Toward a Formal Analysis of Deceptive Signaling

Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy (see Augustine 1952; Kant 1996; Chisholm & Feehan 1977; Mahon 2007; Carson 2010). However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers (e.g., Sober 1994; Hauser 1997; Searcy & Nowicki 2005, Skyrms 2010) have endorsed the broader view that deception only requires that a deceiver benefit from sending a misleading signal. Moreover, in order to facilitate game-theoretic study of deception in the context of Lewisian sender-receiver games, Brian Skyrms has proposed an influential formal analysis of this view. Such formal analyses have the potential to enhance our philosophical understanding of deception in humans as well as animals. However, as we argue in this paper, Skyrms's analysis, as well as two recently proposed alternative analyses (viz., Godfrey-Smith 2011; McWhirter 2016), are seriously flawed and can lead us to draw unwarranted conclusions about deception

Toward a Formal Analysis of Deceptive Signaling

Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy (see Augustine 1952; Kant 1996; Chisholm & Feehan 1977; Mahon 2007; Carson 2010). However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers (e.g., Sober 1994; Hauser 1997; Searcy & Nowicki 2005, Skyrms 2010) have endorsed the broader view that deception only requires that a deceiver benefit from sending a misleading signal. Moreover, in order to facilitate game-theoretic study of deception in the context of Lewisian sender-receiver games, Brian Skyrms has proposed an influential formal analysis of this view. Such formal analyses have the potential to enhance our philosophical understanding of deception in humans as well as animals. However, as we argue in this paper, Skyrms's analysis, as well as two recently proposed alternative analyses (viz., Godfrey-Smith 2011; McWhirter 2016), are seriously flawed and can lead us to draw unwarranted conclusions about deception

Formal Concept Analysis and Resolution in Algebraic Domains

We relate two formerly independent areas: Formal concept analysis and logic of domains. We will establish a correspondene between contextual attribute logic on formal contexts resp. concept lattices and a clausal logic on coherent algebraic cpos. We show how to identify the notion of formal concept in the domain theoretic setting. In particular, we show that a special instance of the resolution rule from the domain logic coincides with the concept closure operator from formal concept analysis. The results shed light on the use of contexts and domains for knowledge representation and reasoning purposes.Comment: 14 pages. We have rewritten the old version according to the suggestions of some referees. The results are the same. The presentation is completely differen

Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht

What's Right With a Syntactic Approach to Theories and Models?

Syntactic approaches in the philosophy of science, which are based on formalizations in predicate logic, are often considered in principle inferior to semantic approaches, which are based on formalizations with the help of structures. To compare the two kinds of approach, I identify some ambiguities in common semantic accounts and explicate the concept of a structure in a way that avoids hidden references to a specific vocabulary. From there, I argue that contrary to common opinion (i) unintended models do not pose a significant problem for syntactic approaches to scientific theories, (ii) syntactic approaches can be at least as language independent as semantic ones, and (iii) in syntactic approaches, scientific theories can be as well connected to the world as in semantic ones. Based on these results, I argue that syntactic and semantic approaches fare equally well when it comes to (iv) ease of application, (iv) accommodating the use of models in the sciences, and (vi) capturing the theory-observation relation

Between emancipation and domination: Habermasian reflections on the empowerment and disempowerment of the human subject

Habermas’s ‘linguistic turn’ can be regarded as a systematic attempt to locate the normative foundations of critical theory in the rational foundations of language. This endeavour is motivated by the insight that any theoretical framework that is committed to the emancipation of the human condition needs to identify the normative grounds on which both its critique of social domination and its pursuit of social liberation can be justified. Just as Habermas’s firm belief in the possibility of human emancipation manifests itself in the concept of the ‘ideal speech situation’, his radical critique of human domination cannot be separated from the concept of ‘systematically distorted communication’. Although the significance of these two concepts for Habermas’s communication-theoretic approach to the social has been widely recognised and extensively debated in the literature, their overall importance for a critical theory of human empowerment and disempowerment has hardly been explored in a satisfying manner. Drawing upon Habermas’s communication-theoretic conception of human coexistence, this paper makes a case for the view that a comprehensive critical theory of society needs to account for both the emancipatory and the repressive potentials of language if it seeks to do justice to both the empowering and the disempowering potentials of the subject

Are black holes about information?

Information theory is increasingly invoked by physicists concerned with fundamental physics, including black hole physics. But to what extent is the application of information theory in those contexts legitimate? Using the case of black hole thermodynamics and Bekenstein's celebrated argument for the entropy of black holes, I will argue that information-theoretic notions are problematic in the present case. Bekenstein's original argument, as suggestive as it may appear, thus fails. This example is particularly pertinent to the theme of the present collection because the Bekenstein-Hawking formula for black hole entropy is widely accepted as 'empirical data' in notoriously empirically deprived quantum gravity, even though the laws of black hole thermodynamics have so far evaded empirical confirmation.Comment: 20 pages; forthcoming in Richard Dawid, Radin Dardashti, and Karim Th\'ebault (eds.), Epistemology of Fundamental Physics, Cambridge University Press; minor changes and additions of reference