Dynamical principles in neuroscience

Dynamical modeling of neural systems and brain functions has a history of success over the last half century. This includes, for example, the explanation and prediction of some features of neural rhythmic behaviors. Many interesting dynamical models of learning and memory based on physiological experiments have been suggested over the last two decades. Dynamical models even of consciousness now exist. Usually these models and results are based on traditional approaches and paradigms of nonlinear dynamics including dynamical chaos. Neural systems are, however, an unusual subject for nonlinear dynamics for several reasons: (i) Even the simplest neural network, with only a few neurons and synaptic connections, has an enormous number of variables and control parameters. These make neural systems adaptive and flexible, and are critical to their biological function. (ii) In contrast to traditional physical systems described by well-known basic principles, first principles governing the dynamics of neural systems are unknown. (iii) Many different neural systems exhibit similar dynamics despite having different architectures and different levels of complexity. (iv) The network architecture and connection strengths are usually not known in detail and therefore the dynamical analysis must, in some sense, be probabilistic. (v) Since nervous systems are able to organize behavior based on sensory inputs, the dynamical modeling of these systems has to explain the transformation of temporal information into combinatorial or combinatorial-temporal codes, and vice versa, for memory and recognition. In this review these problems are discussed in the context of addressing the stimulating questions: What can neuroscience learn from nonlinear dynamics, and what can nonlinear dynamics learn from neuroscience?This work was supported by NSF Grant No. NSF/EIA-0130708, and Grant No. PHY 0414174; NIH Grant No. 1 R01 NS50945 and Grant No. NS40110; MEC BFI2003-07276, and Fundación BBVA

Computational physics of the mind

In the XIX century and earlier such physicists as Newton, Mayer, Hooke, Helmholtz and Mach were actively engaged in the research on psychophysics, trying to relate psychological sensations to intensities of physical stimuli. Computational physics allows to simulate complex neural processes giving a chance to answer not only the original psychophysical questions but also to create models of mind. In this paper several approaches relevant to modeling of mind are outlined. Since direct modeling of the brain functions is rather limited due to the complexity of such models a number of approximations is introduced. The path from the brain, or computational neurosciences, to the mind, or cognitive sciences, is sketched, with emphasis on higher cognitive functions such as memory and consciousness. No fundamental problems in understanding of the mind seem to arise. From computational point of view realistic models require massively parallel architectures