620 research outputs found
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks
In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and
parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and
security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to
create a trusted execution environment within the processor. SGX relies on the
hardware, and claims runtime protection even if the OS and other software
components are malicious. However, SGX disregards side-channel attacks. We
introduce a powerful cache side-channel attack that provides system adversaries
a high resolution channel. Our attack tool named CacheZoom is able to virtually
track all memory accesses of SGX enclaves with high spatial and temporal
precision. As proof of concept, we demonstrate AES key recovery attacks on
commonly used implementations including those that were believed to be
resistant in previous scenarios. Our results show that SGX cannot protect
critical data sensitive computations, and efficient AES key recovery is
possible in a practical environment. In contrast to previous works which
require hundreds of measurements, this is the first cache side-channel attack
on a real system that can recover AES keys with a minimal number of
measurements. We can successfully recover AES keys from T-Table based
implementations with as few as ten measurements.Comment: Accepted at Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
(CHES '17
Implicit Cache Lockdown on ARM: An Accidental Countermeasure to Cache-Timing Attacks
As Moore`s law continues to reduce the cost of computation at an exponential rate, embedded computing capabilities spread to ever-expanding application scenarios, such as smartphones, the Internet of Things, and automation, among many others. This trend has naturally caused the underlying technology to evolve and has introduced increasingly complex microarchitectures into embedded processors in attempts to optimize for performance. While other microarchitectures, like those used in personal computers, have been extensively studied, there has been relatively less research done on embedded microarchitectures. This is especially true in terms of their security, which is growing more important as widespread adoption increases.
This thesis explores an undocumented cache behavior found in ARM Cortex processors that we call implicit cache lockdown. While it was presumably implemented for performance reasons, it has a large impact on the recently popular class of cybersecurity attacks that utilize cache-timing side-channels. These attacks leverage the underlying hardware, specifically, the small timing differences between algorithm executions due to CPU caches, to glean sensitive information from a victim process.
Since the affected processors are found in an overwhelming majority of smart phones, this sensitive information can include cryptographic secrets, credit card information, and passwords. As the name implies, implicit cache lockdown limits the ability for an attacker to evict certain data from a CPU`s cache. Since this is precisely what known cache-timing attacks rely on, they are rendered ineffective in their current form. This thesis analyzes implicit cache lockdown in great detail, including the methodology we used to discover it, its implications on all existing cache-timing attacks, and how it can be circumvented by an attacker
Cache Equalizer: A Cache Pressure Aware Block Placement Scheme for Large-Scale Chip Multiprocessors
This paper describes Cache Equalizer (CE), a novel distributed cache management scheme for large scale chip multiprocessors (CMPs). Our work is motivated by large asymmetry in cache sets usages. CE decouples the physical locations of cache blocks from their addresses for the sake of reducing misses caused by destructive interferences. Temporal pressure at the on-chip last-level cache, is continuously collected at a group (comprised of cache sets) granularity, and periodically recorded at the memory controller to guide the placement process. An incoming block is consequently placed at a cache group that exhibits the minimum pressure. CE provides Quality of Service (QoS) by robustly offering better performance than the baseline shared NUCA cache. Simulation results using a full-system simulator demonstrate that CE outperforms shared NUCA caches by an average of 15.5% and by as much as 28.5% for the benchmark programs we examined. Furthermore, evaluations manifested the outperformance of CE versus related CMP cache designs
DR.SGX: Hardening SGX Enclaves against Cache Attacks with Data Location Randomization
Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to various
software-based side-channel attacks. In particular, attacks that monitor CPU
caches shared between the victim enclave and untrusted software enable accurate
leakage of secret enclave data. Known defenses assume developer assistance,
require hardware changes, impose high overhead, or prevent only some of the
known attacks. In this paper we propose data location randomization as a novel
defensive approach to address the threat of side-channel attacks. Our main goal
is to break the link between the cache observations by the privileged adversary
and the actual data accesses by the victim. We design and implement a
compiler-based tool called DR.SGX that instruments enclave code such that data
locations are permuted at the granularity of cache lines. We realize the
permutation with the CPU's cryptographic hardware-acceleration units providing
secure randomization. To prevent correlation of repeated memory accesses we
continuously re-randomize all enclave data during execution. Our solution
effectively protects many (but not all) enclaves from cache attacks and
provides a complementary enclave hardening technique that is especially useful
against unpredictable information leakage
Processor Microarchitecture Security
As computer systems grow more and more complicated, various optimizations can unintentionally introduce security vulnerabilities in these systems. The vulnerabilities can lead to user information and data being compromised or stolen. In particular, the ending of both Moore\u27s law and Dennard scaling motivate the design of more exotic microarchitectural optimizations to extract more performance -- further exacerbating the security vulnerabilities. The performance optimizations often focus on sharing or re-using of hardware components within a processor, between different users or programs. Because of the sharing of the hardware, unintentional information leakage channels, through the shared components, can be created. Microarchitectural attacks, such as the high-profile Spectre and Meltdown attacks or the cache covert channels that they leverage, have demonstrated major vulnerabilities of modern computer architectures due to the microarchitectural~optimizations. Key components of processor microarchitectures are processor caches used for achieving high memory bandwidth and low latency for frequently accessed data. With frequently accessed data being brought and stored in caches, memory latency can be significantly reduced when data is fetched from the cache, as