Seamless Service Provisioning for Mobile Crowdsensing: Towards Integrating Forward and Spot Trading Markets

The challenge of exchanging and processing of big data over Mobile Crowdsensing (MCS) networks calls for the new design of responsive and seamless service provisioning as well as proper incentive mechanisms. Although conventional onsite spot trading of resources based on real-time network conditions and decisions can facilitate the data sharing over MCS networks, it often suffers from prohibitively long service provisioning delays and unavoidable trading failures due to its reliance on timely analysis of complex and dynamic MCS environments. These limitations motivate us to investigate an integrated forward and spot trading mechanism (iFAST), which entails a new hybrid service trading protocol over the MCS network architecture. In iFAST, the sellers (i.e., mobile users with sensing resources) can provide long-term or temporary sensing services to the buyers (i.e., sensing task owners). iFast enables signing long-term contracts in advance of future transactions through a forward trading mode, via analyzing historical statistics of the market, for which the notion of overbooking is introduced and promoted. iFAST further enables the buyers with unsatisfying service quality to recruit temporary sellers through a spot trading mode, upon considering the current market/network conditions. We analyze the fundamental blocks of iFAST, and provide a case study to demonstrate its superior performance as compared to existing methods. Finally, future research directions on reliable service provisioning for next-generation MCS networks are summarized

A Semi-supervised Sensing Rate Learning based CMAB Scheme to Combat COVID-19 by Trustful Data Collection in the Crowd

Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS), through employing considerable workers to sense and collect data in a participatory manner, has been recognized as a promising paradigm for building many large-scale applications in a cost-effective way, such as combating COVID-19. The recruitment of trustworthy and high-quality workers is an important research issue for MCS. Previous studies assume that the qualities of workers are known in advance, or the platform knows the qualities of workers once it receives their collected data. In reality, to reduce their costs and thus maximize revenue, many strategic workers do not perform their sensing tasks honestly and report fake data to the platform. So, it is very hard for the platform to evaluate the authenticity of the received data. In this paper, an incentive mechanism named Semi-supervision based Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit reverse Auction (SCMABA) is proposed to solve the recruitment problem of multiple unknown and strategic workers in MCS. First, we model the worker recruitment as a multi-armed bandit reverse auction problem, and design an UCB-based algorithm to separate the exploration and exploitation, considering the Sensing Rates (SRs) of recruited workers as the gain of the bandit. Next, a Semi-supervised Sensing Rate Learning (SSRL) approach is proposed to quickly and accurately obtain the workers' SRs, which consists of two phases, supervision and self-supervision. Last, SCMABA is designed organically combining the SRs acquisition mechanism with multi-armed bandit reverse auction, where supervised SR learning is used in the exploration, and the self-supervised one is used in the exploitation. We prove that our SCMABA achieves truthfulness and individual rationality. Additionally, we exhibit outstanding performances of the SCMABA mechanism through in-depth simulations of real-world data traces.Comment: 18 pages, 14 figure

Matching-based Hybrid Service Trading for Task Assignment over Dynamic Mobile Crowdsensing Networks

By opportunistically engaging mobile users (workers), mobile crowdsensing (MCS) networks have emerged as important approach to facilitate sharing of sensed/gathered data of heterogeneous mobile devices. To assign tasks among workers and ensure low overheads, a series of stable matching mechanisms is introduced in this paper, which are integrated into a novel hybrid service trading paradigm consisting of futures trading mode and spot trading mode to ensure seamless MCS service provisioning. In the futures trading mode, we determine a set of long-term workers for each task through an overbooking-enabled in-advance many-to-many matching (OIA3M) mechanism, while characterizing the associated risks under statistical analysis. In the spot trading mode, we investigate the impact of fluctuations in long-term workers' resources on the violation of service quality requirements of tasks, and formalize a spot trading mode for tasks with violated service quality requirements under practical budget constraints, where the task-worker mapping is carried out via onsite many-to-many matching (O3M) and onsite many-to-one matching (OMOM). We theoretically show that our proposed matching mechanisms satisfy stability, individual rationality, fairness and computational efficiency. Comprehensive evaluations also verify the satisfaction of these properties under practical network settings, while revealing commendable performance on running time, participators' interactions, and service quality

Auction-Based Efficient Online Incentive Mechanism Designs in Wireless Networks

Recently, wide use of mobile devices and applications, such as YouTube and Twitter, has facilitated every aspect of our daily lives. Meanwhile, it has also posed great challenges to enable resource-demanding users to successfully access networks. Thus, in order to enlarge network capacity and fully make use of vacant resources, new communication architectures emerge, such as D2D communications, edge computing, and crowdsourcing, all of which ask for involvement of end mobile users in assisting transmission, computation, or network management. However, end mobile users are not always willing to actively provide such sharing services if no reimbursements are provided as they need to consume their own computation and communication resources. Besides, since mobile users are not always stationary, they can opt-in and opt-out the network for their own convenience. Thus, an important practical characteristic of wireless networks, i.e., the mobility of mobile users cannot be ignored, which means that the demands of mobile users span over a period of time. As one of promising solutions, the online incentive mechanism design has been introduced in wireless networks in order to motivate the participation of more mobile users under a dynamic environment. In this thesis, with the analyses of each stakeholder's economic payoffs in wireless networks, the auction-based online incentive mechanisms are proposed to achieve resource allocations, participant selections, and payment determinations in two wireless networks, i.e., Crowdsensing and mobile edge computing. In particular, i) an online incentive mechanism is designed to guarantee Quality of Information of each arriving task in mobile crowdsensing networks, followed by an enhanced online strategy which could further improves the competitive ratio; ii) an online incentive mechanism jointly considering communication and computation resource allocations in collaborative edge computing networks is proposed based on the primal-dual theory; iii) to deal with the nonlinear issue in edge computing networks, an nonlinear online incentive mechanism under energy budget constraints of mobile users is designed based on the Maximal-in-Distributional Range framework; and iv) inspired by the recent development of deep learning techniques, a deep incentive mechanism with the budget balance of each mobile user is proposed to maximize the net revenue of service providers by leveraging the multi-task machine learning model. Both theoretical analyses and numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the designed mechanisms

Game Theory for Multi-Access Edge Computing:Survey, Use Cases, and Future Trends

Game theory (GT) has been used with significant success to formulate, and either design or optimize, the operation of many representative communications and networking scenarios. The games in these scenarios involve, as usual, diverse players with conflicting goals. This paper primarily surveys the literature that has applied theoretical games to wireless networks, emphasizing use cases of upcoming multiaccess edge computing (MEC). MEC is relatively new and offers cloud services at the network periphery, aiming to reduce service latency backhaul load, and enhance relevant operational aspects such as quality of experience or security. Our presentation of GT is focused on the major challenges imposed by MEC services over the wireless resources. The survey is divided into classical and evolutionary games. Then, our discussion proceeds to more specific aspects which have a considerable impact on the game's usefulness, namely, rational versus evolving strategies, cooperation among players, available game information, the way the game is played (single turn, repeated), the game's model evaluation, and how the model results can be applied for both optimizing resource-constrained resources and balancing diverse tradeoffs in real edge networking scenarios. Finally, we reflect on lessons learned, highlighting future trends and research directions for applying theoretical model games in upcoming MEC services, considering both network design issues and usage scenarios