FIVE STEPS TO RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility has entered the academic discourse of logicians hardly more than few decades ago. I suggest a logical concept of responsibility which employs ideas both from a number of theories belonging to different branches of logic as well from other academic areas. As a comment to this concept, I suggest five steps narrative scenario in order to show how the logical dimension of responsibility emerges from diverse tendencies in logic and other sciences. Here are the five steps briefly stated: Step 1. Developing modal formalisms capable of evaluative analysis of situations (deontic, epistemic and etc.). Step 2. Drawing a conceptual borderline between normal and non-normal (weak) logical systems. Step 3. Using different kinds of models. Step 4. Agent- and action- friendly turn in logic. Step 5. Creating formalisms for modeling different types of agency. An idea advocated here within 5-Steps route to responsibility is that this concept is a complex causal and evaluative (axiological) relation. A logical account may be given for causal and normative aspects of this relation. Unfolding the responsibility back and forth through 5 Steps will result in different concepts. The technicalities are minimized for the sake of keeping the philosophical scope of the paper. For the same reason I also refrain from discussing legal and juridical ramifications of the issue

Algebras for Agent Norm-Regulation

An abstract architecture for idealized multi-agent systems whose behaviour is regulated by normative systems is developed and discussed. Agent choices are determined partially by the preference ordering of possible states and partially by normative considerations: The agent chooses that act which leads to the best outcome of all permissible actions. If an action is non-permissible depends on if the result of performing that action leads to a state satisfying a condition which is forbidden, according to the norms regulating the multi-agent system. This idea is formalized by defining set-theoretic predicates characterizing multi-agent systems. The definition of the predicate uses decision theory, the Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions, and an algebraic representation of normative systems.Comment: 25 page

The Current State of Normative Agent-Based Systems

Recent years have seen an increase in the application of ideas from the social sciences to computational systems. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the domain of multiagent systems. Because multiagent systems are composed of multiple individual agents interacting with each other many parallels can be drawn to human and animal societies. One of the main challenges currently faced in multiagent systems research is that of social control. In particular, how can open multiagent systems be configured and organized given their constantly changing structure? One leading solution is to employ the use of social norms. In human societies, social norms are essential to regulation, coordination, and cooperation. The current trend of thinking is that these same principles can be applied to agent societies, of which multiagent systems are one type. In this article, we provide an introduction to and present a holistic viewpoint of the state of normative computing (computational solutions that employ ideas based on social norms.) To accomplish this, we (1) introduce social norms and their application to agent-based systems; (2) identify and describe a normative process abstracted from the existing research; and (3) discuss future directions for research in normative multiagent computing. The intent of this paper is to introduce new researchers to the ideas that underlie normative computing and survey the existing state of the art, as well as provide direction for future research.Norms, Normative Agents, Agents, Agent-Based System, Agent-Based Simulation, Agent-Based Modeling

Ethical arguments for moral principles

Apart from metaethics, in ethics there are arguments of two main levels: 1. application arguments, which apply moral principles to specific (groups of) cases, and 2. justifications of moral principles. A quick analysis shows that application arguments use standard argument schemes (or combinations thereof) as they have been identified by the epistemological approach to argumentation. About arguments for moral principles, however, there is deep dissent. The contribution criticises some of the respective proposals but mainly analyses two promising types: 1. demonstration of adequacy, i.e. establishing and justifying some adequacy conditions and showing that certain moral principles fulfil them; 2. instrumentalist justification, i.e. establishing and justifying the aim or function of morality and showing that certain moral principles, norms etc. are good means to realise this function

Severity-sensitive norm-governed multi-agent planning

This research was funded by Selex ES. The software developed during this research, including the norm analysis and planning algorithms, the simulator and harbour protection scenario used during evaluation is freely available from doi:10.5258/SOTON/D0139Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Uncovering the Moral Heuristics of Altruism: A Philosophical Scale

Extant research suggests that individuals employ traditional moral heuristics to support their observed altruistic behavior; yet findings have largely been limited to inductive extrapolation and rely on relatively few traditional frames in so doing, namely, deontology in organizational behavior and virtue theory in law and economics. Given that these and competing moral frames such as utilitarianism can manifest as identical behavior, we develop a moral framing instrument—the Philosophical Moral-Framing Measure (PMFM)—to expand and distinguish traditional frames associated and disassociated with observed altruistic behavior. The validation of our instrument based on 1015 subjects in 3 separate real stakes scenarios indicates that heuristic forms of deontology, virtue-theory, and utilitarianism are strongly related to such behavior, and that egoism is an inhibitor. It also suggests that deontic and virtue-theoretical frames may be commonly perceived as intertwined and opens the door for new research on self-abnegation, namely, a perceived moral obligation toward suffering and self-denial. These findings hold the potential to inform ongoing conversations regarding organizational citizenship and moral crowding out, namely, how financial incentives can undermine altruistic behavior

Hypothetical Justifications

A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified. Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the concept of 'hypothetical justification' is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics.non-cognitivism, hypothetical norms, hypothetical justification

Public Deliberation and Epistemic Parity in Direct Democracies

In a context of public-policy making, I propose to consider a fundamental norm of epistemic parity as contributing to the justification, the acceptability and the legitimacy of decisions taken through deliberative processes. I also suggest that models of semi-direct democracy, whose constitutional foundations include the possibility of deliberations among all citizens sanctioned by popular votes, promote epistemic parity