Progress in Behavioral Game Theory

Is game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not? It is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question. The seminal book by von Neumann and Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational. In more recent work, game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise. At one extreme, highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions. At the other extreme, adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple models-mostly developed to describe nonhuman animals-in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all. When game theory does aim to describe behavior, it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing

The logic of the CAP: Politics or Economics?

Distorted incentives, agricultural and trade policy reforms, national agricultural development, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade, F13, F14, Q17, Q18,

Downsian competition in the absence of a Condorcet winner

This paper studies studies two-party electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing platforms and observe each other's choises, altering one's platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it is sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is that the game ends in the first period with the parties converging on whatever platform the incumbent chooses. If, however, there is a slight chance of a small mistake, the incumbent does best in choosing a local equilibrium platform. This suggest that local equilibrium policies can be the predicted outcome even if the voting process is not myopic in any way.Voting; Downsian competition; Local equilibrium; Spatial trembles

On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games

This paper provides a set of mechanisms that we refer to as emph{reciprocal mechanisms. }These mechanisms have the property that every outcome that can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium in a competing mechanism game can be supported as an equilibrium in reciprocal mechanisms. In this sense, reciprocal mechanisms play the same role as direct mechanisms do in single principal problems. The advantage of these mechanisms over alternatives like the universal set of mechanisms is that they are conceptually straightforward and no more difficult to deal with than the simple direct mechanisms used in single principal mechanism design.competing mechanisms, revelation principle

Co-creative pricing (CCP) : a conceptual development of consumers’ participation in pricing practicing in services

Keskustelu yhteisestä arvonluonnista on saavuttanut yhä laajempaa huomiota niin nykypäivän tieteellisteoreettisessa markkinointikirjallisuudessa kuin käytännössä. Suosiosta huolimatta keskustelusta on jäänyt miltei tyystin huomioimatta arvokäsitteen eräs varsin oleellinen ulottuvuus: hinta. Siitä syystä on ensiarvoisen tärkeää tutkia hinnan merkitys arvokäsitteen, yhdessä tuottamisen ja hinnan muodostamassa suhteiden kolmiossa, sillä vaihdannassa hinta on yksi arvonmuodostuksen tärkeimmistä osatekijöistä. Toissijaisia tutkimusmenetelmiä käyttäen, tämän tutkimuksen tarkoitus on pyrkiä käsitteellistämään yhteinen hinnanluonti arvon lisääjänä. Niinikään tutkimus tarjoaa mallinnuksen niistä vallitsevista olosuhteista, jotka ovat arvon muodostuksessa välttämättömiä. Esitetty malli perustaa juurensa palvelumarkkinoinnin Service-Dominant Logic -ajattelusta, muodostaen fuusion yhdessä ARA-mallin ja markkinointikeskustelussa vallalla olevan elämysmarkkinointiajattelun kanssa. Tutkimus edistää yhteisen arvonluonnin tieteellistä keskustelua syventämällä jo olemassa olevaa tietoa arvon muodostuksesta. Lisäksi, tutkimus edistää käytännön tietämystä esittämällä eksploratiivisen avauksen hinnoittelun dynaamisesta yhteisajattelusta haastamalla markkinoijia ajattelemaan myös hinnoittelua uudesta innovatiivisesta yhteiseen arvonluontiin perustuvasta näkökulmasta. Nykyajan asiakkaat ovat yhä halukkaampia, pystyvämpiä sekä resursseiltaan rikkaampia osallistumaan hinnoittelupäätöksiin kuin aikaisemmin. Yhdessä tuotettu arvo hinnoittelun kautta tarjoaa vaihtoehtoisen ajattelutavan pitkään vallinneelle yritysten sisäänpäin suuntautuneelle hinnoitteluajattelulle ja esittää, että kääntämällä katse asiakkaan suuntaan, saavutetaan todellinen arvo, sellaisena kuin asiakas sen määrittelee. Tutkimuksessa esiin tuotu ajattelutapa tarjoaa uusia mahdollisuuksia vaihtoehtoisille hinnoittelumenetelmille sekä palveluinnovaatioille.Co-creation debate has increasingly become a key topic in the contemporary services marketing theory and practice. Domains of co-creation and value have thus far attracted plenty of academic interest, however, there is an evident deficiency of one essential dimension of value: price. In the triangular relation of co-creation, value and price, it is of high importance to research the role of price, as it is one of the prime components contributing to the formation of value in an exchange. Using secondary research methods, this research works towards a conceptualization of CCP and offers a model of the conditions that need to be in place for value through CCP to occur. The model builds its foundations on Service-Dominant Logic debate. Combined together with the ARA model, and the prevalent thinking of experiential marketing, the work contributes to the academic co-creation literature by adding to the knowledge of value creation. Further, it presents an explorative opening of dynamic pricing thinking for practitioners by challenging the marketers to think their pricing from an innovative co-creation based view. Co-created pricing offers an alternative logic to inwardly focused value creation of the firm and suggests that by turning the focus on the customer, the true value, as perceived by the customer, is captured. Today’s customers are increasingly willing, capable and rich in their resources to participate in pricing decisions, thereby offering an opportunity for alternative pricing methods and service innovations

