2,474 research outputs found
ECONOMIC APPROACHES AND MARKET STRUCTURES FOR TEMPORAL-SPATIAL SPECTRUM SHARING
In wireless communication systems, economic approaches can be applied to spectrum sharing and enhance spectrum utilization.
In this research, we develop a model where geographic information, including licensed areas of primary users (PUs) and locations of secondary users (SUs), plays an important role in the spectrum sharing system. We consider a multi-price policy and the pricing power of noncooperative PUs in multiple geographic areas. Meanwhile, the value assessment of a channel is price-related and the demand from the SUs is price-elastic. By applying an evolutionary procedure, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the optimal payoff for each PU selling channels without reserve. In the scenario of selling channels with reserve, we predict the channel prices for the PUs leading to the optimal supplies of the PUs and hence the optimal payoffs.
To increase spectrum utilization, the scenario of spatial spectrum reuse is considered. We consider maximizing social welfare via on-demand channel allocation, which describes the overall satisfaction of the SUs when we involve the supply and demand relationship. We design a receiver-centric spectrum reuse mechanism, in which the optimal channel allocation that maximizes social welfare can be achieved by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction for maximal independent groups (MIGs). We prove that truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for the SUs, even though the SUs do not participate in the VCG auction for MIGs directly. Therefore, the MIGs are bidding truthfully and the requirement for social welfare maximization is satisfied.
To further improve user satisfaction, user characteristics that enable heterogeneous channel valuations need to be considered in spatial spectrum reuse. We design a channel transaction mechanism for non-symmetric networks and maximize user satisfaction in consideration of multi-level flexible channel valuations of the SUs. Specifically, we introduce a constrained VCG auction. To facilitate the bid formation, we transform the constrained VCG auction to a step-by-step decision process. Meanwhile, the SUs in a coalition play a coalitional game with transferable utilities. We use the Shapley value to realize fair payoff distribution among the SUs in a coalition
Recommended from our members
Enabling Spectrum Sharing in Secondary Market Auctions
Wireless spectrum is a scare resource, but in practice much of it is under-used by current owners. To enable better use of this spectrum, we propose an auction approach to dynamically allocate the spectrum in a secondary market. Unlike previous auction approaches, we seek to take advantage of the ability to share spectrum among some bidders while respecting the needs of others for exclusive use. Thus, unlike unlicensed spectrum (e.g. Wi-Fi), which can be shared by any device, and exclusive-use licensed spectrum, where sharing is precluded, we enable efficient allocation by supporting sharing alongside quality-of-service protections. We present SATYA (Sanskrit for “truth”), a strategyproof and scalable spectrum auction algorithm whose primary contribution is in the allocation of a right to contend for spectrum to both sharers and exclusive-use bidders. Achieving strategyproofness in our setting requires appropriate handling of the externalities created by sharing. We demonstrate SATYA’s ability to handle heterogeneous agent types involving different transmit powers and spectrum needs through extensive simulations.Engineering and Applied Science
Recommended from our members
Enabling Sharing in Auctions for Short-Term Spectrum Licenses
Wireless spectrum is a valuable and scarce resource that currently suffers from under-use because of the dominant paradigm of exclusive-use licensing. We propose the SATYA auction (Sanskrit for truth), which allows short-term leases to be auctioned and supports diverse bidder types, including those willing to share access and those who require exclusive-use access. Thus, unlike unlicensed spectrum such as Wi-Fi, which can be shared by any device, and exclusive-use licensed spectrum, where sharing is precluded, SATYA improves efficiency through supporting sharing alongside quality-of-service protections. The auction is designed to be scalable, and also strategy proof, so that simple bidding protocols are optimal. The primary challenge is to handle the externalities created by allocating shared-use alongside exclusive-use bidders. Using realistic Longley-Rice based propagation modeling and data from the FCC’s CDBS database, we conduct extensive simulations that demonstrate SATYA’s ability to handle heterogeneous bidders involving different transmit powers and spectrum needs.Engineering and Applied Science
- …