Between the Two Images: Reconciling the Scientific and Manifest Images

The paper bridges between a science-based metamathematical model of emerging truth and truth emerging from inquiry within ordinary contexts of argumentation. This requires that the underlying intuitions driving the notion of truth in the scientific image be made clear and analogues identified in a manner that permits their application within the ordinary contexts found in the manifest image

Two Contrasting Cultures

I have argued that argumentation theorists should concern themselves with scientific argument as a source for images of epistemic virtue in argument. In this paper I will contrast the lessons learned from this endeavour with their counterpart in the evaluation of political arguments. Despite obvious differences, fundamental symmetries between the two argumentation cultures point to the need for a more serious engagement with rigorous disciplinary arguments in argument theory

Emerging truth and the defeat of scientific racism

This paper looks at the attack on scientific racism in the 20th century by a group of social and biological scientists. I will utilize the apparatus of my model of emerging truth to show how even in complex socially conditioned argumentation the ultimate virtue is seeking the truth through increasingly powerful logical connections and deeply embedded warrants

Warranting evidence in diverse evidentiary settings

Informal logic, is faced with the problematic of persuasive arguments in contexts where evidence is rich, diverse and preferentially selected on the basis of pre-established attitudes. This requires that the standard view of challenge by presenting inconsistent evidence be rethought. In this paper, I will argue that the solution is to focus less on evidence that contradicts claims and to confront the network of warrants that support the selecting and evaluating of evidentiary moves

Retórica, dialéctica o pragmática: a 50 años de "Los usos de la argumentación" de Stephen Toulmin

Stephen Toulmin published The Uses of Argument in 1958, a book dedicated to discussing the epistemological dimension of behavioral sciences, such as psychology, anthropology, and sociology, by means of an analytical overview in which the argumentative and linguistic realms are the main ones. Fifty years after its publication there is no consensus amongst argumentation scholars and discourse analysts regarding the core emphasis of this text that, besides Chäim Perelman’s work, opened the door to the contemporary studies of argumentative discourse. In this paper the three principal angles from which this book has been mainly analyzed are discussed: rhetoric, dialectics, and pragmatics. By making a constant parallel between Toulmin’s texts and the distinctions of contemporary critics, this paper dismisses the idea that this book has a rhetorical face, that the book contains enough evidence to define it as dialectical and undermines the opinion which invites reading Toulmin’s book in a complete pragmatic sense.Stephen Toulmin publicó en 1958 The Uses of Argument, un libro dedicado a discutir la dimensión epistemológica de las ciencias del comportamiento, como la psicología, la antropología, o la sociología, de la mano de un desglose analítico en que las esferas argumentativa y lingüística eran protagonistas. Cincuenta años después, entre los teóricos de la argumentación y los analistas del discurso, aun no hay consenso respecto de cuál es el alcance de su obra que, junto a la de Chäim Perelman, se puede decir con justicia abrió la puerta a los estudios del discurso argumentativo. En este trabajo se discute los tres ángulos principales desde los que se ha tendido a interpretar este texto: retórica, dialéctica y pragmática. Haciendo un paralelo constante entre las obras del propio Toulmin y las distinciones de los críticos contemporáneos, este trabajo, primero, descarta que este libro tenga un cariz retórico; descarta también que haya señas suficientes para catalogarlo como dialéctico; y desestima la opinión que insta a leer este escrito en clave enteramente pragmática

Argumentation and the Force of Reasons

Argumentation involves offering and/or exchanging reasons—either reasons for adopting various attitudes towards specific propositional contents or else reasons for acting in various ways. This paper develops the idea that the force of reasons is through and through a normative force because what good reasons accomplish is precisely to make one entitled to do what they are reasons for. The paper attempts to shed light on what it is to have a reason, how the entitlement arising from reasons differs from other species of entitlement and how the norms by which such entitlement is assessed obtain their status as norms

How do students know they are right and how does one research it?

Although standards of rigor in mathematics are subject to debate among philosophers, mathematicians and educators, proof remains fundamental to mathematics and distinguishes mathematics from other sciences. There is no doubt that the ability to appreciate, understand and construct proofs is necessary for students at all levels, in particular for students in advanced undergraduate and graduate mathematics courses. However, studies show that learning and teaching proof may be problematic and students experience difficulties in mathematical reasoning and proving. This thesis is influenced by Lakatos’ (1976) view of mathematics as a ‘quasi-empirical’ science and the role of experimentation in mathematicians’ practice. The purpose of this thesis was to gain insight into undergraduate students’ ways of validating the results of their mathematical thinking. How do they know that they are right? While working on my research, I also faced methodological difficulties. In the thesis, I included my earliest experiences as a novice researcher in mathematics education and described the process of choosing, testing and adapting a theoretical framework for analyzing a set of MAST 217 (Introduction to Mathematical Thinking) students’ solutions of a problem involving investigation. The adjusted CPiMI (Cognitive Processes in Mathematical Investigation, Yeo, 2017) model allowed me to analyze students’ solutions and draw conclusions about the ways they solve the problem and justify their results. Also I placed the result of this study in the context of previous research