Qafny: Quantum Program Verification Through Type-guided Classical Separation Logic

Formal verification has been proven instrumental to ensure that quantum programs implement their specifications but often requires a significant investment of time and labor. To address this challenge, we present Qafny, an automated proof system designed for verifying quantum programs. At its core, Qafny uses a type-guided quantum proof system that translates quantum operations to classical array operations. By modeling these operations as proof rules within a classical separation logic framework, Qafny automates much of the traditionally tedious and time-consuming reasoning process. We prove the soundness and completeness of our proof system and implement a prototype compiler that transforms Qafny programs both into the Dafny programming language and into executable quantum circuits. Using Qafny, we demonstrate how to efficiently verify important quantum algorithms, including quantum-walk algorithms, Grover's search algorithm, and Shor's factoring algorithm, with significantly reduced human effort.Comment: Version

Reachability and Termination Analysis of Concurrent Quantum Programs

We introduce a Markov chain model of concurrent quantum programs. This model is a quantum generalization of Hart, Sharir and Pnueli's probabilistic concurrent programs. Some characterizations of the reachable space, uniformly repeatedly reachable space and termination of a concurrent quantum program are derived by the analysis of their mathematical structures. Based on these characterizations, algorithms for computing the reachable space and uniformly repeatedly reachable space and for deciding the termination are given.Comment: Accepted by Concur'12. Comments are welcom

Symbolic Abstractions for Quantum Protocol Verification

Quantum protocols such as the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol exchange qubits to achieve information-theoretic security guarantees. Many variants thereof were proposed, some of them being already deployed. Existing security proofs in that field are mostly tedious, error-prone pen-and-paper proofs of the core protocol only that rarely account for other crucial components such as authentication. This calls for formal and automated verification techniques that exhaustively explore all possible intruder behaviors and that scale well. The symbolic approach offers rigorous, mathematical frameworks and automated tools to analyze security protocols. Based on well-designed abstractions, it has allowed for large-scale formal analyses of real-life protocols such as TLS 1.3 and mobile telephony protocols. Hence a natural question is: Can we use this successful line of work to analyze quantum protocols? This paper proposes a first positive answer and motivates further research on this unexplored path

Fifty years of Hoare's Logic

We present a history of Hoare's logic.Comment: 79 pages. To appear in Formal Aspects of Computin