A Model for Access Negotiations in Dynamic Coalitions

The process of negotiating common access states in dynamic coalitions that comprise tens of autonomous domains sharing hundreds of resources is time-consuming and error-prone if performed without the benefit of automated tools. This process is also repetitive since, during the lifetime of a dynamic coalition, member domains must undertake the task of negotiating common access states multiple times as domains leave and new ones join the coalition. To define and verify the correctness of tools for automated negotiation, we develop a formal state-transition model of the process of negotiating a common access state. We extend an existing Role Based Access Control (RBAC) language to illustrate a wide variety of negotiation constraints and present a resolution procedure for verifying the satisfaction of such constraints in the state-transition model

Coalition Formation Games for Collaborative Spectrum Sensing

Collaborative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) between secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks exhibits an inherent tradeoff between minimizing the probability of missing the detection of the primary user (PU) and maintaining a reasonable false alarm probability (e.g., for maintaining a good spectrum utilization). In this paper, we study the impact of this tradeoff on the network structure and the cooperative incentives of the SUs that seek to cooperate for improving their detection performance. We model the CSS problem as a non-transferable coalitional game, and we propose distributed algorithms for coalition formation. First, we construct a distributed coalition formation (CF) algorithm that allows the SUs to self-organize into disjoint coalitions while accounting for the CSS tradeoff. Then, the CF algorithm is complemented with a coalitional voting game for enabling distributed coalition formation with detection probability guarantees (CF-PD) when required by the PU. The CF-PD algorithm allows the SUs to form minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), i.e., coalitions that achieve the target detection probability with minimal costs. For both algorithms, we study and prove various properties pertaining to network structure, adaptation to mobility and stability. Simulation results show that CF reduces the average probability of miss per SU up to 88.45% relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining a desired false alarm. For CF-PD, the results show that up to 87.25% of the SUs achieve the required detection probability through MWCComment: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, to appea

Multilateral negotiations over climate change policy

Negotiations in the real world have many features which tend to be ignored inpolicy modeling. They are often multilateral, involving many negotiating parties with preferences over outcomes that can differ substantially. They are also often multi-dimensional,in the sense that several policies are negotiated over simultaneously. Trade negotiations are a prime example, as are negotiations over environmental policies toabate carbon dioxide. We demonstrate how one can formally model this type of negotiation process. We use a policy-oriented computable general equilibrium model to generate preference functions which are then used in a formal multilateral bargaining game. The case study is to climate change policy, but the main contribution is to demonstrate how one can integrate formal economic models of the impacts of policies with formal bargaining models of the negotiations over those policies.CGE, bilateral bargaining, CO2, Climate Change

Willingness to pay and the sovereign debt contract

This paper uses a contract theory model to argue that covenants ruling debt renegotiations are important to assure the sovereign willingness to pay. The model includes the following features: first, collective action clauses, exit consents, aggregation provisions and pari passu clauses play an important role in the post default “game” of negotiations and coalitions. These covenants are represented in reduced form by the endogenous probability of refinancing a defaulted sovereign debt. Second, the model has “endogenous bad luck” because the unfavorable state of nature where default occurs depends on the level of indebtedness, which is itself an endogenous variable. Third, “vultures”, contrary to conventional wisdom, tend to improve the access of emerging economies to capital markets because they might help to rule out strategic defaults. And fourth, under special assumptions the model is able to analyze the possibility of post default discrimination between domestic and foreign bondholders.debt, default, negotiation, vultures, Shapley-values

Civil society in trade policy-making in Latin America: the case of the environmental movement

In recent years, and particularly perhaps since the ‘battle of Seattle’ in 1999, the issue of civil society participation in trade policy has attracted increasing policy and academic attention. Much of this attention has been drawn to the question of institutional access and channels of participation and representation within the WTO. The challenge is one that has faced other global institutions such as the World Bank and IMF for a number of years (O’Brien et al 2000). Improving the transparency of and access to decision-making in the context of up-scaling civil society participation is not exclusively a global challenge, however. There has been a great deal of activity at the regional level around trade negotiations and increasingly in Latin America with the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) following in the wake of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur). Few institutional reforms have been brought about without significant pressure from civil society, however. Some challenges are common to all movements attempting to participate and make their voice heard in the sensitive and traditionally closed arena of trade negotiations. But others are unique, and reflect distinct regional political histories, previous experiences of mobilisation and prevailing social and material realities. Given this, it becomes important to understand what can be learned from the experience of a globally significant region like Latin America about the possibilities and limitations of civil society participation in trade policy. By comparing the documented experiences of NAFTA with analysis of Mercosur and the evolving FTAA negotiations, in terms of the participation of the environmental movements, important insights may be gained about: who is participating in trade policy, how and with what effect and, equally importantly, who is not participating and what are the implications of this? The analysis will therefore attempt to identify key factors which shape these dynamics. These include; * key strategic issues within the movements and among groups themselves (diversity of strategies, politics of coalition-building, patterns of influence and engagement/non-engagement) * the organisation of institutional access (rights, representation, process, decision-making) * key economic and political regional dynamics which affect each of the above (differences between and within individual countries regarding key issues and attitudes towards participation) By comparing across different sets of trade negotiations and institutional arrangements it will be possible to identify what the key drivers and shapers of change appear to be. In other words, the extent to which these appear to derive from the nature of the institution or process itself, the strategies of the movement engaging with it, or more likely still, some combination of both these elements. The challenge is to account for diverse forms of engagement and non-engagement and, more importantly, to derive lessons from them about the possibility of constructing more effective, sustainable and transparent mechanisms of participation and representation in trade policy based on experiences to date in Latin America

Bargaining Coalitions in the Agricultural Negotiations of the Doha Round: Similarity of Interests or Strategic Choices? An Empirical Assessment

The paper aims at understanding the structural features of the bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor looking at general economics indicators, development levels, structure of the agricultural sectors, and trade policies for agricultural products. Bargaining coalitions are analyzed by grouping countries through a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions, in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the detection of possible “defectors”, i.e. countries that according to their economic conditions and policies seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join.Agricultural trade negotiations, Bargaining coalitions, WTO, Cluster analysis

Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game

We analyse a two period model of the interbank market, i.e. the market at which banks trade liquidity. We assume that banks do not take the inter- bank interest rate as given, but multilaterally negotiate on interest rates and transaction volumes. The solution concept applied is the Shapley value. We show that there is a multiplicity of average equilibrium interest rates of the first period so that the average interest rate in this period does not convey any information on the expected liquidity situation at the interbank market. -- Wir analysieren ein Zwei-Perioden-Modell des Interbankenmarktes, d. h. des Marktes an dem Banken untereinander Liquidität handeln. Wir nehmen an, dass die Banken den Zinssatz am Interbankenmarkt nicht als exogen betrachten, sondern Zinssätze und Transaktionsvolumen in multilateralen Verhandlungen festlegen. Als Gleichgewichtskonzept dient der Shapley-Wert. Wir zeigen, dass der durchschnittliche Zinssatz der ersten Periode im Gleichgewicht nicht eindeutig ist und daher keine Informationen über die erwartete Liquiditätssituation am Interbankenmarkt enthält.

Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Algorithm for Computations

New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination.Design of climate treaty protocol, Coalition formation, Non-cooperative game theory

Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real-life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (e.g. climate change control). What factors determine the outcome of negotiations such as those mentioned above? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on a non-cooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, non-cooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connection among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate the progress towards a unified framework.Negotiation theory, Bragaining, Coalitions, Fairness, Agreements