A Non-Cooperative Power Control Game for Multi-Carrier CDMA Systems

In this work, a non-cooperative power control game for multi-carrier CDMA systems is proposed. In the proposed game, each user needs to decide how much power to transmit over each carrier to maximize its overall utility. The utility function considered here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted per joule of energy consumed. It is shown that the user's utility is maximized when the user transmits only on the carrier with the best "effective channel". The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for the proposed game are investigated and the properties of equilibrium are studied. Also, an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the equilibrium (if it exists) is presented. It is shown that the proposed approach results in a significant improvement in the total utility achieved at equilibrium compared to the case in which each user maximizes its utility over each carrier independently.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, New Orleans, LA, March 13 - 17, 200

Energy efficient power control for device to device communication in 5G networks

Next generation cellular networks require high capacity, enhanced energy efficiency and guaranteed quality of service (QoS). In order to meet these targets, device-to device (D2D) communication is being considered for future 5th generation especially for certain applications that require the proximity gain, the reuse gain, and the hop gain. In this paper, we investigate energy efficient power control for the uplink of an OFDMA (orthogonal frequency-division multiple access) single-cell communication system composed of both regular cellular users and device to device (D2D) pairs. Firstly, we analyze and mathematically model the actual requirements forD2D communications and traditional cellular links in terms of minimum rate and maximum power requirement. Secondly, we use fractional programming in order to transform the original problem into an equivalent concave one and we use the non-cooperative Game theory in order to characterize the equilibrium. Then, the solution of the game is given as a water-filling power allocation. Furthermore, we implement a distributed power allocation scheme using three ways: a) Fractional programming techniques b) Closed form expression (the novelty is the use of wright omega function). c) Inverse water filling. Finally, simulations in both static and dynamic channel setting are presented to illustrate the improved performance in term of EE, SE (spectral efficiency) and time of execution of the iterative algorithm (Dinkelbach) than the closed form algorithms

Border Games in Cellular Networks

In each country today, cellular networks operate on carefully separated frequency bands. This separation is imposed by the regulators of the given country to avoid interference between these networks. But, the separation is only valid within the borders of a country, hence the operators are left on their own to resolve cross-border interference of their cellular networks. In this paper, we focus on the scenario of two operators, each located on one side of the border. We assume that they want to fine-tune the emitting power of the pilot signals (i.e., beacon signals) of their base stations. This operation is crucial, because the pilot signal power determines the number of users they can attract and hence the revenue they can obtain. In the case of no power costs, we show that there exists a motivation for the operators to be strategic, meaning to fine-tune the pilot signal powers of their base stations. In addition, we study Nash equilibrium conditions in an empirical model and investigate the efficiency of the Nash equilibria for different user densities. Finally, we modify our game model to take power costs into account. The game with power costs corresponds to the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma: The players are still motivated to adjust their pilot powers, but their strategic behavior leads to a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium