56,662 research outputs found
Mechanism Design Approach for Energy Efficiency
In this work we deploy a mechanism design approach for allocating a divisible
commodity (electricity in our example) among consumers. We consider each
consumer with an associated personal valuation function of the energy resource
during a certain time interval. We aim to select the optimal consumption
profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required
energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive
users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. We start
by presenting a very basic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we discuss its
weakness and propose several more complex variants.Comment: Techical repor
An Exchange Mechanism to Coordinate Flexibility in Residential Energy Cooperatives
Energy cooperatives (ECs) such as residential and industrial microgrids have
the potential to mitigate increasing fluctuations in renewable electricity
generation, but only if their joint response is coordinated. However, the
coordination and control of independently operated flexible resources (e.g.,
storage, demand response) imposes critical challenges arising from the
heterogeneity of the resources, conflict of interests, and impact on the grid.
Correspondingly, overcoming these challenges with a general and fair yet
efficient exchange mechanism that coordinates these distributed resources will
accommodate renewable fluctuations on a local level, thereby supporting the
energy transition. In this paper, we introduce such an exchange mechanism. It
incorporates a payment structure that encourages prosumers to participate in
the exchange by increasing their utility above baseline alternatives. The
allocation from the proposed mechanism increases the system efficiency
(utilitarian social welfare) and distributes profits more fairly (measured by
Nash social welfare) than individual flexibility activation. A case study
analyzing the mechanism performance and resulting payments in numerical
experiments over real demand and generation profiles of the Pecan Street
dataset elucidates the efficacy to promote cooperation between co-located
flexibilities in residential cooperatives through local exchange.Comment: Accepted in IEEE ICIT 201
Design for Optimized Multi-Lateral Multi-Commodity Markets
In this paper, we propose a design for an an economically efficient, optimized, centralized, multi-lateral, periodic commodity market that addresses explicitly three issues: (i) substantial transportation costs between sellers and buyers; (ii) non homogeneous, in quality and nature, commodities; (iii) complementary commodities that have to be traded simultaneously. The model allows sellers to offer their commodities in lots and buyers to explicitly quantify the differences in quality of the goods produced by each individual seller. The model does not presume that products must be shipped through a market hub. We also propose a multi-round auction that enables the implementation of the direct optimized market and approximates the behaviour of the "ideal" direct optimized mechanism. The process allows buyers and sellers to modify their initial bids, including the technological constraints. The proposed market designs are particularly relevant for industries related to natural resources. We present the models and algorithms required to implement the optimized market mechanisms, describe the operations of the multi-round auction, and discuss applications and perspectives. Nous présentons un concept de marché optimisé, centralisé, multilatéral et périodique pour l'acquisition de produits qui traite explicitement les trois aspects suivants: (i) des coûts de transport importants des vendeurs vers les acheteurs; (ii) des produits non homogènes en valeur et qualité; des complémentarités entre les divers produits qui doivent donc être négociés simultanément. Le modèle permet aux vendeurs d'offrir leurs produits groupés en lots et aux acheteurs de quantifier explicitement leur évaluation des lots mis sur le marché par chaque vendeur. Le modèle ne suppose pas que les produits doivent être expédiés par un centre avant d'être livrés. Nous proposons également un mécanisme de tâtonnement à rondes multiples qui approxime le comportement du marché direct optimisé et qui permet de mettre ce dernier en oeuvre. Le processus de tâtonnement permet aux vendeurs et aux acheteurs de modifier leurs mises initiales, incluant les contraintes technologiques. Les concepts proposés sont particulièrement adaptés aux industries reliées aux matières premières. Nous présentons les modèles et algorithmes requis à la mise en oeuvre du marché multi-latéral optimisé, nous décrivons le fonctionnement du processus de tâtonnement, et nous discutons les applications et perspectives reliées à ces mécanismes de marché.Market design, optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets, multi-round auctions, Design de marché, marché multi-latéraux optimisés, processus de tâtonnement
Power Load Management as a Computational Market
Power load management enables energy utilities to reduce peak loads and thereby save money. Due to the large number of different loads, power load management is a complicated optimization problem. We present a new decentralized approach to this problem by modeling direct load management as a computational market. Our simulation results demonstrate that our approach is very efficient with a superlinear rate of convergence to equilibrium and an excellent scalability, requiring few iterations even when the number of agents is in the order of one thousand. Aframework for analysis of this and similar problems is given which shows how nonlinear optimization and numerical mathematics can be exploited to characterize, compare, and tailor problem-solving strategies in market-oriented programming
Combining Spot and Futures Markets: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access
Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization
and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit
opportunistically the under-utilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a
widely-used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and,
hence, achieves the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources.
In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid secondary spectrum market
consisting of both the futures market and the spot market, in which SUs
(buyers) purchase under-utilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator,
either through predefined contracts via the futures market, or through spot
transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum allocation
among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum
utilization efficiency. The problem is challenging due to the stochasticity and
asymmetry of network information. To solve this problem, we first derive an
off-line optimal allocation policy that maximizes the ex-ante expected spectrum
utilization efficiency based on the stochastic distribution of network
information. We then propose an on-line VickreyCClarkeCGroves (VCG) auction
that determines the real-time allocation and pricing of every spectrum based on
the realized network information and the pre-derived off-line policy. We
further show that with the spatial frequency reuse, the proposed VCG auction is
NP-hard; hence, it is not suitable for on-line implementation, especially in a
large-scale market. To this end, we propose a heuristics approach based on an
on-line VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further
characterize the corresponding performance loss bound analytically. We finally
provide extensive numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed
solutions.Comment: This manuscript is the complete technical report for the journal
version published in INFORMS Operations Researc
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