On the threat of counterfeiting

We study counterfeiting of currency in a search–theoretic model of monetary exchange. In contrast to Nosal and Wallace (2007), we establish that counterfeiting does not pose a threat to the existence of a monetary equilibrium; i.e., a monetary equilibrium exists irrespective of the cost of producing counterfeits, or the ease with which genuine money can be authenticated. However, the possibility to counterfeit ?at money can affect its value, velocity, output and welfare, even if no counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium. We provide two extensions of the model under which the threat of counterfeiting can materialize: counterfeits can circulate across periods, and sellers set terms of trades in some matches. Policies that make the currency more costly to counterfeit or easier to recognize raise the value of money and society’s welfare, but the latter policy does not always decrease counterfeiting.Counterfeits and counterfeiting

Profitability goals, control goals, and the R&D investment decisions of family and non-family firms

R&D investments can help build sustainable competitive advantages and improve firm performance as well as foster industry transformations and economic growth. Nevertheless, managers also acknowledge the difficulties associated with managing R&D and the low chances of success of innovation programs. For this reason, researchers have long been interested in understanding how managers make R&D investment decisions and, more specifically, identifying the conditions under which managers are most likely to increase or decrease R&D investments. Research grounded in the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that a primary driver of R&D investment decisions is profitability: when profitability goals have not been met, managers are more likely to initiate a problemistic search through increasing R&D investments. While emphasizing profitability goals and their relationship with R&D investments, prior research largely downplays the role of goals beyond profitability that exist in a significant number of firms (family firms) that are owned and managed by family members whose primary concern is preserving their control over the organization. Research indicates that these family-centered non-economic goals lead family managers to minimize R&D investments and that the coexistence of multiple goals produces highly variable R&D investment behavior in family firms. Yet, how family-centered goals for control and profitability goals enter decision-making in family firms is not fully understood nor has any empirical study directly examined how these two apparently incompatible classes of goals jointly affect R&D investment variations in family firms. In this study, we propose that family managers form distinctive reference points that capture supplier bargaining power and are used to evaluate the degree of external obstruction to their managerial control. Accordingly, we hypothesize that family managers use reference points for profitability and for control jointly when making R&D investment decisions. The empirical analysis of panel data on 431 private Spanish manufacturing firms observed over the period 2000-2006 shows that the importance of profitability and control goals follows a sequential logic in family firms, such that family firms react more strongly to increasing supplier bargaining power when their profitability reference points have been reached. This study extends current understanding of the distinctive organizational processes engendered by family management in business organizations leading to new perspectives and research opportunities at the intersection of the innovation management and family business literatures

Are Groups more Rational than Individuals? A Review of Interactive Decision Making in Groups

Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. In the present article, we review the literature on decision making made by groups of the past 25 years. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner’s dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal-agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that groups behave closer to the game-theoretical assumption of rationality and selfishness than individuals. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area.group decision making, interactive decision making, rationality, discontinuity effect

Will Social Security and Medicare Remain Viable as the U.S. Population is Aging? An Update

Yes, subject to concerns about Medicare inefficiencies and potentially self-confirming skepticism. The U.S. social security system-broadly defined to include Medicare-faces significant financial problems as the result of an aging population. But demographic change is also likely to raise savings, increase wages, and reduce interest rates, and up to a point, a growing GDP-share of medical spending is an efficient response to an aging population. Thus viability is more a political economy than an economic feasibility issue. To examine the political viability of social security, I focus on intertemporal cost-benefit tradeoffs in a median voter setting. For a variety of assumptions and policy alternatives, I find that social security should retain majority support.