TumbleBit: an untrusted Bitcoin-compatible anonymous payment hub

This paper presents TumbleBit, a new unidirectional unlinkable payment hub that is fully compatible with today s Bitcoin protocol. TumbleBit allows parties to make fast, anonymous, off-blockchain payments through an untrusted intermediary called the Tumbler. TumbleBits anonymity properties are similar to classic Chaumian eCash: no one, not even the Tumbler, can link a payment from its payer to its payee. Every payment made via TumbleBit is backed by bitcoins, and comes with a guarantee that Tumbler can neither violate anonymity, nor steal bitcoins, nor print money by issuing payments to itself. We prove the security of TumbleBit using the real/ideal world paradigm and the random oracle model. Security follows from the standard RSA assumption and ECDSA unforgeability. We implement TumbleBit, mix payments from 800 users and show that TumbleBits offblockchain payments can complete in seconds.https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/575.pdfPublished versio

SHAREDWEALTH: A CRYPTOCURRENCY TO REWARD MINERS EVENLY

Bitcoin [19] is a decentralized cryptocurrency that has recently gained popularity and has emerged as a popular medium of exchange. The total market capitalization is around 1.5 billion US dollars as of October 2013 [28]. All the operations of Bitcoin are maintained in a distributed public global ledger known as a block chain which consists of all the successful transactions that have ever taken place. The security of a block chain is maintained by a chain of cryptographic puzzles solved by participants called miners, who in return are rewarded with bitcoins. To be successful, the miner has to put in his resources to solve the cryptographic puzzle (also known as a proof of work). The reward structure is an incentive for miners to contribute their computational resources and is also essential to the currency\u27s decentralized nature. One disadvantage of the reward structure is that the payment system is uneven. The reward is always given to one person. Hence people form mining pools where every member of the pool solves the same cryptographic puzzle and irrespective of the person who solved it, the reward is shared evenly among all the members of the pool. The Bitcoin protocol assumes that the miners are honest and they follow the Bitcoin protocol as prescribed. If group of selfish miners comes to lead by forming pools, the currency stops being decentralized and comes under the control of the selfish miners. Such miners can control the whole Bitcoin network [29]. Our goal is to address this problem by creating a distinct peer-to-peer protocol that reduces the incentives for the miners to join large mining pools. The central idea is to pay the “runners-up” who come close to finding a proof, thereby creating a less volatile payout situation. The work done by the “runners-up” can be used by other miners to find the solution of proof of work by building upon their work. Once they find the actual solution they have to include the solution of the other miner in order to get rewarded. The benefit of this protocol is that not only the miners save their computational resources but also the reward is distributed among the miners

Quantum Coins

One of the earliest cryptographic applications of quantum information was to create quantum digital cash that could not be counterfeited. In this paper, we describe a new type of quantum money: quantum coins, where all coins of the same denomination are represented by identical quantum states. We state desirable security properties such as anonymity and unforgeability and propose two candidate quantum coin schemes: one using black box operations, and another using blind quantum computation.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figure

A multi-agent architecture for electronic payment

The Internet has brought about innumerable changes to the way enterprises do business. An essential problem to be solved before the widespread commercial use of the Internet is to provide a trustworthy solution for electronic payment. We propose a multi-agent mediated electronic payment architecture in this paper. It is aimed at providing an agent-based approach to accommodate multiple e-payment schemes. Through a layered design of the payment structure and a well-defined uniform payment interface, the architecture shows good scalability. When a new e-payment scheme or implementation is available, it can be plugged into the framework easily. In addition, we construct a framework allowing multiple agents to work cooperatively to realize automation of electronic payment. A prototype has been built to illustrate the functionality of this design. Finally we discuss the security issues

Questions related to Bitcoin and other Informational Money

A collection of questions about Bitcoin and its hypothetical relatives Bitguilder and Bitpenny is formulated. These questions concern technical issues about protocols, security issues, issues about the formalizations of informational monies in various contexts, and issues about forms of use and misuse. Some questions are formulated in the more general setting of informational monies and near-monies. We also formulate questions about legal, psychological, and ethical aspects of informational money. Finally we formulate a number of questions concerning the economical merits of and outlooks for Bitcoin.Comment: 31 pages. In v2 the section on patterns for use and misuse has been improved and expanded with so-called contaminations. Other small improvements were made and 13 additional references have been include

Internet gambling: issues, concerns, and recommendations.

The influence of technology in the field of gambling innovation continues to grow at a rapid pace. After a brief overview of gambling technologies and deregulation issues, this review examines the impact of technology on gambling by highlighting salient factors in the rise of Internet gambling (i.e., accessibility, affordability, anonymity, convenience, escape immersion/ dissociation, disinhibition, event frequency, asociability, interactivity, and simulation). The paper also examines other factors in relation to Internet gambling including the relationship between Internet addiction and Internet gambling addiction. The paper ends by overviewing some of the social issues surrounding Internet gambling (i.e., protection of the vulnerable, Internet gambling in the workplace, electronic cash, and unscrupulous operators). Recommendations for Internet gambling operators are also provided

Anonymous reputation based reservations in e-commerce (AMNESIC)

Online reservation systems have grown over the last recent years to facilitate the purchase of goods and services. Generally, reservation systems require that customers provide some personal data to make a reservation effective. With this data, service providers can check the consumer history and decide if the user is trustable enough to get the reserve. Although the reputation of a user is a good metric to implement the access control of the system, providing personal and sensitive data to the system presents high privacy risks, since the interests of a user are totally known and tracked by an external entity. In this paper we design an anonymous reservation protocol that uses reputations to profile the users and control their access to the offered services, but at the same time it preserves their privacy not only from the seller but the service provider