Neurons and symbols: a manifesto

We discuss the purpose of neural-symbolic integration including its principles, mechanisms and applications. We outline a cognitive computational model for neural-symbolic integration, position the model in the broader context of multi-agent systems, machine learning and automated reasoning, and list some of the challenges for the area of neural-symbolic computation to achieve the promise of effective integration of robust learning and expressive reasoning under uncertainty

Neural implementation of psychological spaces

Psychological spaces give natural framework for construction of mental representations. Neural model of psychological spaces provides a link between neuroscience and psychology. Categorization performed in high-dimensional spaces by dynamical associative memory models is approximated with low-dimensional feedforward neural models calculating probability density functions in psychological spaces. Applications to the human categorization experiments are discussed

Are there optical communication channels in the brain?

Despite great progress in neuroscience, there are still fundamental unanswered questions about the brain, including the origin of subjective experience and consciousness. Some answers might rely on new physical mechanisms. Given that biophotons have been discovered in the brain, it is interesting to explore if neurons use photonic communication in addition to the well-studied electro-chemical signals. Such photonic communication in the brain would require waveguides. Here we review recent work [S. Kumar, K. Boone, J. Tuszynski, P. Barclay, and C. Simon, Scientific Reports 6, 36508 (2016)] suggesting that myelinated axons could serve as photonic waveguides. The light transmission in the myelinated axon was modeled, taking into account its realistic imperfections, and experiments were proposed both in-vivo and in-vitro to test this hypothesis. Potential implications for quantum biology are discussed.Comment: 13 pages, 5 figures, review of arXiv:1607.02969 for Frontiers in Bioscience, updated figures, new references on existence of opsins in the brain and experimental effects of light on neuron

Extending Tlusty's method to the glycome: Tuning the repertoire of glycan determinants

We apply Tlusty's information-theoretic analysis of the genetic code to the glycome, using a cognitive paradigm in which external information sources constrain and tune the glycan code error network, in the context of available metabolic energy. The resulting dynamic model suggests the possibility of observing spontaneous symmetry breaking of the glycan code as a function of metabolic energy intensity. These effects may be currently present, or embedded in evolutionary trajectory, recording large-scale ecosystem resilience shifts in energy availability such as the aerobic transition

Culture and generalized inattentional blindness

A recent mathematical treatment of Baars' Global Workspace consciousness model, much in the spirit of Dretske's communication theory analysis of high level mental function, is used to study the effects of embedding cultural heritage on a generalized form of inattentional blindness. Culture should express itself quite distinctly in this basic psychophysical phenomenon, acting across a variety of sensory and other modalities, because the limited syntactic and grammatical 'bandpass' of the topological rate distortion manifold characterizing conscious attention is itself strongly sculpted by the constraints of cultural context

Institutional Cognition

We generalize a recent mathematical analysis of Bernard Baars' model of human consciousness to explore analogous, but far more complicated, phenomena of institutional cognition. Individual consciousness is limited to a single, tunable, giant component of interacting cogntivie modules, instantiating a Global Workspace. Human institutions, by contrast, seem able to multitask, supporting several such giant components simultaneously, although their behavior remains constrained to a topology generated by cultural context and by the path-dependence inherent to organizational history. Surprisingly, such multitasking, while clearly limiting the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, does not eliminate it. This suggests that organizations (or machines) explicitly designed along these principles, while highly efficient at certain sets of tasks, would still be subject to analogs of the subtle failure patterns explored in Wallace (2005b, 2006). We compare and contrast our results with recent work on collective efficacy and collective consciousness