European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion). --European Union,comitology,principal-agent-relationship,structure-induced agent discretion

European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).

The Expansion of Fishery Jurisdiction: Fishery Interests and Congressional Voting

The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 greatly broadened the scope of U.S. fishery regulation. While the act contained a variety of features, its primary and certainly most controversial provision expanded the regulated fishing zone from 12 to 200 miles. This paper identifies the primary gainers and losers from the act and assesses their roles in influencing the legislative outcome. The voting behavior of congressional representatives is analyzed by multivariate probit analysis in order to quantify the influences of the major lobbying groups.Environmental Economics and Policy, International Relations/Trade, Political Economy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Voters, legislators and bureaucracy: Institutional design in the public sector

The purpose of this paper is to outline a theory of representative democracy which explains why rational actors construct an excessively bureaucratized government. We define excessive bureaucratization as the selection of an inefficient production technology for the public sector, characterized by relative factor proportions that entail more bureaucracy than the proportions that would minimize total costs. Thus, the question of excessive bureaucracy is related to but conceptually different from whether a particular policy is worthwhile. Furthermore, it presumes a concern more fundamental than the observation that implementing a public policy inevitably requires the expenditure of scarce resources

Essays on the political economy of state government saving and the role of budget stabilization funds

This dissertation explores the saving behavior of state governments in the context of the ability of states to weather recessionary periods. The first chapter of the dissertation discusses the role of savings as a policy option for state decision-makers in light of the fiscal constraints facing state governments, reviews the previous literature that has examined the savings behavior of state governments, and outlines the research agenda for the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides statistics on the post-World War II savings of states to explore recent trends in their savings behavior and discusses the data employed in the dissertation. The third chapter examines an implication of the common pool problem associated with public sector savings by investigating how anticipated future changes in the controlling parties of states\u27 legislatures affect the current level of saving. The results provide evidence that state saving is adversely impacted by future changes in controlling political parties, suggesting that politically unstable states may be ill-prepared to deal with recessions relative to politically stable states. Chapter 4 of the dissertation examines the role that political stability and other factors have had on states\u27 choices to adopt budget stabilization funds. The results provide evidence that states which have experienced more long-term political instability, have been severely hit by recessions, and have expenditure and/or tax limitation laws in place, are more likely to adopt a budget stabilization fund as an additional vehicle for saving. The final research chapter of the dissertation investigates the effectiveness of budget stabilization funds by examining how states\u27 savings behavior has changed as a result of utilizing budget stabilization funds. The results from this chapter provide evidence that budget stabilization funds governed by explicit deposit and withdrawal rules can assist state decision-makers in saving and thus enhance a state\u27s ability to mitigate recessions in the future. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the dissertation and discusses areas of future research investigating state saving and budget stabilization funds

Sharing Islamic punishment criteria (based on jurisprudence)

The recognition of sharing Islamic punishment criteria is based on understanding the basic and Islamic law criterion, which is basis of mischief disposal Islamic law. Attracting human interest criteria and mentioned criterion is the basis of canonization of all decrees including the Islamic punishment so that it can be human's benevolence-oriented. Mercy and attracting interest to men, and disposal of mischief, refining and purification of the offender and excommunication from crime, consideration of proportionality between the losses and punishment based on  punishment  proportionality with  damage to the victim due to the severity of the injury and social benefits  as well as the importance of committed crime by considering the proportionality with crime and personality characteristics of offender and the victim's fault are criteria that in canonization of punishment have been considered of legislator

Institutional Problems of Spatial Policy during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Polish Case

The COVID-19 pandemic and its economic consequences have caused several repercussions in various spheres, including real estate management and spatial policy. In Poland, public authorities (the government) was triggered to develop the so-called "Anti-Crisis Shields", a legal act introducing transitional solutions to various spheres of life. Some provisions also covered the sphere related to spatial policy. Consequently, new dilemmas have arisen regarding the way of applying spatial policy tools in the new situation. The article aims to isolate and evaluate new conditions and dilemmas related to spatial policy tools in the Polish spatial management system. After a brief description of Poland's spatial management system and its main problems, attention was paid to: (1) the emerging dilemma of what is more important in the conditions of a pandemic: the speed of planning processes or protection of critical values in the spatial management system; (2) new directions of activities related to the use of spatial policy tools, especially in the context of ensuring social distance and more comprehensive health protection; and (3) new conditions for public participation.  Based on the analysis, a new direction of spatial policy changes caused by the pandemic crisis was proposed. The investigation covers a new problem of public authorities' inefficiency during a pandemic. From this perspective, we evaluated the spatial planning legislation introduced during the COVID-19 in detail