opposed to being fetched from the main memory. With limited processor chip area, however, the cache size cannot be very large. Thus, modern processors adopt a cache hierarchy with multiple levels of caches, where the cache close to processor is faster but smaller, and the cache far from processor is slower but larger. This leads to a fundamental property of modern processors: {\em the latency of accessing data in different cache levels and in main memory is different}. As a result, the timing of memory operations when fetching data from different cache levels, e.g., the timing of fetching data from closest-to-processor L1 cache vs. from main memory, can reveal secret-dependent information if attacker is able to observe the timing of these accesses and correlate them to the operation of the victim\u27s code. Further, due to limited size of the caches, memory accesses by a victim may displace attacker\u27s data from the cache, and with knowledge, or reverse-engineering, of the cache architecture, the attacker can learn some information about victim\u27s data based on the modifications to the state of the cache -- which can be observed by the timing~measurements. Caches are not only structures in the processor that can suffer from security vulnerabilities. As an essential mechanism to achieving high performance, cache-like structures are used pervasively in various processor components, such as the translation lookaside buffer (TLB) and processor frontend. Consequently, the vulnerabilities due to timing differences of accessing data in caches or cache-like structures affect many components of the~processor. The main goal of this dissertation is the {\em design of high performance and secure computer architectures}. Since the sophisticated hardware components such as caches, TLBs, value predictors, and processor frontend are critical to ensure high performance, realizing this goal requires developing fundamental techniques to guarantee security in the presence of timing differences of different processor operations. Furthermore, effective defence mechanisms can be only developed after developing a formal and systematic understanding of all the possible attacks that timing side-channels can lead to. To realize the research goals, the main main contributions of this dissertation~are: \begin{itemize}[noitemsep] \item Design and evaluation of a novel three-step cache timing model to understand theoretical vulnerabilities in caches \item Development of a benchmark suite that can test if processor caches or secure cache designs are vulnerable to certain theoretical vulnerabilities. \item Development of a timing vulnerability model to test TLBs and design of hardware defenses for the TLBs to address newly found vulnerabilities. \item Analysis of value predictor attacks and design of defenses for value predictors. \item Evaluation of vulnerabilities in processor frontends based on timing differences in the operation of the frontends. \item Development of a design-time security verification framework for secure processor architectures, using information flow tracking methods. \end{itemize} \newpage This dissertation combines the theoretical modeling and practical benchmarking analysis to help evaluate susceptibility of different architectures and microarchitectures to timing attacks on caches, TLBs, value predictors and processor frontend. Although cache timing side-channel attacks have been studied for more than a decade, there is no evidence that the previously-known attacks exhaustively cover all possible attacks. One of the initial research directions covered by this dissertation was to develop a model for cache timing attacks, which can help lead towards discovering all possible cache timing attacks. The proposed three-step cache timing vulnerability model provides a means to enumerate all possible interactions between the victim and attacker who are sharing a cache-like structure, producing the complete set of theoretical timing vulnerabilities. This dissertation also covers new theoretical cache timing attacks that are unknown prior to being found by the model. To make the advances in security not only theoretical, this dissertation also covers design of a benchmarking suite that runs on commodity processors and helps evaluate their cache\u27s susceptibility to attacks, as well as can run on simulators to test potential or future cache designs. As the dissertation later demonstrates, the three-step timing vulnerability model can be naturally applied to any cache-like structures such as TLBs, and the dissertation encompasses a three-step model for TLBs, uncovering of theoretical new TLB attacks, and proposals for defenses. Building on success of analyzing caches and TLBs for new timing attacks, this dissertation then discusses follow-on research on evaluation and uncovering of new timing vulnerabilities in processor frontends. Since security analysis should be applied not just to existing processor microarchitectural features, the dissertation further analyzes possible future features such as value predictors. Although not currently in use, value predictors are actively being researched and proposed for addition into future microarchitectures. This dissertation shows, however, that they are vulnerable to attacks. Lastly, based on findings of the security issues with existing and proposed processor features, this dissertation explores how to better design secure processors from ground up, and presents a design-time security verification framework for secure processor architectures, using information flow tracking methods
PThammer: Cross-User-Kernel-Boundary Rowhammer through Implicit Accesses
Rowhammer is a hardware vulnerability in DRAM memory, where repeated access
to memory can induce bit flips in neighboring memory locations. Being a
hardware vulnerability, rowhammer bypasses all of the system memory protection,
allowing adversaries to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of data.
Rowhammer attacks have shown to enable privilege escalation, sandbox escape,
and cryptographic key disclosures. Recently, several proposals suggest
exploiting the spatial proximity between the accessed memory location and the
location of the bit flip for a defense against rowhammer. These all aim to deny
the attacker's permission to access memory locations near sensitive data. In
this paper, we question the core assumption underlying these defenses. We
present PThammer, a confused-deputy attack that causes accesses to memory
locations that the attacker is not allowed to access. Specifically, PThammer
exploits the address translation process of modern processors, inducing the
processor to generate frequent accesses to protected memory locations. We
implement PThammer, demonstrating that it is a viable attack, resulting in a
system compromise (e.g., kernel privilege escalation). We further evaluate the
effectiveness of proposed software-only defenses showing that PThammer can
overcome those.Comment: Preprint of the work accepted at the International Symposium on
Microarchitecture (MICRO) 2020. arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:1912.0307
- …