypotheses," elements of background theory serve as truth-apt premises in arguments for or against a hypothesis. I argue that this view is mistaken. Rather than serving as truth-apt premises in arguments, auxiliary hypotheses are employed as (reliability-apt) "epistemic tools": instruments that perform specific tasks in connecting our theoretical questions with the world but that are not (or not usually) premises in arguments. On the resulting picture, the acceptability of an auxiliary hypothesis depends not on its truth but on contextual factors such as the task or purpose it is put to and the other tools employed alongside it
How to Do Things with Theory: The Instrumental Role of Auxiliary Hypotheses in Testing
Pierre Duhem's influential argument for holism relies on a view of the role that background theory plays in testing: according to this still common account of "auxiliary hypotheses," elements of background theory serve as truth-apt premises in arguments for or against a hypothesis. I argue that this view is mistaken. Rather than serving as truth-apt premises in arguments, auxiliary hypotheses are employed as (reliability-apt) "epistemic tools": instruments that perform specific tasks in connecting our theoretical questions with the world but that are not (or not usually) premises in arguments. On the resulting picture, the acceptability of an auxiliary hypothesis depends not on its truth but on contextual factors such as the task or purpose it is put to and the other tools employed alongside it
Meta-heuristic Strategies in Scientific Judgment
In the first half of this dissertation, I develop a heuristic methodology for analyzing scientific solutions to the problem of underdetermination. Heuristics are rough-and-ready procedures used by scientists to construct models, design experiments, interpret evidence, etc. But as powerful as they are, heuristics are also error-prone. Therefore, I argue that they key to prudently using a heuristic is the articulation of meta-heuristics---guidelines to the kinds of problems for which a heuristic is well- or ill-suited.
Given that heuristics will introduce certain errors into our scientific investigations, I emphasize the importance of a particular category of meta-heuristics involving the search for robust evidence. Robustness is understood to be the epistemic virtue bestowed by agreement amongst multiple modes of determination. The more modes we have at our disposal, and the more these confirm the same result, the more confident can we be that a result is not a mere artifact of some heuristic simplification. Through an analysis of case-studies in the philosophy of biology and clinical trials, I develop a principled method for modeling and evaluating heuristics and robustness claims in a qualitative problem space.
The second half of the dissertation deploys the heuristic methodology to address ethical and epistemological issues in the science of clinical trials. To that end, I develop a network model for the problem space of clinical research, capable of representing the various kinds of experiments, epistemic relationships, and ethical justifications intrinsic to the domain. I then apply this model to ongoing research with the antibacterial agent, moxifloxacin, for the treatment of tuberculosis, tracking its development from initially successful and promising in vitro and animal studies to its disappointing and discordant performance across five human efficacy trials. Given this failure to find a robust result with moxifloxacin across animal and human studies, what should researchers now do? While my final analysis of this case does not definitively answer that question, I demonstrate how my methodology, unlike a statistical meta-analysis, helps to clarify the directions for further research
Why Quantum Theory is Possibly Wrong
Quantum theory is a tremendously successful physical theory, but nevertheless suffers from two serious problems: the measurement problem and the problem of interpretational underdetermination. The latter, however, is largely overlooked as a genuine problem of its own. Both problems concern the doctrine of realism, but pull, quite curiously, into opposite directions. The measurement problem can be captured such that due to scientific realism about quantum theory common sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts as an argument against scientific realism. I will also consider the more refined distinctions of ontic and epistemic realism and demonstrate that quantum theory in its most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various realism claims. A way out of the conundrum is to come to the bold conclusion that quantum theory is, possibly, wrong (in the realist sense)
The Nature of Physical Knowledge
https://epublications.marquette.edu/mupress-book/1020/thumbnail.jp
Scientific theories as intervening representations
In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the di-chotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the re-lation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.PeerReviewe
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