Selfish grids: Game-theoretic modeling and NAS/PSA benchmark evaluation

Selfish behaviors of individual machines in a Grid can potentially damage the performance of the system as a whole. However, scrutinizing the Grid by taking into account the noncooperativeness of machines is a largely unexplored research problem. In this paper, we first present a new hierarchical game-theoretic model of the Grid that matches well with the physical administrative structure in real-life situations. We then focus on the impact of selfishness in intrasite job execution mechanisms. Based on our novel utility functions, we analytically derive the Nash equilibrium and optimal strategies for the general case. To study the effects of different strategies, we have also performed extensive simulations by using a well-known practical scheduling algorithm over the NAS (Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation) and the PSA (Parameter Sweep Application) workloads. We have studied the overall job execution performance of the Grid system under a wide range of parameters. Specifically, we find that the Optimal selfish strategy significantly outperforms the Nash selfish strategy. Our performance evaluation results can serve as a valuable reference for designing appropriate strategies in a practical Grid. © 2007 IEEE.published_or_final_versio

A game-theoretic and hybrid genetic meta-heuristics model for security-assured scheduling of independent jobs in computational grids

Scheduling independent tasks in Computational Grids commonly arises in many Grid-enabled large scale applications. Much of current research in this domain is focused on the improvement of the efficiency of the Grid schedulers, both at global and local levels, which is the basis for Grid systems to leverage large computing capacities. However, unlike traditional scheduling, in Grid systems security requirements are very important to scheduling tasks/applications to Grid resources. The objective is thus to achieve efficient and secure allocation of tasks to machines. In this paper we propose a new model for secure scheduling at the Grid sites by combining game-theoretic and genetic-based meta-heuristic approaches. The game-theoretic model takes into account the realistic feature that Grid users usually perform independently of each other. The scheduling problem is then formalized as a noncooperative non-zero sum game with Nash equilibria as the solutions. The game cost function is minimized, at global and user levels, by using four genetic-based hybrid meta-heuristics. We have evaluated the proposed model through a static benchmark of instances, for which we have measured two basic metrics, namely the makespan and flowtime. The obtained results suggest that it is more resilient for the Grid users (and local schedulers) to tolerate some job delays defined as additional scheduling cost due to security requirements instead of taking a risk of allocating at unreliable resources.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Achieving an optimal trade-off between revenue and energy peak within a smart grid environment

We consider an energy provider whose goal is to simultaneously set revenue-maximizing prices and meet a peak load constraint. In our bilevel setting, the provider acts as a leader (upper level) that takes into account a smart grid (lower level) that minimizes the sum of users' disutilities. The latter bases its decisions on the hourly prices set by the leader, as well as the schedule preferences set by the users for each task. Considering both the monopolistic and competitive situations, we illustrate numerically the validity of the approach, which achieves an 'optimal' trade-off between three objectives: revenue, user cost, and peak demand

Modelling of user requirements and behaviors in computational grids

In traditional distributed computing systems a few user types are found having ratherPeer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Game-theoretic, market and meta-heuristics approaches for modelling scheduling and resource allocation in grid systems

Task scheduling and resource allocation are the crucial issues in any large scale distributed system, such as Computational Grids (CGs). However, traditional computational models and resolution methods cannot effectively tackle the complex nature of Grid, where the resources and users belong to many administrative domains with their own access policies, users' privileges, etc. Recently, researchers are investigating the use of game theoretic approaches for modelling task and resource allocation problems in CGs. In this paper, we present a compact survey of the most relevant research proposals in the literature to use game-based models for the resource allocation problems and their resolution using metaheuristic methods. We emphasize the need of the translation of the traditional economical models into the game scenarios and the use of metaheuristic schedulers for solving such games in order to address the new complex scheduling and allocation criterions. We study the case of asymmetric Stackelberg game used for modelling the Grid users' behavior, where the security and reliability criterions are aggregated and defined as the users' costs functions. The obtained results show the efficiency of the hybridization of heuristic-based approaches with game models, which enables to include additional requirements and features into the computational models and tackle more effectively the resolution of the applied schedulers.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version